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Abstract 
People willingly pay to harm cheats in economic games. Although, punishment 
ostensibly increases cooperation levels, consensus is lacking over when 
punishment can increase individual or group payoffs and what motivates 
punishment decisions. Most previous studies have assumed that all individuals are 
equal. However, in reality individuals often vary in terms of power, such that 
some players are able to inflict a greater cost on their partner than their partner is 
able to reciprocate. I investigated the effect of power asymmetries on cooperation 
and punishment in repeated prisoner's dilemma games with punishment both 
where cooperation investment was binary and where cooperation investment was 
variable. I found that punishment did not promote cooperation from targets in any 
conditions. 
Several studies have suggested that punishment may be motivated by 
disadvantageous inequality aversion. These findings raise the possibility that 
individuals use punishment to restore equality. However, the alternative that 
punishment is simply motivated by a desire for revenge and is not tailored to 
achieve equality, cannot be ruled out. I used a modified dictator game with 
punishment to disentangle these two possibilities. I found evidence that punishment 
was motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for equality. 
Individuals often punish those who deviate from social norms. Why atypical 
behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. 
One possibility is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. Alternatively, 
individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour because the cost of 
punishment generally increases with the number of individuals punished. To test 
these hypotheses, I used a modified public goods game with third party punishment. 
My results suggest that punishment of atypical behaviour might often be explained 
in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.  
In summary, my thesis sheds light on the conditions in which punishment is most 
likely to promote cooperation and on the motivations underpinning punishment 
decisions. 
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General Introduction 
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1.1 The evolution of cooperative behaviour 
The human tendency to cooperate with non-relatives, including complete 
strangers who we are unlikely to meet again in the future, exceeds that of all other 
species. Following Bshary & Bergmüller (2008), I define cooperation as a social 
interaction which results in lifetime fitness benefits to interacting individuals. 
Cooperation often requires individuals to pay a short-term cost in order to provide 
benefits for another individual (Bshary & Bergmüller 2008; West et al. 2007). In 
this way, cooperative behaviour can be thought of as a kind of investment (Bshary 
& Bergmüller 2008). Since, selection favours individuals that maximize their own 
fitness (Darwin 1859), the problem facing evolutionary biologists is to explain 
how individuals that make short-term cooperative investments are compensated in 
terms of lifetime fitness.  
One way in which cooperative investments can be repaid is through indirect 
fitness benefits. Cooperative individuals can receive indirect fitness benefits by 
helping relatives to reproduce and in doing so, helping shared genes get passed on 
to the next generation (known as ‘Kin Selection’; Hamilton 1964a; Hamilton 
1964b; Hamilton 1975; Hamilton 1972). Nevertheless, in several species 
(especially humans) cooperative behaviour also exists between unrelated 
individuals. Under these circumstances, individuals must somehow derive direct 
fitness benefits from cooperative behaviours. 
A traditional approach to investigating how cooperative behaviour can result in 
direct fitness benefits has been to use simple economic games. Of these games, 
perhaps the best known is the prisoner's dilemma (PD; Luce & Raïffa 1957; 
Rapoport & Chammah 1965). The PD describes a hypothetical situation involving 
two individuals who must decide whether to cooperate or cheat (commonly 
referred to as ‘defect’ in the PD setting; Luce & Raïffa 1957): if both players 
cooperate they gain more than if both defect. However, in a one shot game, each 
player does their best to defect, regardless of their partner's behaviour (Figure 
1.1). Mutual defection is therefore the unique Nash equilibrium (see glossary; 
Nash 1951) and the only evolutionarily stable strategy (see glossary; Maynard 
Smith 1982)  in a one-shot game (Luce & Raïffa 1957). The public goods game 
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(PGG; Ledyard 1995) is closely related to the PD game but is used to study 
cooperation in a group setting. In the PGG, players are endowed with an initial 
sum of money and must decide how much money to contribute to a communal 
pot. The communal pot is then multiplied by a factor (greater than one and less 
than the number of players, N), producing the ‘public good’. The public good is 
then divided evenly amongst the players regardless of how much they contributed. 
In the PGG, the collective payoff is maximized when everyone contributes the 
maximum amount to the public good. However, individuals do best by 
contributing nothing and ‘free-riding’ on the investments made by the others in 
the group. Thus, if everybody adopts the ‘rational’ strategy of contributing 
nothing, no public good is produced.  It has been argued that the social dilemma 
faced by individuals playing the PD game and the PGG is relevant to real-world 
cooperation problems due to their resemblance to many activities that have been 
important throughout our evolutionary history; for example, hunting big game, 
food sharing, trade, conserving common property resources, and warfare (Fehr & 
Gächter 2002). 
 
  
           Player 1 
 
 Cooperate Defect 
Player 2 
 
Cooperate R,R T,S 
Defect S,T P,P 
 
Figure 1.1  The payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Mutual 
cooperation pays each player a reward R, whereas mutual defection yields the 
punishment P. If a cooperator interacts with a defector, the cooperator gets the 
‘sucker’s payoff’, S (the lowest pay-off in the game) and the defector gets the 
‘temptation to defect’, T (the highest payoff). In order to be a prisoners dilemma, 
the pay-offs must satisfy T > R > P > S.  
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The study of these, along with other economic games, has uncovered a variety of 
mechanisms by which individuals can directly benefit from cooperative 
behaviours,  including but not limited to direct reciprocity (Axelrod 1984; Trivers 
1971), indirect reciprocity (Panchanathan & Boyd 2004; Nowak & Sigmund 
1998; Alexander 1987; Wedekind & Braithwaite 2002; Nowak & Sigmund 2005; 
Boyd & Richerson 1989; Seinen & Schram 2006; Rockenbach & Milinski 2006; 
Milinski et al. 2002), partner choice (Sylwester & Roberts 2010; Barclay & Willer 
2007; Roberts 1998; Barclay 2004; McNamara et al. 2008; Hardy & Van Vugt 
2006; Sylwester & Roberts 2013) and punishment (Gardner & West 2004a; 
Henrich & Boyd 2001; Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr 
& Gächter 2002; Gächter et al. 2008). Trivers (1971) proposed that when 
individuals are likely to interact repeatedly, cooperative behaviour could evolve 
among non-relatives if players are conditionally cooperative.  Specifically, direct 
reciprocity works on the principle that ‘if I help you now, you will be more likely 
to help me in the future’. In a repeated version of the PD game (‘known as an 
iterated prisoners dilemma’; IPD), direct reciprocity has been shown to generate 
stable cooperation. However, in the absence of other control mechanisms, direct 
reciprocity commonly breaks down in larger groups (e.g. in repeated PGG’s) 
because it is not possible to retaliate against non-cooperators without also harming 
cooperative group members (Boyd & Richerson 1988). 
Nevertheless, empirical work suggests that humans will often behave 
cooperatively even in one-shot encounters, where there is no scope for direct 
reciprocity to occur (e.g. Fehr et al. 2002; Fehr & Henrich 2003; McCabe et al. 
2003; Henrich et al. 2005). In one-shot encounters, indirect reciprocity provides 
an alternative mechanism for the evolution of cooperation (Panchanathan & Boyd 
2004; Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Alexander 1987; Wedekind & Braithwaite 2002; 
Nowak & Sigmund 2005; Boyd & Richerson 1989; Seinen & Schram 2006; 
Rockenbach & Milinski 2006; Milinski et al. 2002). Indirect reciprocity requires 
individuals to build a reputation based on their history of cooperation with others 
and works on the principle that ‘if I help you now, then it is more likely that a 
third individual (i.e. a bystander) will help me in the future’. The ability to build a 
reputation may also promote cooperation through partner choice (Sylwester & 
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Roberts 2010; Barclay & Willer 2007; Roberts 1998; Barclay 2004; McNamara et 
al. 2008; Hardy & Van Vugt 2006; Sylwester & Roberts 2013; Noë & 
Hammerstein 1995). According to this theory, when individuals seek to acquire 
the best cooperators as partners, there will competition to be more cooperative 
than others in order to gain access to cooperative partners (Roberts 1998; Barclay 
& Willer 2007; Noë & Hammerstein 1995). Therefore, the most cooperative 
individuals can incur benefits from an increased access to cooperative partners. 
Nevertheless, these mechanisms, cannot explain why humans frequently 
cooperate with large groups of genetically unrelated individuals, when 
reputational gains are small or absent. It has been suggested that punishment may 
provide a solution to this problem (Gardner & West 2004a; Henrich & Boyd 2001; 
Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Gächter et al. 2008). 
1.2 Punishment and cooperation 
Punishment typically involves an individual paying a cost in order to harm a peer 
who previously cheated (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 
2012). Punishment can therefore be thought of as negative reciprocity. 
Punishment may sustain cooperation by imposing costs on cheats so that it pays 
for them to avoid cheating again in subsequent interactions with the punisher 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; McCullough et al. 2013). This increased 
cooperation provides a possible mechanism by which the costs associated with 
punishment can be recouped by punishers in two-player games. However, in 
larger groups, the benefits resulting from the punishment of free-riders are shared 
amongst the group. Therefore, it has been suggested that punishment itself 
represents a ‘second order’ public good, where individuals will be tempted to 
abstain from punishing (even if they contributed to the public good), whilst free-
riding on the other group members’ punishment investments (Yamagishi 1986; 
Colman 2006). This, it has been argued, will result in the invasion of punishers, 
destabilizing punishment and leading to reduced cooperation (Sigmund 2007; 
Rankin et al. 2009; Gardner & West 2004a; Panchanathan & Boyd 2004; Hauert et 
al. 2007; Hilbe & Sigmund 2010; Boyd et al. 2010). While some theorists have 
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suggested that the second order public goods problem may be solved by ‘second-
order punishment’, the punishment of those who do not punish cheats (Axelrod 
1986; Henrich 2004; Henrich & Boyd 2001), this solution only shifts the problem 
up a level because ‘third-order punishment’ would be needed to maintain second-
order punishment and so on. Nevertheless, recent theoretical work has suggested 
that within a wide parameter space typical of experimental games, in the long 
term, the individual benefits arising from increased cooperation when any group 
member punishes will offset the costs of punishing (even in groups of larger than 
two; Roberts 2013). This means that in repeated games, punishment may often be 
in the punisher’s self-interest, without the need for any higher order punishment  
(Roberts 2013; Bshary & Bshary 2010).   
Other theoretical models have demonstrated that when individuals are able to 
build a reputation, punishment can evolve because carrying a reputation as 
someone who is prepared to invest in punishment reduces the risk that future 
partners will defect (Brandt et al. 2003; Hilbe & Traulsen 2012; Sigmund et al. 
2001; Hilbe & Sigmund 2010; dos Santos et al. 2011; Roos et al. 2014). In 
addition, Raihani & Bashary (2015) argue that when competitive motives can be 
ruled out, a punitive reputation may convey an individual's cooperative intent. If 
partner choice is an option, individuals are expected to preferentially choose 
cooperative players as interaction partners (Sylwester & Roberts 2010; Barclay & 
Willer 2007; Roberts 1998; Barclay 2004; McNamara et al. 2008; Hardy & Van 
Vugt 2006; Sylwester & Roberts 2013; Noë & Hammerstein 1995). Therefore, 
punishers may benefit from being preferentially selected for interactions (Raihani 
& Bshary 2015). However, these mechanisms do not explain why punishment is 
also observed in one-shot games where there is no opportunity to build for players 
to build punitive reputation (e.g. Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gächter & Herrmann, 
2009; Walker & Halloran, 2004).  
Several authors have suggested that cultural processes - as well as genetic - may 
underpin the evolution of punishment (e.g. Boehm, 1993, 1999; Gächter, 
Herrmann, & Thöni, 2010; Joseph Henrich et al., 2006). This has lead to the 
development of a cultural group selection explanation for the evolution of 
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punishment (Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis et al. 2003; Bowles & Gintis 2004; Boyd & 
Richerson 1982; Boyd & Richerson 1990; Falk et al. 2005; Fehr et al. 2002; 
Henrich 2004; Henrich & Boyd 2001; Lehmann et al. 2007; Boyd & Richerson 
2005). According to cultural group selection, cultural traits can quickly spread 
through groups via social learning and when groups are in competition with each 
other, groups with cultural traits that are beneficial to the group, like punishment, 
will outcompete and replace groups without these traits.  In this way, group-level 
benefits can offset the individual costs associated with punishment, even in one-
shot anonymous encounters. It has been argued that punishment of cheating group 
members can evolve through cultural group selection more easily than 
cooperation itself because when cheating is rare the costs of punishment become 
low, so punishers only have a weak payoff disadvantage relative to non-punishers 
(Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich & Boyd 2001). Although in theory, group-level 
benefits could also arise through genetic group selection, maintaining high enough 
between-group genetic variation and strong enough between-group selection 
pressure for this to occur would require unrealistically low rates of migration and 
unrealistically high rates of group extinction (Ridley 2004). The requirements for 
cultural group selection however are less strict because cultural transmission of 
traits throughout a group is typically much faster than genetic inheritance (due in 
part to the fact that we can inherit genetic traits from individuals other than our 
parents), meaning that the required levels of between-group variation can arise (El 
Mouden et al. 2014; Bell et al. 2009). In addition, groups performing less well 
than the other groups may simply adopt the winning groups’ behavioural traits 
rather than becoming extinct (El Mouden et al. 2014; Bell et al. 2009). 
Nevertheless, there is still considerable debate over the plausibility of the 
assumptions underpinning the cultural group selection account of the evolution of 
punishment (Burnham & Johnson 2005; Hagen & Hammerstein 2006; West et al. 
2010). Several authors have argued that since punishment is altruistic in both 
cultural and genetic group selection models, it requires kin selection to spread 
throughout a population (Lehmann et al. 2007; Gardner & West 2004a) and 
therefore adds nothing useful to our understanding of how punishment can spread 
through populations of individuals with low relatedness (Foster et al. 2006). In 
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addition, these models cannot account for the initial establishment of punishment 
when it is initially rare (Gardner & West 2004a; Lehmann et al. 2007; Fowler 
2005) or explain why individuals punish even when punishment reduces group 
payoffs (e.g. Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
An alternative explanation for the observation that people often punish in 
anonymous one--shot games is that such punishment occurs as a result of the 
miss-firing of psychological mechanisms which evolved (or were learnt) in the 
context of repeated interactions where interactions were typically observed by 
others  (Ben-Ner & Putterman 2000; Burnham & Johnson 2005; Cosmides & 
Tooby 1989; Delton et al. 2011; Hagen & Hammerstein 2006; Hoffman et al. 
1998; Johnson et al. 2003; Tooby et al. 2006). Consequently, these psychological 
mechanisms may motivate players to punish in one-shot lab settings where such 
behaviour is not in their best monetary interests. Nevertheless, laboratory studies 
using one-shot games have demonstrated that when players are given time to ‘cool 
off’ before making their punishment decision they are less likely to punish 
cheating partners (Grimm & Mengel 2011; Smith & Silberberg 2010; Sutter et al. 
2003).  These studies suggest that when players are given time to consider their 
decisions they are more likely to respond in a way that maximizes their payoff in 
their current one-shot setting rather than rely on intuitions that may maximize 
payoffs over repeated encounters in the real world. 
Despite the myriad of studies demonstrating people’s willingness to engage in 
punishment under laboratory conditions, real-life evidence of punishment in 
humans is relatively rare. In his seminal paper, Boehm (1993) surveyed the 
ethnographic literature revealing that punishment occurs in wide range of forms; 
from ridicule, gossip and verbal reproach up to social ostracism and homicide. 
Boehm (1993)’s review focused on small-scale egalitarian societies without 
centralized leadership, such societies are likely to resemble those in which 
humans lived for most of their evolutionary history (Sahlins 1972). However, 
when groups become larger and repeated interactions become infrequent, as in 
most modern societies, it is more difficult for individuals to recoup the costs 
associated with punishing cheats. Consequently, in larger populations, 
9 
 
decentralized punishment (see Glossary) is expected to be uncommon unless the 
costs associated with punishment are low (Balafoutas & Nikiforakis 2012; 
Balafoutas et al. 2014; Yamagishi 1988). Therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that 
in real-life we rarely observe commuters assaulting fare-dodgers or tax-payers 
accosting defrauders (Traulsen et al. 2012). Instead, punishment is typically 
handed over to a centralized authority (Hobbes 1651; Baldassarri & Grossman 
2011; Greif 1993; Rustagi et al. 2010; Kümmerli 2011; Boone 1992; Marlowe & 
Berbesque 2008; Wellington 1976).  For example, 11
th
 century merchants in 
Europe created guilds to enforce trade contracts (Greif 1993), hunters in rural 
African villages turn to their chiefs to settle disputes (Gibson & Marks 1995) and 
members of trade unions turn to their union to discipline strike-breakers 
(Wellington 1976). In modern times these central authorities often take the form 
of institutions, such as the police, who we pay (e.g. through taxes) to punish those 
who violate the laws of the society. Yet centralized punishment is costly even if 
there are no cheats to be punished - in the same way as the maintenance of a 
police force causes costs even if no crimes are committed - and in this sense 
centralized punishment is less efficient than decentralized punishment (Sigmund 
et al. 2010; Sigmund et al. 2011). However, theoretical and laboratory  studies 
have shown that centralized punishment can increase cooperation and average 
payoffs (Kube & Traxler 2010; Boyd et al. 2010; Steiner 2007; Sigmund et al. 
2010; Baldassarri & Grossman 2011; Falkinger et al. 2000) and that when  those 
who don’t contribute towards paying for centralized punishment are themselves 
punished (e.g. the punishment of tax dodgers), contributors in centralized 
punishment systems do better than punishers in decentralized systems (Sigmund 
et al. 2010; Sigmund et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2013). Moreover, in experimental 
games subjects have been shown to prefer to pay a centralized authority to mete 
out punishment on their behalf, rather than to punish cheats themselves (Traulsen 
et al. 2012; Andreoni & Gee 2011). 
Other anthropological studies have suggested that even when punishment is not 
centralized, punishment might only occur if a critical mass of peers agree to 
participate in punishing the cheat (Mathew & Boyd 2011; Wiessner 2005; Mahdi 
1986; Boehm 1993). For example, warriors of the pastoralist Turkana society of 
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Kenya often administer corporate punishment and fines on individuals that desert 
during raids on neighbouring ethnic groups. Importantly, punishment only occurs 
if a sufficient number of peers assemble to punish the cheat (Mathew & Boyd 
2011). Consistent with these anthropological studies, experimental  and theoretical 
work has shown that coordinated punishment can raise group average payoffs 
(Ertan et al. 2009; Boyd et al. 2010). Nevertheless, while some real-world 
evidence of human punishment does exist, none of these studies have explicitly 
examined whether punishment induces cooperation from the target in future 
interactions. 
1.3 When does punishment promote cooperation? 
 Punishment has been studied most extensively in the PGG by introducing a 
second stage in which players are able to pay a fee to impose a fine on their peers 
(e.g. Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Egas & 
Riedl 2008; Sefton et al. 2007; Bochet et al. 2006; Page et al. 2005; Yamagishi 
1986). In the context of a PGG, cheating (often referred to as ‘free-riding’, (Fehr 
& Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Egas & Riedl 2008; Yamagishi 1986) is 
typically defined as any contribution that is less than the population mean. Despite 
the cost incurred by punishers, laboratory studies have found that humans are 
often willing to invest to punish free-riders (Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr & Gächter 
2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Egas & Riedl 2008; Sefton et al. 2007; Bochet et al. 
2006; Page et al. 2005; Yamagishi 1986; Dreber et al. 2008; Nikiforakis & 
Normann 2008; Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Gürerk et al. 2006; Rockenbach & 
Milinski 2006). Moreover, in a laboratory experiment, individuals have been 
shown to choose to join groups where punishment occurs over groups where 
punishment was not possible (Gürerk et al. 2006).  
A slew of studies have shown that in a PGG setting punishment does increase 
cooperation in comparison to when punishment is not possible (Yamagishi 1986; 
Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Egas & Riedl 
2008; Sefton et al. 2007; Bochet et al. 2006; Page et al. 2005). For instance, the 
seminal studies by Fehr & Gächter (2000; 2002) demonstrated that, in the absence 
of punishment, contributions to a public good started reasonably high (players 
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contributed on average around 60 % of their endowments) but decreased 
drastically after multiple rounds. However, they found that when punishment was 
possible, contributions started higher than in the no-punishment condition and 
increased rapidly to almost 100% (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002).  
Previous studies have suggested that the use and effectiveness of punishment is 
dependent on the efficiency of the punishment technology available (Nikiforakis 
& Normann 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Falk et al. 2005; Vukov et al. 2013). The 
efficiency of punishment can be described by the fee to fine ratio, whereby a ratio 
of 1: 3 would reflect punishment that cost the punisher 1 unit for every 3 units 
removed from the targets payoff. Several studies have shown that the more 
efficient punishment is (i.e. the cheaper punishment is to administer), the more it 
is used (Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Ostrom et al. 1992; Falk et al. 2005; Egas 
& Riedl 2008; Nikiforakis et al. 2010) and the more effective punishment is at 
sustaining cooperation (Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Falk et 
al. 2005; Vukov et al. 2013). An empirical study that investigated the use and 
effectiveness of a range of fee to fine ratios found that punishment with a fee to 
fine ratio of 1: 2 or lower is required to prevent cooperation from deteriorating 
over time (Nikiforakis & Normann 2008). However, despite the findings of these 
individual studies, a meta-analysis revealed that there was no difference in the 
effect of punishment with various fee to fine ratios (1 : 1, 1 : 2, 1: 3 and 1 : 4) on 
cooperation (Balliet et al. 2011), suggesting that the effect the efficiency of 
punishment on its use and effectiveness remains unclear.  
Although higher cooperation levels typically imply higher payoffs for the group, 
this is not necessarily true if players are allowed to invest in punishment because 
punishment is costly to both the punisher and the target. While punishment (the 
availability of) ostensibly increases cooperation levels in the PGG setting 
(Yamagishi 1986; Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 
2002; Egas & Riedl 2008; Sefton et al. 2007; Bochet et al. 2006; Page et al. 2005), 
several studies have shown that punishment has no effect (Bochet et al. 2006; 
Page et al. 2005) or even reduces group payoffs  (Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & 
Gächter 2002; Ostrom et al. 1992; Sefton et al. 2007) in all but long-run 
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encounters (Gächter et al. 2008). In addition, although relatively few studies 
explore the effect of punishment in the PD game, one such study found that while 
punishment did increase cooperation levels in a PD game, punishment reduced 
payoffs at the group level and perhaps most interestingly punishers received lower 
payoffs than non-punishers (Dreber et al. 2008).  
Punishment is especially likely to reduce payoffs to punishers where it provokes 
retaliation (e.g. Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Fehl et al. 2012; Janssen & Bushman 
2008; Engelmann & Nikiforakis 2012). Retaliation refers to the willingness of an 
individual to avenge punishment with counter-punishment. Retaliation increases 
the costs associated with punishing because, in addition to the cost of inflicting 
the punishment, the punisher also incurs the cost of being reciprocally punished. 
An empirical study that investigated the effect of retaliation on the effectiveness 
of punishment found that one quarter of all punishments were retaliated and that 
the threat of retaliation made individuals less likely to invest in punishment 
leading to a breakdown of cooperation (Nikiforakis & Normann 2008). When 
Engelmann & Nikiforakis (2012) allowed retaliation they found that, punishment 
reduced payoffs even in long-run encounters. These findings have led colleagues 
to question whether punishment is effective at sustaining cooperation (Dreber et 
al. 2008), or perhaps evolved in some other context such as enforcing dominance 
hierarchies.  
The majority of previous work investigating the effect of punishment on 
cooperation has made the unrealistic assumption that all individuals are equal. In 
reality, however, individuals are likely to vary in their strength or resource holding 
potential. This variation is likely to translate into asymmetries in players’ ability to 
punish one another and the formation of dominance hierarchies. Punishment is 
expected to operate down these dominance hierarchies, with dominants more 
likely to punish subordinates who are, in turn, unlikely to retaliate
 
(Clutton-Brock 
& Parker 1995; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012). This prediction is supported by 
experiments using cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus), which have shown that 
males (the larger sex) punish females that cheat during joint inspections of model 
clients but—apparently due to the size difference; females never retaliate or 
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punish males (Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012). Power 
asymmetries may also fundamentally affect the outcome of human interactions 
involving punishment. Nevertheless, power asymmetries have not been 
investigated in (i) 2 player games or (ii) when retaliation is possible. 
1.4 The proximate motivations underpinning punishment 
Empirical studies have demonstrated that as well as the victims of cheats 
(‘second-parties’), third-parties are also often prepared to invest in punishing 
cheats, even though they are not directly affected by a cheat’s behaviour (known 
as ‘third-party punishment’; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Gintis 2000; Fehr et al. 2002; 
Gintis et al. 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Fowler 2005; Mathew & Boyd 2011; 
Charness et al. 2008; Carpenter et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the proximate 
motivations underpinning second-party and third-party punishment are not well 
understood. Negative emotions – particularly anger – are thought to promote 
punishment of cheats by both second-parties (Fehr & Gächter 2002; Sanfey et al. 
2003; Xiao & Houser 2005; Grimm & Mengel 2011; Wang et al. 2011) and third-
parties (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b; Jordan et al. 2014). Moreover, neuroimaging 
studies have indicated that undertaking punishment activates reward centres in the 
brain of second and third party punishers, suggesting that the act of administering 
punishment can be subjectively rewarding for both (de Quervain et al. 2004; 
Strobel et al. 2011; Sanfey et al. 2003; Buckholtz et al. 2008). 
Nevertheless, the negative emotions associated with interacting with a cheating 
partner could arise from variety of possible sources (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012a). 
Firstly, since victims of cheats incur a reduction in payoff, negative emotions may 
therefore precipitate from a desire to reciprocally harm cheating partners (also 
termed the desire for 'revenge'; McCullough et al. 2013). Second, extensive 
experimental evidence suggests that disadvantageous inequality aversion (the 
disutility associated with experiencing lower payoffs than others in a social 
interaction, (Fehr & Schmidt 1999) is an important motivator for both second-
party punishment (Johnson et al. 2009; Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b) and third-
party punishment (Pedersen et al. 2013). This raises the possibility that 
punishment may be motivated by a desire for equality.   However, from these 
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studies we cannot rule out the possibility that punishment is simply related to the 
disutility associated with experiencing inequality and is not tailored to achieve 
equal outcomes. 
Alternative studies have suggested that third-party punishment is motivated by the 
violation of a broadly recognized group norm (i.e. descriptive norms), rather than 
simply by a personal aversion to cheats or disadvantageous inequality. For 
instance, in a PD game defectors were more severely punished by a third-party if 
their partner cooperated than if their partner also defected (Fehr & Fischbacher 
2004b). Similarly, individuals in a PGG were more likely to be punished by a 
third-party the more their contribution deviated from the group average (Carpenter 
& Matthews 2012). However, since the costs of punishment typically increase 
with the number of individuals that are punished (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher 2004; 
Carpenter & Matthews 2012), we cannot rule out the possibility that individuals 
are more likely to punish atypical defectors simply because this is by definition 
cheaper than punishing defectors when defection is common.  
1.5 Thesis structure 
I begin in Chapter 2 with a description of the methodological and statistical 
techniques which were used throughout this thesis. The questions this thesis 
addresses are as follows:  
 In Chapter 3 I ask: What effect do power asymmetries have on cooperation 
and punishment in a repeated Prisoners Dilemma game with binary 
investments? 
 In Chapter 4 I ask: What effect do power asymmetries have on cooperation 
and punishment in a repeated Prisoners Dilemma game where players are 
able to vary their investment in cooperation? 
 In Chapter 5 I ask: Is punishment motivated by a desire for revenge or a 
desire for equality? 
 In Chapter 6 I ask: To what extent do the motivations for punishment vary 
according to framing or other contextual effects? 
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 In Chapter 7 I ask: Can the lower cost of punishing atypical behaviour 
explain the punishment of descriptive norm violators?  
Finally, in chapter 8 I synthesise the findings of this thesis and discuss its 
contribution to and implications for research on cooperation and punishment. I 
also suggest several avenues for future research. 
1.6 Glossary 
Antisocial punishment: punishment that is aimed at cooperative or non-cheating 
individuals. 
Centralized punishment: punishment devolved from a legitimate authority. 
Cheating: behaviour in which individuals do not cooperate (or cooperate less 
than their fair share) but still benefit from the positive interactions with 
cooperating individuals. 
Cooperation: the outcome of a social interaction between two or more members 
that results in net direct fitness benefits to each player. 
Decentralized punishment: punishment carried out by other members of the 
social group of the cheat (often referred to as peer-punishment). 
Defection: behaviour that increases immediate pay offs to the defector but which 
reduces the immediate pay offs of their partner (a form of cheating).  
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS): a strategy which, if adopted by a 
population of players, cannot be invaded by another, initially rare strategy. 
Free-riding: involves contributing less than the group mean to a public good (a 
form of cheating).  
Nash Equilibrium:  a strategy chosen by players in a game of two or more 
players where each player knows the equilibrium strategies of the other players 
and no player can benefit by changing their own strategy. 
Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game: an experimental game involving two players 
who must both decide whether to cooperate or defect. Defection always yields a 
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higher pay-off than cooperating irrespective of the partner’s behaviour. The 
prisoners’ dilemma games can be a one-shot game or can be repeated over several 
rounds with the same partner. A repeated prisoner’s dilemma is also known as an 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). 
Public goods game (PGG): an experimental game where players are endowed 
with an initial sum of money and must decide how much money to contribute to a 
communal pot. The communal pot is then multiplied by a factor (greater than one 
and less than the number of players, N) and then divided among all players in the 
game, regardless of how much they contributed. In these games, the most 
profitable strategy is to withhold contributions and ‘free-ride’ on the investments 
of others. The public goods game can be a one-shot game or can be repeated over 
several rounds with the same group members. 
Punishment: occurs when an individual reduces their own payoff to harm a 
cheating partner. 
Second-party punishment: refers to a scenario where a cheating individual is 
punished by an individual who was affected by the cheat’s behaviour.  
Third-party punishment: refers to a scenario where a cheating individual is 
punished by an uninvolved bystander. 
Direct fitness: lifetime reproductive success (i.e. the number of total offspring 
that survive until adulthood).  
Indirect fitness: component of one’s fitness that is increased by helping relatives 
to reproduce and in doing so, helping shared genes get passed on to the next 
generation. 
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2.1 Recruitment of subjects via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
In Chapter 5, 6 & 7 of this thesis, I recruited subjects to take part in experimental 
games using the online labour market, Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk; www.mturk.com). MTurk connects ‘requesters’ (or experimenters) with 
‘workers’ (or subjects), the latter being incentivized to perform short tasks for 
small payments. MTurk workers are identified by a unique 14-digit code rather 
than their names. Workers were told that their ID would not be revealed to their 
partner in the game, thus ensuring anonymity.  Workers were prevented from 
participating repeatedly in the experiment by allowing only one entry per unique 
ID. Worker IDs must be linked to a valid credit card, which largely prevents 
workers from accruing multiple accounts (Horton et al. 2011). Subjects recruited 
on MTurk were redirected to an external survey website (https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk) 
to take part in the experiment. As a further step to prevent subjects from taking 
part in experiments more than once, the external survey website prevented 
repeated access from the same IP address.  
Players’ payoffs were determined by collecting the decisions of all subjects, and 
then once the experiment was over, matching them with a partner (‘ex-post 
matching’; as in Horton et al. 2011). This means that players were told how their 
partner behaved (e.g. whether or not their partner stole from them) before actually 
being matched with another player. Using this method meant that subjects who 
interacted with each other did not need to be present at precisely the same time 
and no sophisticated software for simultaneous play was needed. When possible, 
players were matched with a unique partner in the same treatment/punishment 
condition/scenario as them self. However, because we did not know how players 
would behave (e.g. whether or not they would steal from there partner) in each 
treatment/punishment condition/scenario, this was not always possible. Thus, 
players were occasionally matched with a unique partner within a different 
treatment/punishment condition/scenario as them self. At the end of this process I 
was typically left with a few players whose behaviour did not match the behaviour 
described to their partners. For example, I was left with players that were told that 
their partner had stolen and partners that did not steal or vice versa. When this 
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occurred these players were matched with partners that had already been matched 
with another player. The payoff of players who were matched with more than one 
partner was based on only one of their matches. 
Although several studies have demonstrated the validity of MTurk as a tool for 
collecting behavioural data (Horton et al. 2011; Rand 2012; Suri & Watts 2011), 
there are potential issues that experimenters have to be aware of when using this 
online platform for behavioural research. An advantage of using MTurk over 
typical  western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD; Henrich 
et al. 2010) samples is that MTurk allows for recruitment of a more diverse 
demographic sample (Buhrmester et al. 2011) and for subjects from non-Western 
world cultures to also be included so that cross-cultural effects on behaviour can 
be explored (e.g. Raihani et al. 2013). Nevertheless, experimenters relinquish a 
degree of control over the experimental setting since they cannot be certain that 
subjects complete the task alone (although most report that they do; Chandler et 
al. 2014) and are not distracted by performing other tasks (e.g. instant messaging) 
simultaneously (Chandler et al. 2014). The use of attention checks, built in as 
comprehension questions, can be used to screen out subjects who either do not 
attend to or do not understand the nature of the task (Goodman et al. 2013).  
Although the hourly rates of MTurk subjects are usually comparable with those in 
the laboratory, concerns remain regarding whether the smaller stakes typically 
used in MTurk experiments systematically affect the decisions made by subjects. 
Previous laboratory studies have found that in both trust games (Johansson-
Stenman et al. 2005) and in public goods games with punishment (Kocher et al. 
2008), players’ decisions were unaffected by increasing the stake size. Similarly, 
studies using dictator games have found no effect of stake size on dictator 
donations either in the laboratory (Forsythe et al. 1994; Carpenter et al. 2005; 
Cherry et al. 2002; Hoffman et al. 1996) or on MTurk (Raihani et al. 2013). 
However, the affect of stake size on behaviour in the ultimatum game are more 
mixed. Whilst, Forsythe et al. (1994) found that doubling the stake size (from $5 
to $10) had no effect on either the size of offers made by proposers or on the rate 
at which responders rejected low offers, alternative studies have found that more 
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extreme increases in stake size can effect players’ behaviour (Hoffman et al. 1996; 
Cameron 1999; Andersen et al. 2011; Munier & Zaharia 2002; Slonim & Roth 
1998). For example, in a study conducted in North East India, Anderson et al. 
(2011) varied stake sizes from 20 Rupees (equivalent to 1.6 hours work) to 20,000 
Rupees (equivalent to 1600 hours work) and found that as stakes went up, 
proposers offers to responders decreased and responders were less likely to reject 
proportionally equivalent offers. 
Perhaps most concerning is the finding that the MTurk subject base has become 
increasingly experienced with common behavioural experiments over time; and 
that performance in some tasks has been shown to vary with the level of 
experience (Rand et al. 2012).  Specifically, in a study conducted on MTurk, Rand 
et al. (2012) showed that decisions made under time pressure varied 
systematically with subject experience. Despite this fact, other studies have shown 
that there are no systematic differences in the responses of experienced versus 
naive subjects when playing common economic games (Raihani & Bshary, in 
review) and that subjects display remarkable consistency in responses, both across 
different games used to measure cooperative tendency conducted on MTurk and 
in self-reports of similar behavioural measures in real-life (Peysakhovich et al. 
2014). On balance, therefore, I feel that so long as appropriate measures are taken 
to exclude subjects who do not pay attention to or do not understand the task, then 
MTurk should yield results that are comparable to those that could be obtained 
using other experimental settings. 
2.2 Model averaging 
In Chapters 3, 4, 6 & 7, to determine the importance of explanatory terms in my 
models, I employed an information theoretic approach with model averaging (as 
described by Grueber et al. 2011). Under an information-theoretic approach, a 
series of candidate models are generated, with each model representing a 
biological hypothesis. Rather than testing a null hypothesis, the relative degree of 
support for each model from the candidate set is calculated (Burnham & Anderson 
2002). Initially, I specified a global model which included all the explanatory 
terms specified above. The input variables were centred by subtracting the mean 
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(Schielzeth 2010), centring allows averaging over models that include different 
interaction terms (Grueber et al., 2011). Although for binary variables this mean 
value does not exist in reality, when the mean is subtracted from a binary variable 
the difference between the levels for the two categories will still be 1 (e.g. −0.25 
and 0.75), this means that estimates of binary explanatory terms still express the 
expected change compared with the reference category. Centering input variables 
leads to explanatory terms and the intercept being estimated at the other 
explanatory variables mean value.  For binary variables, estimating the other 
explanatory terms at this imaginary mean level makes sense because these 
estimates can be interpreted as the average effect across different levels of the 
binary predictor (Gelman 2008; Grueber et al. 2011; Schielzeth 2010). After 
centering, continuous input explanatory variables were then standardized by 
dividing by 2 standard deviations (Gelman, 2008). Standardization allows the 
relative strength of parameter estimates to be interpreted (Gelman, 2008). 
I used the package MuMIn (Barton 2013) to derive and compare submodels from 
the initial global model. Models were compared to one another using Akaike's 
Information Criterion corrected for small sample sizes (AICc; Hurvich & Tsai 
1993).  A subset of 'top models' were defined by taking the best model (the model 
with the lowest AICc value) and any models within 2AICc units of the best model 
(following Burnham & Anderson 2002). Using this subset of 'top' models, I 
computed the average parameter estimates for each term included in the subset of 
models, as well as the relative importance of the term. Importance is calculated by 
summing the Akaike weights of all models where the term in question is included 
in the model. Akaike weights represent the probability of a given model being the 
true model (compared to other candidate models in the set; Burnham & Anderson 
2002). Importance can therefore be thought of as the probability that the term in 
question is a component of the best model (Symonds & Moussalli 2011). In the 
results sections of each chapter, I only present the parameter estimates from the 
top models (those that were within 2 AICc units of the best model).  
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Chapter 3 
The Effect of Power Asymmetries on 
Cooperation and Punishment in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
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3.1  Note 
This work has been published as Bone JE, Wallace B, Bshary R, Raihani NJ 
(2015) doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0117183. Nichola Raihani contributed to 
experimental design and discussion. Redouan Bshary contributed to discussion. 
Brian Wallace contributed to data collection and discussion. I designed the 
experiment, collected the data, analysed the data and wrote the paper. 
3.2  Abstract 
Recent work has suggested that punishment is detrimental because punishment 
provokes retaliation, not cooperation, resulting in lower overall payoffs. These 
findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal: in 
reality individuals are expected to vary in the power with which they can punish 
defectors. Here, we allowed strong players to interact with weak players in an 
iterated prisoner's dilemma game with punishment. Defecting players were most 
likely to switch to cooperation if the partner cooperated: adding punishment 
yielded no additional benefit and, under some circumstances, increased the chance 
that the partner would both defect and retaliate against the punisher. Our findings 
show that, in a two-player game, cooperation begets cooperation and that 
punishment does not seem to yield any additional benefits. Further work should 
explore whether strong punishers might prevail in multi-player games. 
3.3 Introduction  
Punishment involves an individual paying a cost in order to inflict harm on a cheat 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012). This investment 
can be recouped if the punished individual - or a bystander - behaves more 
cooperatively in subsequent encounters (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Raihani et 
al. 2010; dos Santos et al. 2013). Although people are apparently willing to pay to 
harm cheats (Bochet et al. 2006; Botelho et al. 2005; Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; 
Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Gürerk et al. 2006; Nikiforakis & 
Normann 2008; Ostrom et al. 1992; Page et al. 2005; Rockenbach & Milinski 
2006; Yamagishi 1986) and even derive subjective pleasure from doing so (de 
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Quervain et al. 2004; Buckholtz et al. 2008), consensus is still lacking over 
whether punishment is effective at promoting cooperation (Fehr & Rockenbach 
2003; Houser et al. 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Gürerk et al. 2006; Sigmund 
2007; Yamagishi 1986; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Vukov et al. 2013). Although 
punishment increases payoffs in long-run encounters (Gächter et al. 2008), others 
have found no benefit to punishers (Bochet et al. 2006; Botelho et al. 2005; Page 
et al. 2005), or that punishment reduces the payoffs of the punisher or their group 
(Dreber et al. 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Ostrom et al. 1992; 
Sefton et al. 2007). Punishment is especially likely to reduce payoffs to punishers 
where it provokes retaliation, rather than cooperation, because, as well as the cost 
of inflicting the punishment, the punisher incurs an additional cost of being 
punished (e.g. Dreber et al. 2008; Nikiforakis 2008; Janssen & Bushman 2008; 
Fehl et al. 2012). Indeed, when retaliation is possible, punishment has been shown 
to reduce payoffs even in long-run encounters (Engelmann & Nikiforakis 2012). 
Based on these findings, it has been argued that rewards are more effective at 
sustaining cooperation (Rand et al. 2009) and that punishment is unlikely to have 
evolved as a cooperation-enforcing mechanism (Dreber et al. 2008). 
Some of the puzzling findings regarding punishment might stem from the 
assumption in several studies (e.g. Dreber et al. 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & 
Gächter 2002) that all players are equal. In reality individuals are expected to 
often vary in power or resource holding potential, such that some players are able 
to inflict a greater cost on the partner than the partner is able to reciprocate. In 
fact, it has been suggested that punishment is most likely to operate down a 
dominance hierarchy, with dominants punishing subordinates who are, in turn, 
unlikely to retaliate (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Axelrod 1984; Raihani, 
Thornton, et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2010; Bshary et al. 2008). For example, 
experiments using cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus), have shown that males (the 
larger sex) punish females that cheat during joint inspections of model clients but 
– apparently due to the size difference - females never retaliate or punish males 
(Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012). Similarly, a recent field study 
revealed that both human males and females were more likely to confront females 
than males for dropping litter. Moreover, fear of retaliation was the most common 
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reason survey respondents gave for not confronting litterers (Balafoutas et al. 
2014). Power asymmetries might therefore be expected to fundamentally affect 
the outcome of human interactions involving punishment but have received 
relatively little attention in comparison to other asymmetries (e.g. in cost of 
contribution, Tan 2008; Noussair & Tan 2011), or benefits derived from (Reuben 
& Riedl 2013; Janssen et al. 2011; Nikiforakis et al. 2012) a public good). One 
study which did explore the effect of power asymmetries showed that in the 
setting of  a public goods game, strong players contributed similar amounts as 
weak players but also punished more and received higher payoffs than weak 
players (Nikiforakis et al. 2010). Although punishment raised the contributions of 
low contributors, this study did not explore whether the effectiveness of 
punishment was affected by power asymmetries, as would be expected. 
Furthermore, players were not informed which of their peers punished them; 
thereby preventing retaliation. Thus, the effect of power asymmetries on 
punishment use and effectiveness in humans remains poorly understood. 
Here, we incorporated power asymmetries into a two-player iterated prisoner's 
dilemma (IPD) game (Luce & Raïffa 1957) with punishment (similar to Dreber et 
al. 2008) in order to explore how asymmetries affected the use and effectiveness 
of punishment in a setting where retaliation was possible. We used a two-player 
(rather than multi-player) game in this experiment as this allowed us to study the 
interaction between weak and strong players without the confounding effect of 
multiple other players’ behaviour. Asymmetries were incorporated into the game 
by allowing strong players to interact with weak players. As in, Nikiforakis et al. 
(2010), investing in punishment cost all players the same amount but strong 
players could inflict greater damage through punishing than weak players. Several 
studies have shown that punishment which inflicts greater damage is used more 
frequently (Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Ostrom et al. 1992; Falk et al. 2005; 
Egas & Riedl 2008; Nikiforakis et al. 2010) and is more effective at promoting 
cooperation (Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Falk et al. 2005; 
Vukov et al. 2013) than milder punishment. We predicted that weaker players 
would be more cooperative in asymmetric than symmetric games, particularly 
after being punished for defecting. We expected weak players would rarely punish 
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in asymmetric games and that power asymmetries would reduce the likelihood 
that weaker players retaliate in response to punishment, thereby decreasing the 
cost associated with punishment for stronger players (Clutton-Brock & Parker 
1995; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012; but see Nikiforakis et al. 2012).It was 
envisaged that by these mechanisms, punishment use for strong players could 
promote cooperation more effectively in asymmetric games than in symmetric 
games.  
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 Experimental protocol 
This research was approved by the University College London ethics board 
(project number 3720/001). All subjects remained anonymous so informed 
consent about the use of personal data was deemed unnecessary and was therefore 
waived by the University College London ethics board. The experiment took 
place over six sessions, one in May 2012, one in Nov 2012, two in March 2013 
and two in April 2014 in the experimental laboratory in the Department of 
Economics, University College London. The lab consists of twenty computers, 
which are visually partitioned. A total of 120 participants (63 women, 57 men, 
mean age ± se = 22.0 ± 0.39 years) were recruited to play an  IPD game with a 
punishment option  Players interacted anonymously in pair-wise encounters by 
means of computer screens using the z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) software. All 
players were paid a £5.00 show-up fee. Each player played two games and their 
final score was summed over both games and multiplied by £0.06 to determine 
additional earned income. Thus, one game unit corresponded to £0.06. To allow 
for negative incomes while maintaining the £5.00 show-up fee, all players began 
each game with 75 units (£4.50) to play with. The average payment per player 
was £16.69 and the average session length was 90 minutes. Prior to the 
experiment, each player was given written instructions about the game structure 
and required to answer nine comprehension questions to verify their 
understanding of the game (see supplementary material for experimental 
instructions and questions). The average score from the comprehension questions 
was 95 %. Players were informed of the correct answers after the test. 
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The IPD game lasted 50 rounds. To avoid end effects (Rapoport & Dale 1966), 
players were told that each game would last between 20 and 100 rounds. Players’ 
behaviour did not change abruptly towards the end of the game (Figure 3.S1 in 
Supporting information S2), indicating that end effects were absent. As in Dreber 
et al. (2008), we constructed our IPD such that cooperation implied paying a cost 
for the other person to receive a benefit, whereas defection implied taking 
something away from the other person (see Table 3.1). 
 
  Player 2 
 
  Cooperate Defect  
P
la
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 1
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(1, 1)  ( -2, 3) 
D
ef
ec
t 
(3, -2) (0, 0) 
Table 3.1 Payoffs accruing to (Player 1, Player 2) in step 1.  
 
Players were randomly split into two types: weak and strong. Weak players 
punished with a 1:1 fee to fine ratio, meaning that if they chose to punish their 
partner it would cost them one unit and it would also cost their partner one unit. 
Strong players punished with a 1:4 fee to fine ratio (as in Dreber et al. 2008), 
meaning that punishing their partner would cost them one unit but it would cost 
their partner four units. Each player played one game with a partner of the same 
type as themselves (symmetric) and one game with a partner of a different type 
(asymmetric). The order in which players played symmetric and asymmetric 
games was counter-balanced. 
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In this study we were interested in the effects of power asymmetries on 
punishment, rather than on coercive behaviour. Coercion is similar to punishment 
since they are both aggressive behaviours that can induce cooperation from the 
target. However, coercion differs from punishment because unlike punishment 
which is typically aimed at producing mutual cooperation, coercion forces the 
target into a position where they would do better if they could avoid interacting 
with the aggressor altogether, but are constrained to do so (Raihani, Thornton, et 
al. 2012).  
To ensure that weak partners were not being coerced into cooperating with a 
defecting strong partner (e.g. Nikiforakis et al. 2014), players could choose to opt 
out of the current round (rather than cooperating or defecting). If either player 
chose to opt out, step two of the current round was skipped and the next round 
then began as normal.  After both players made their choice, they were shown 
their own and their partner’s choice and each player's payoffs from this step.  
Each round of the game was split into two steps. In step one, both players 
simultaneously chose between the options of “cooperate”, “defect”, or “do not 
participate in this round” (opt out). In step two, players were given the option of 
whether or not to punish the partner. Thus, unlike Dreber et al. (2008), choosing 
to punish in our game did not imply that players must also forego the option to 
cooperate in that round. At the end of step 2, players were shown their own and 
their partner's choice and payoff from step 2, as well as the cumulative payoffs for 
both players for that round and their own total payoff (summed over all rounds). 
To prevent negative incomes, if a player’s total payoff became zero or below, they 
were bankrupt and both they and their partner were unable to take part in the 
remaining rounds of the game. Only three players went bankrupt during the game 
(two were weak players in asymmetric games and one was a strong player in a 
symmetric game). At the end of the first game, players were presented with the 
final scores and then randomly re-matched for the second game.  
In order to avoid framing effects, neutral language was used. Player types “weak” 
and “strong” were replaced with “type 1” and “type 2”; “cooperate” and “defect” 
were replaced with “option A” and “option B”; and “punish” and “don’t punish” 
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were replaced by “option C” and “option D”. After both games had finished, all 
subjects were required to fill in a questionnaire to provide demographic 
information (see supplementary material for questions and demographic data). 
3.4.2 Analyses 
We asked how asymmetries affected (i) players' tendency to cooperate and (ii) 
players' tendency to punish their partner’s defection. Previous work has shown 
that cooperators are more likely than defectors to use punishment (Falk et al. 
2005). Thus, in analysis (ii), we controlled for whether or not the player 
cooperated (see Table 3.2 for a full list of all models with response and 
explanatory terms). We then asked (iii) how punishing a cheating partner affected 
the punisher's payoff. To answer this question, we analysed how a players’ total 
payoffs at the end of each game was affected by the proportion of times which 
they punished in response to their partner defecting. This analysis was restricted to 
players whose partner defected at least once. 
Next, we asked how players responded to being punished. We asked whether 
punishment affected the likelihood that a player would subsequently (iv) 
cooperate (v) retaliate or (vi) opt out in the next round in both symmetric and 
asymmetric games. We compared the likelihood that players cooperated, retaliated 
or opted out in round n + 1 after having been punished (or not) in round n. We 
classed a player as retaliating if they punished a cooperative partner in round n + 
1, having been punished by that partner in round n.  
Finally, we asked (vii) how defecting players responded to their partner opting out 
(rather than punishing) in the previous round. We compared the likelihood that 
players cooperated in round n+2 when their partner opted out of round n+1 with 
the likelihood that  players cooperated in round n+1 when there partner did not opt 
out of round n+1. 
For analyses (iv) - (vii), data were restricted to instances where players had 
defected in round n (i.e. the effect of antisocial punishment on players' behaviour 
was not measured). Players' behaviour in round n + 1 could also be affected by 
whether their partner cooperated or defected in round n. Therefore, in analyses 
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(iv) & (vi), we controlled for whether or not the partner cooperated in round n. 
However, since opportunities to retaliate were relatively rare (N = 107 
opportunities for retaliation), in analysis (v), we did not have sufficient data to 
control for the effects of whether or not the partner cooperated in round n (see 
Table 3.2 for a full list of all models with response and explanatory terms). 
For analyses (iii) and (iv), initially a three-way interaction was a component of the 
best model (Table 3.S2 in Supporting information S2) so separate models were 
produced for weak and strong players for ease of interpretation (Table 3.2; Table 
3.6). A three-way interaction was also a component of the best model when data 
were restricted to strong players so separate models were produced for strong 
players with defecting partners and strong players with cooperating partners 
(Table 3.2). For analysis (v), a model was only produced for players with strong 
partners because we did not record any instances of retaliation against weak 
partners (Table 3.2; Table 3.3).  
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Model Question Response term Explanatory terms n for analysis 
(i) Do asymmetries affect 
cooperation? 
Player defected (0) 
Player cooperated (1) 
 
Player type (strong) 
Game type (asymmetric) 
Player type x game type 
 
 
9610 rounds 
(ii) Do asymmetries affect 
punishment? 
Player did not punish defecting 
partner (0) 
Player did punish defecting 
partner (1) 
Player type (strong) 
Game type (asymmetric) 
Player cooperated (yes) 
All 2-way interactions and the 3-way interaction 2173 rounds 
(iii) 
 
 
 
(a) 
(b) 
Does punishing a cheating 
partner affect the punishers 
total payoff ? 
 
Player is weak 
Player is strong 
Players total score at the end of 
the game 
Proportion player punished  
Game type (asymmetric) 
Proportion player punished  
x Game type 
92 players 
83 players 
(iv) 
 
 
 
(a.1) 
(b.1) 
 
(b.2) 
 
Do asymmetries affect whether 
punishment promotes 
cooperation?  
 
Player is weak 
Player is strong & partner 
defected 
Player is strong & partner 
cooperated 
Player continued to defect (0) 
Player switched to cooperate (1) 
 
 
Game type (asymmetric) 
Partner Punished (yes) 
Partner cooperated (yes)  
All 2-way interactions and the 3-way interaction  
(Partner cooperated and the 3-way interaction are only 
included  in model 1.1) 
 
     
 
 
 
936 rounds 
476 rounds 
 
236 rounds 
(v) 
 
 
 
(a) 
(b) 
Do asymmetries affect whether 
punishment provokes 
retaliation?  
 
Partner is weak 
Partner is strong 
Player did not punish 
cooperative partner (0) 
Player did  punish cooperative 
partner (1) 
 
Player type (strong) 
Partner punished (yes) 
Player type x Partner punished 
N/A 
176 rounds 
(vi) 
 
 
 
Do asymmetries affect whether 
punishment provokes opting 
out?  
 
Player did not opt out (0) 
Player opted out (1) 
 
Player type (strong) 
Game type (asymmetric) 
Partner punished (yes) 
Partner cooperated (yes) 
All 2-way interactions and 3-way interactions  2157 rounds 
(vii) Do asymmetries affect whether 
punishment promotes opting 
out?  
Player continued to defect (0) 
Player switched to cooperate (1) 
Player type (strong) 
Game type (asymmetric) 
Partner opted out (yes) 
All 2-way interactions and 3-way interactions 1394 rounds 
Table 3.2 Explanatory terms: player type is a 2-level factor with levels 'weak' and 
'strong'; game type is a 2-level factor with levels 'symmetric' and 'asymmetric'; 
player cooperated is a 2-level factor describing whether the player cooperated or 
defected in the current round; partner punished is a 2-level factor describing 
whether or not the player was punished by their partner in the previous round; 
partner cooperated is a 2-level factor describing whether the partner cooperated or 
not in the previous round; proportion player punished is a continuous variable 
measuring the proportion of times that the player punished if their partner 
defected; partner opted out is a 2-level factor describing whether or not the 
player’s partner opted out in the previous round. 
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3.4.3 Statistical methods 
Data were analysed using R version 2.15.2 (R Development Core Team 2011). 
Generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) were used for all analyses. For all but 
analysis (iii), GLMMs were fit with a binomial error structure and logit link 
function. For analysis (iii), GLMMs were fit with a Poisson error structure and log 
link function. To determine the importance of explanatory terms in our models, 
we used an information theoretic approach with model averaging (Grueber et al. 
2011; see General methods for details). GLMMs allow repeated measures to be 
fitted as random terms, thus controlling for their effects on the distribution of the 
data. Player identity was included as a random term in all models produced. For 
all analyses, we excluded rounds where either player was bankrupt. Explanatory 
input variables were centred by subtracting their mean (Schielzeth 2010). After 
centring, continuous explanatory input variables were then standardized by 
dividing by 2 standard deviations. We only present the effect sizes from the top 
models (see supplementary material for effect sizes for analyses (v) and (vi)). 
3.5  Results 
Cooperation was relatively common in all game types and when measured over 
the whole game strong players were typically more cooperative than weak players 
(Table 3.3). Cooperation levels (over the whole game) varied with game type: 
although weak players were more cooperative in asymmetric games than in 
symmetric games, strong players were less cooperative in asymmetric games than 
in symmetric games (Table 3.3; Table 3.4; Figure 3.1). Thus, both weak and 
strong players were most likely to cooperate if their partner was strong.  
Although when taking the whole game into account, cooperation levels differed 
according to player type and game type, for all but strong players in symmetric 
games these differences became vanishingly small as cooperation levels 
converged to higher levels over the course of the game (Table 3.3; Figure 3.2a). 
For strong players in symmetric games, cooperation levels also increased over the 
course of the game but at a slower rate than for other players. This meant that 
while symmetric games between strong players had the highest cooperation levels 
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at the beginning of the game, the cooperation levels in other game types was 
considerably higher in the final rounds of the game (Table 3.3; Figure 3.2a). 
In general, players were most likely to punish a defecting partner if they 
themselves had cooperated; the magnitude of this effect was larger for weak 
players than strong players (Table 3.3; Table 3.5; Figure 3.3). Strong players were 
typically more likely to punish than weak players (Table 3.3; Table 3.5; Figure 
3.3). Punishment was used most often – by players of both types – in asymmetric 
rather than symmetric games (Table 3.3; Table 3.5; Figure 3.3). Nevertheless, 
punishment use generally decreased over the course of the game (Table 3.3; 
Figure 3.2b). 
For weak players, investing in punishment appeared to have a negative effect on 
payoffs in both symmetric and asymmetric games (Table 3.6; Figure 3.4a). In 
contrast, for strong players punishing defecting partners only appeared to reduce  
punishers’ payoffs in symmetric games; in asymmetric games strong players' 
payoffs were unaffected by their investment in punishment (Table 3.6; Figure 
3.4b). However, for both weak and strong players the confidence intervals for this 
term crossed zero, meaning that there is little evidence for these effects (Table 
3.6). Nevertheless, in general weak players received higher total payoffs in 
symmetric games than in asymmetric games (Table 3.3). Strong players on the 
other hand received similar total payoffs in symmetric and asymmetric games 
(Table 3.3). Although from our model (Table 3.6) it appears as if strong players 
generally received higher total payoffs in asymmetric games than in symmetric 
games, this is an artifact resulting from the model excluding players whose 
partner never defected; specifically because these players were more prevalent in 
symmetric games (n = 25) than in asymmetric games (n = 12) and were typically 
the highest scoring players. 
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Weak players Strong Players 
 
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric 
Cooperated (over 
whole game) 
0.70 ± 0.01 0.77 ± 0.01 0.84 ± 0.01 0.78 ± 0.01 
Cooperated (last 10 
rounds) 
0.91 ± 0.01 0.88 ± 0.02 0.83 ± 0.02 0.87 ±0.02 
Punished partner for D 
(Player cooperated) 
0.25 ± 0.04 0.31 ± 0.04 0.39 ± 0.04 0.59 ± 0.04 
Punished partner for D 
(Player defected) 
0.07 ± 0.01 0.11 ± 0.02 0.23 ± 0.03 0.27 ± 0.02 
Antisocial punishment  0.03 ± 0.00 0.04 ± 0.00 0.05 ± 0.00 0.09 ± 0.01 
Punished partner (last 
10 rounds) 
0.02 ± 0.01 0.04 ± 0.01 0.01 ± 0.01 0.02 ± 0.01 
Opted out 0.12 ± 0.06 0.19 ± 0.01 0.08 ± 0.00 0.04 ± 0.00 
Retaliation 0 ± 0 0.21 ± 0.06 0.24 ± 0.07 0 ± 0 
Total payoff 100 ± 2.96 91.5 ± 4.36 99.7 ± 4.32 98.5 ± 3.75 
 
Table 3.3 The proportion of players who cooperated (± SE) over the whole game 
and in the last 10 rounds of the game, the proportion of rounds in which players 
cooperated / defected / opted out, the proportion of instances in which the partner 
defected (D) / cooperated (‘antisocial punishment’) that cooperating players & 
defecting players responded with punishment, the proportion of rounds in which 
players punished their partner in the last 10 rounds of the game regardless of 
whether the player or their partner cooperated or defected, the proportion of 
instances in which players punished their partner in round n + 1 (when the partner 
cooperated) following being punished for defecting in round n (‘retaliation’) and 
mean total payoffs. All proportions (except for ‘opted out’) exclude rounds in 
which either player opted out. 
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Parameter Effect size SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Importance 
Intercept 1.41 0.21 (0.99, 1.81)   
Player  type (strong) 1.18 0.41 (0.36, 2.00) 1.00 
Game type 
(asymmetric) 
-0.1 0.06 (-0.21, 0.03) 1.00 
Player type x Game 
type 
-0.99 0.12 (-1.23, -0.75) 1.00 
Table 3.4 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models for the binary 
response term encoding whether or not players cooperated in each round of the 
game (player defected = 0, player cooperated = 1). 
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Figure 3.1 Barplot showing the proportion of rounds which players cooperated in 
symmetric (red bars) and asymmetric (blue bars) games according to whether they 
were weak or strong. Data exclude rounds where either player opted out or was 
bankrupt. Error bars represent standard errors. Plots are generated from raw data. 
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Parameter 
Effect 
size  SE 
Confidence 
Interval Importance 
Intercept -1.81 0.18 (-2.16, -1.47)  
Player type (strong) 1.15 0.35 (0.88, 2.22) 1.00 
Game type (asymmetric) 0.88 0.19 (0.51, 1.26) 1.00 
Player cooperated (yes) 1.29 0.16 (0.97, 1.61) 1.00 
Game type x Player 
cooperated  0.47 0.29 (-0.11, 1.04) 1.00 
Player type x Player 
cooperated -0.75 0.31 (-1.37, -0.14) 0.65 
Player type x Game type 0.16 0.36 (-0.55, 0.87) 0.19 
Table 3.5 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models for the binary 
response term encoding whether or not players punished their partners for 
defecting (player did not punish defecting partner = 0, player did punish defecting 
partner = 1). 
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Figure 3.2 Scatter plot showing the mean proportion of players that a) cooperated 
and b) punished their partner, according to whether they were weak or strong and 
whether they were in a symmetric or asymmetric game. Rounds where either 
player opted out or was bankrupt were excluded.  
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Figure 3.3 Barplot showing the proportion of their partner's defection that players 
punished in a) symmetric and b) asymmetric games according to whether they 
were weak or strong and whether they cooperated or defected them self. Data 
were restricted to instances in which the partner defected in the previous round, 
excluding rounds where either player opted out or was bankrupt. Error bars 
represent standard errors. Plots are generated from raw data. 
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Player 
type Parameter Estimate  SE 
Confidence 
Interval Importance 
Weak Intercept 87.1 2.98 (81.2, 93.1)  
 
Game type 
(asymmetric) -14.3 5.23 (-24.7, -3.86) 1.00 
 
Proportion player 
punished -3.68 5.87 (-15.4, 7.75) 1.00 
      
Strong Intercept 85.0 3.69 (77.7, 92.37)  
 
Game type 
(asymmetric) 14.4 6.53 (1.37, 27.4) 1.00 
 
Proportion player 
punished -13.2 7.71 (-28.5, 2.12) 1.00 
 
Game type x 
Proportion player 
punished 27.9 14.1 (-0.18, 55.91) 0.68 
Table 3.6. Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models for the response 
term ‘total payoff’. 
 
Figure 3.4. Scatter plots showing how the probability of punishing in response to 
defection affected total payoffs in symmetric and asymmetric games for (a) weak 
players and (b) strong players. Circles represent raw data points; red circles are 
symmetric games and blue circles are asymmetric games. Regression lines are 
shown for symmetric (red line) and asymmetric (blue line) games. 
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If the punisher had also defected (i.e. punishment was 'unjustified' or 
'hypocritical'), then punishment had no meaningful effect on the target’s 
propensity to cooperate in the next round (Table 3.7; Figure 3.5). The effect of 
being punished by a cooperative partner ('justified punishment') produced more 
variable outcomes on the target's behaviour. Where justified punishment was 
aimed at weak players, it produced no discernible effect on subsequent tendency 
to cooperate (cooperate if not punished = 0.43 ± 0.04; versus if punished = 0.35 ± 
0.05). Justified punishment aimed at strong players produced different outcomes. 
When the punishment was administered by a weak partner, it had no discernible 
effect on the strong player's cooperative behaviour in the next round (cooperate if 
not punished = 0.59 ± 0.06; versus if punished = 0.61 ± 0.09). However, in a 
strong-symmetric game, justified punishment actually reduced the tendency of the 
player to cooperate in the next round (cooperated if not punished= 0.71 ± 0.05; 
versus if punished = 0.22 ± 0.06; Table 3.7; Figure 3.4). Rather than responding to 
punishment, defecting players were more likely to subsequently cooperate when 
the partner had cooperated (compared to when the partner had also defected) 
(cooperate if partner cooperated = 0.48 ± 0.02; versus if partner defected = 0.1 ± 
0.01). Thus, cooperative behaviour from the partner appeared to be sufficient to 
convert defectors to cooperators, and punishment in addition to cooperation did 
not yield any additional benefits.  
Neither weak nor strong players ever retaliated against a weak partner (Table 3.3). 
However, weak and strong players did and were equally likely to retaliate in 
response to punishment from strong partners (Table 3.3; Table 3.8; Figure 3.5). In 
general, weak players opted out more often than strong players (Table 3.3; Table 
3.9). In addition, both weak and strong players were more likely to opt out if their 
partner was strong (Table 3.3) and if they were punished in the previous round 
(proportion of instances in which players opted out if they were not punished for 
defecting in the previous round ± SE = 0.11 ± 0.01 versus if they were punished 
for defecting in the previous round = 0.19 ± 0.02; Table 3.9).  Players were also 
less likely to opt out if their partner cooperated, rather than defected, in the 
previous round (proportion of instances in which players opted out if their partner 
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defected in the previous round ± SE = 0.14 ± 0.01 versus if their partner 
cooperated in the previous round = 0.07 ± 0.01; Table 3.9) 
Regardless of player type or game type, defecting players were slightly less likely 
to switch to cooperate if their partner opted out in the previous round. However, 
the confidence intervals for this term include zero, meaning that this effect is 
weak (proportion of instances in which players switched to cooperate if their 
partner did not opt out of the previous round = 0.14 ± 0.04 versus if their partner 
did opt out in the previous round 0.2 ± 0.01; Table 3.10). 
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Figure 3.5 Barplot showing the proportion of instances in which players 
cooperated following defecting in the previous round, according to whether they 
were weak or strong and whether they were punished by their partner in the 
previous round. Data is shown for players in a) symmetric games where the 
partner defected in the previous round b) asymmetric games where the partner 
defected in the previous round c) symmetric games where the partner cooperated 
in the previous round and d) asymmetric games where the partner cooperated in 
the previous round. Data were restricted to instances in which the player defected 
in the previous round, excluding rounds where either player opted out or was 
bankrupt. Error bars represent standard errors. Plots are generated from raw data. 
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Table 3.7 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models for the binary 
response term encoding whether or not players punished their partners for 
defecting (player did not punish defecting partner = 0, player did punish defecting 
partner = 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameter 
Effect 
size  SE 
Confidence 
Interval Importance 
Intercept -1.81 0.18 (-2.16, -1.47)  
Player type (strong) 1.15 0.35 (0.88, 2.22) 1.00 
Game type (asymmetric) 0.88 0.19 (0.51, 1.26) 1.00 
Player cooperated (yes) 1.29 0.16 (0.97, 1.61) 1.00 
Game type x Player 
cooperated  0.47 0.29 (-0.11, 1.04) 1.00 
Player type x Player 
cooperated -0.75 0.31 (-1.37, -0.14) 0.65 
Player type x Game type 0.16 0.36 (-0.55, 0.87) 0.19 
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Partner 
type Parameter 
Effect 
size  SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
Importance 
Strong Intercept -3.34 0.84 (-7.45, -2.18)  
 
Punished 
(yes) 1.96 
 
0.73 (0.58, 3.57) 1.00 
Table 3.8 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating 
whether a player retaliated against a punitive partner (player did not punish 
cooperative partner = 0, player did punish cooperative partner = 1). 
 
Figure 3.6 Barplot showing the mean proportion of players in a) symmetric and 
b) asymmetric games that punished their partner for cooperating, according to 
whether they were weak or strong and whether they were punished by their 
partner in the previous round. Data were restricted to instances in which the player 
defected in the previous round and their partner cooperated in the current round. 
Rounds where either player opted out or was bankrupt were also excluded. Error 
bars represent standard errors. Thus, red bars represent antisocial punishment 
whereas blue bars can be interpreted as retaliation for punishment previously 
received. Plots are generated from raw data. 
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Parameter 
Effect 
size  SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
 
Importance 
Intercept -2.60 0.18 (-2.95, -2.25)  
Player type (strong) -1.10 0.33 (-1.74, -0.46) 1.00 
Game type (asymmetric) -0.14 0.20    (-0.54, 0.26) 1.00 
Partner punished 0.94 0.20 (0.55, 1.32) 1.00 
Partner cooperated -1.04 0.24 (-1.51, -0.57) 1.00 
Player type x Game type -1.36 0.45 (-2.24, -0.47) 1.00 
Player type x Partner 
cooperated  0.56 0.45 (-0.33, 1.44) 0.39 
Game type x Partner 
cooperated -0.44 0.43 (-1.28, 0.39) 0.35 
Partner cooperated  x 
Partner punished 0.38  0.44 (-0.49, 1.24) 0.31 
Table 3.9 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating 
whether players opted out (player did not opt out = 0, player opted out = 1).  
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Parameter 
Effect 
size  SE Confidence Interval  Importance 
Intercept 1.35 0.00 (-1.35, -1.35)  
Game type (asymmetric) -0.17 0.00 (-0.17, -0.16) 1.00 
Player type (strong) 1.12 0.00 (1.12, 1.13) 1.00 
Game type x Player type -1.44 0.00 (-1.45, -1.44) 1.00 
Partner opted out (yes) -0.06 0.03 (-0.06,  -0.06) 0.27 
Table 3.10 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating how 
players that defected in round n responded to their partner opting out of round n + 
1 (player continued to defect = 0, player switched to cooperate = 1). 
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3.6 Discussion 
Previous studies have suggested that punishment use is detrimental because it 
induces retaliation rather than cooperation (Dreber et al. 2008; Janssen & 
Bushman 2008; Nikiforakis 2008). However, previous studies have typically not 
accounted for asymmetries between players, which might affect how targets 
respond to being punished. In this two-player game, punishment did not promote 
cooperation under any circumstances. Moreover, punishment from strong players 
provoked (i) further defection and (ii) retaliation from the target. Therefore, 
punishment carried both the cost of inflicting the punishment itself and the cost 
associated with retaliation (for strong players) but did not confer the benefits of 
increased cooperation. We discuss reasons why our findings may not have 
matched the theoretical predictions below.  
As expected, punishment was most often directed from cooperating players at 
defecting partners and strong players were generally more likely to punish than 
weak players. While these results supported our initial predictions, we had other 
findings that were more puzzling.  First, weak players were more likely to punish 
in asymmetric games than in symmetric games, which is the opposite pattern to 
that which we predicted. Second, players seemed to respond more to the 
cooperative decision of the partner than to the punitive action when deciding how 
to behave in the next round. In situations where the partner cooperated, there was 
no additional positive effect of punishment on the propensity of the target to 
cooperate and, in fact, in some cases the punishment made the target more likely 
to defect. Third, while strong punishers frequently encountered retaliation from 
the target, we did not record a single instance of retaliation against a weak 
punisher. These results are clearly counter to our predictions that punishment 
would operate down a dominance hierarchy and be most likely to promote 
cooperation when directed from strong players at weak targets. In part these 
findings might stem from the fact that cooperating and defecting were specified as 
binary, all-or-nothing responses in this study, rather than continuous variables. 
Thus, a player that switched to cooperation (in response to the partner's 
cooperation) could not, by definition, increase their investment even more in 
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response to being punished. This is unlike the situation with cleaner fish, where, 
although defecting is a binary outcome (bite client / do not bite client) investment 
can be modelled as a continuous variable (duration of time 'cooperating' by 
removing ectoparasites; Bshary et al. 2008). In other real world settings it is 
debatable whether cooperation should be modelled as an all-or-nothing response 
or instead as a continuous variable (Sherratt & Roberts 1998; Wahl & Nowak 
1999; Killingback et al. 1999; Killingback & Doebeli 2002). Had we specified 
cooperation as a continuous variable in this study, we may have been more likely 
to measure a meaningful effect of punishment on the target's subsequent 
cooperation. This remains an important avenue for further exploration.  
Another possibility is that the effectiveness of punishment varies between two-
player games and multi-player games. Previous theoretical and empirical studies 
(Dreber et al. 2008; Rand et al. 2009) have argued that in two player games 
selection favours strategies that cooperate conditionally rather than paying to 
punish cheats. Our data seem to support these arguments, even when player 
asymmetries are included in games. Although conditional cooperation is 
successful in two-player games, such strategies might be less effective in multi-
player games because defecting in response to a defector harms the cooperative 
partners in the group as well as the cheats (Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012). Thus, 
although asymmetries did not allow punishment to promote cooperation in this 
two-player game, they may be more effective in a multi-player game (e.g. 
Przepiorka & Diekmann 2013). Furthermore, punishment is likely to be most 
effective at promoting cooperation where the possibility for retaliation is reduced, 
for example when punishment is administered by a legitimate authority 
(Baldassarri & Grossman 2011) or when it is administered jointly by several 
group members (Boyd et al. 2010). 
While these explanations might help us to understand why punishment did not 
promote cooperation, it is less clear why punishment from strong, but not weak, 
players was actually detrimental - being more likely to provoke both retaliation 
and defection. It has been suggested that the moral legitimacy of punishment is an 
important determinant of how the target is expected to respond (Fehr & 
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Rockenbach 2003; Xiao 2013). According to Fehr & Rockenbach (2003), 
punishment may be perceived as being morally illegitimate if it is associated with 
selfish or greedy (rather than altruistic) intentions. In this way, punishment that 
increases the payoffs of the punisher, relative to the target (as punishment from 
strong players in our study did), may be interpreted as a competitive act and 
therefore perceived as morally illegitimate. It has been argued that morally 
illegitimate punishment is unlikely to promote cooperation from targets (Xiao 
2013; Fehr & Rockenbach 2003): an extension of this prediction might be that 
morally illegitimate punishment makes players more likely to defect and to 
retaliate. Supporting this idea, a recent study that incorporated power asymmetries 
in a two-player game where senior workers could exploit junior partners (by 
suggesting that they contribute larger investments and punishing them if they 
failed to obey) showed that junior workers did not obey strong partners when they 
knew that they were being exploited (Nikiforakis et al. 2014). Conversely, when 
junior workers only had incomplete information about how much the other player 
earned, they were more likely to comply with the senior worker's suggestion 
(Nikiforakis et al. 2014). Theoretical work has shown that in multi-player games, 
punishment may be cost-effective if multiple individuals within the group 
collectively punish defectors (Boyd et al. 2010). Such collective punishment may 
also be perceived to be more legitimate than punishment from a single group 
member because it is more likely to be in the collective interest, rather than in the 
interest of a selfish individual. Although, punishment in this study was 
decentralized, the legitimacy of punishment is also likely to be important under 
centralized punishment regimes. For example, punishment is likely to be more 
effective at promoting cooperation when centralized authorities have been 
legitimately elected; rather than chosen at random (Baldassarri & Grossman 
2011). In light of these results and the results of our study, we suggest that further 
work to explore the moral assessment of punishment in different circumstances 
would be very helpful to understand why punishment sometimes promotes and 
sometimes undermines cooperation. It is important that this future work should 
collect data on both players’ behavioural responses as well as their subjective 
evaluations of punishment. 
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This study suggests that punishing cheats was detrimental to punisher’s payoffs 
(as in Dreber et al. 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Ostrom et al. 
1992; Sefton et al. 2007) for weak players in symmetric and asymmetric games 
and strong players in symmetric games, but in asymmetric games, strong players’ 
payoffs were unaffected by punishing. However, evidence for this finding was 
weak. Although these results are inconclusive, if strong punishers do receive 
higher payoffs in asymmetric games than in symmetric games (as suggested) this 
may be because while strong players were equally likely to incur retaliation from 
weak and strong partners, retaliation from strong partners was considerably more 
costly than retaliation from weak partners. This effect may also be caused by the 
finding that while justified punishment from strong players had no effect on weak 
partners’ tendency to switch to cooperation, it made strong partners more likely to 
defect in the next round. Nevertheless, in artificial laboratory settings, individual 
payoffs are necessarily determined by the (largely) arbitrary costs and benefits 
associated with the different actions available to players in the game. In addition, 
the time horizon of the interaction, which is again largely determined arbitrarily 
by the experimenter, can have a fundamental bearing on whether punishment is 
found to improve payoffs: punishment is least likely to be beneficial in short-run 
interactions (Gächter et al. 2008). Therefore, we suggest that since the net benefit 
of punishment in real-world settings must emerge from its ability to deter partners 
(or bystanders; dos Santos et al. 2013) from defecting, the effect of punishment on 
targets' behaviour, rather than the total payoffs accruing to the punisher, is more 
important for understanding the functional basis of punishment. 
In general, weak players opted out more than strong players and both player types 
opted out more when faced with a strong partner. Although, theoretical studies 
have suggested that cooperation and punishment is more likely to occur and 
persist if players have the option to opt out (Hauert et al. 2007; Hauert et al. 
2008), these models assumed that all players were equal in strength, used multi-
player rather than two-player games and permitted only a small number of 
behavioural strategies. In our study, players were more likely to opt out of rounds 
if they were previously punished than when they were not punished. This suggests 
that both player types occasionally chose to avoid further punishment by 
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withdrawing from the game rather than by switching to cooperation. Punishment 
may be more effective at promoting cooperation when players are unable to opt 
out of rounds and can therefore only avoid further punishment by switching to 
cooperation. This hypothesis could be tested by repeating this experiment but 
excluding the option for players to opt out of rounds. 
In this experiment, we found that cooperation levels increased over the course of 
the game. Our other findings suggest that this increase in cooperation was most 
likely to be driven by conditional cooperation rather than by punishment. Indeed, 
previous work has shown that cooperation in repeated prisoners dilemma games 
can increase over time, even in the absence of punishment (Normann & Wallace 
2012). Cooperation levels of strong players in symmetric games increased at a 
slower rate than that of other players. We suggest that this is because punishment 
from strong players in symmetric games decreased cooperation rates. As 
cooperation levels increased with time, punishment was no longer needed so 
often, this lead to a decrease in punishment use over the course of the game.    
Weak and strong players were also more likely to opt out of rounds if their partner 
defected than if their partner cooperated in the previous round. This suggests that 
players used opting out either to avoid defectors or to signal their disapproval with 
the defector's action. However, opting out appeared to decrease the probability 
that a defecting partner would switch to cooperation. A recent study by Delton et 
al. (2013) found that opting out of a public goods game was viewed as morally 
wrong and incited punishment from other group members. In other words, players 
who opted out were treated as cheats despite not actually exploiting collective 
benefits. The authors suggest that players who opt out  may be perceived to be 
more likely to free-ride in the future (than those who contribute to the public 
good) and that punishment may therefore serve a preventative function (Delton et 
al. 2013). Similarly, in this study players who opted out may have been perceived 
to be immoral and more likely to cheat in future interactions. This may have 
provoked their partners to defect in order to avoid being exploited in future 
rounds. 
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To summarize, we found no evidence that punishment promoted cooperation in 
this two-player game and in fact punishment use sometimes had a detrimental 
effect on cooperation. Future work could explore whether these results stem from 
using a binary response term for cooperation and whether punishment might be 
more effective where investments are continuous. We also propose that 
understanding the moral assessment of punishment will be crucial for predicting 
when it will promote and when it will undermine cooperation. 
3.7 Supplementary materials 
3.7.1 Experimental instructions  
Participants were given a printed copy of the instructions below. They were given 
15 minutes to read through the instructions before attempting the comprehension 
questions. Participants were free to refer back to the instructions whilst 
completing the comprehension questions and throughout the experiment.  
Welcome and thank you for volunteering for this experiment.  
Please be quiet during the entire experiment. Do not talk to your neighbours and 
do not try to look at their screens. If you have any questions, please raise your 
hand. We will come to you and answer it privately. 
This experiment is about decision-making. You will be randomly assigned the 
role as either a “type 1” or a “type 2” player. You will keep this role during the 
entire experiment. You will play a two-player game twice. Each game will last for 
a predetermined number of rounds (between 20 and 100).  
In each game you will be randomly matched with a different person in the 
room. You will play with the same person for the duration of each game. 
Therefore, you will play with two people in total. In one game you will play with 
someone of the same type as yourself and in one game you will play someone of a 
different type to yourself. You will remain anonymous throughout the 
experiment and will be identified only by the name in the top left corner of your 
computer screen.  
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Before playing the games you will answer some questions about the 
experiment. The purpose of this is to make sure that everybody fully understands 
the rules of the experiment before we start. So please make sure you read these 
instructions carefully.   
Depending on your decisions and the decisions made by the other player in each 
of the two games you play, you will be able to earn a considerable amount of 
money. The scores you receive in the game will be given in units (1 unit= 6p). 
Everyone will receive a show-up fee of £5. In addition, you will be given an 
additional 75 units (£4.50) to play with at the start of each game. Depending 
on the decisions made by you and the other player during each game you will gain 
or lose units from this initial amount. After the experiment has finished, your units 
will be converted to real money. You will be paid the show-up fee and the money 
that you earn. In total this could be as much as £32.   
Payment: Payment will happen after both games have been played. 
The Game: 
Each round will be split into two steps. In each step you will be asked to make 
a decision. The decisions you make will affect the score you and the other 
player receives for that round. There is a time limit of 15 seconds on each step 
(shown in the top right corner of the screen). It is important you make a choice 
within this time, if not a default choice will be picked for you and you will move 
on to the next step. 
Each of these steps will now be explained to you in detail: 
Step 1:   
Both you and the other player simultaneously choose between the options, “A”, 
“B” or “Do not participate in this round”.  
If you choose “A” then you will get −1 unit, whereas the other player will get 
+2 units.  
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If you choose “B” then you will get +1 unit, whereas the other player will get 
−1 unit.  
If either player chooses “Do not participate in this round” both you and the other 
player will skip the second step and move to step 1 of the next round. Neither 
player will gain or lose any units in this entire round. The next round will 
begin as normal. 
Step 2: If either player chose “Do not participate in this round” in step 1 then 
this round is skipped. Otherwise, you and the other player are presented with 
each other’s choices and scores from step 1. You must both then decide whether 
you would or would not like to reduce the other player's income at a cost to 
yourself by choosing between options “C” or “D”, respectively.  
Option “C” = reduce the other player's income at a cost of 1 unit to yourself. 
Option “D” = do nothing (neither you nor the other player will gain or lose any 
points). 
The number of units that the other player’s income is reduced by when you 
choose option “C” varies depending upon what “type” of player you were 
assigned as at the start of the experiment. 
Type 1 player: If you choose “C” then you will lose 1 unit, and the other 
player will lose 1 unit. 
Type 2 player: if you choose “C” you will lose 1 unit, and the other player will 
lose 4 units. 
After you have made a decision, you and the other player are presented with 
each other’s choices and incomes from step 2 as well as your overall incomes 
for the round.  You will also be told your total score for the current game. 
Your overall income in each step is determined by the addition of the income 
from both your decision and the other player's decision. 
Some examples are given below; 
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Step1: 
If both you and the other player choose “A” then you will get +1 (-1 from 
yourself, +2 from the other player = +1 total). 
If both you and the other player choose “B” then you will get 0 (+1 from 
yourself, -1 from the other player= 0 total). 
If you choose “A”, and the other player chooses “B” then you will get –2 (-1 
from yourself, -1 from the other player = -2 total).  
If you choose “B” and the other player chooses “A” then you get +3 (+1 from 
yourself, +2 from the other player = +3 total). 
Step 2: If either player chose “Do not participate in this round” in step 1 then 
this step is skipped. 
If you both you and the other player choose “C” then you will get -2 if the 
other player is “type 1” player (-1 from yourself, -1 from the other player = -2 
total) and -5 if the other player is “type 2” player (-1 from yourself, -4 from the 
other player= -5 total). 
If you both you and the other player choose “D” then you will both get 0 (0 
from yourself, 0 from the other player =0 total). 
If you choose “C”, and the other player chooses “D” then you get -1 (-1 from 
yourself, 0 from the other player = -1 total). 
If you choose “D”, and the other player chooses “C” then you get -1 if the 
other player is a “type 1” player (0 from yourself, -1 from the other player = -1 
total) or -4 if the other player is a “type 2” player (0 from yourself -4 from the 
other player = -4 total).  
Your income for the round will be determined by the addition of your income 
from step 1 and step 2. 
The total number of units that you have at the end of these games will 
determine how much money you have earned. Therefore, the additional money 
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you and the other player each earn depends on which options you both choose. 
However, the final scores of the other players do not matter for your earnings. 
If your total score drops to 0 units or below, you will not be able to play for the 
remaining rounds of the game of the current game.  
At the end of both games, your total earnings will be computed. If you finish with 
a total score of 0 over the two games, you will walk away with just the £5 show 
up fee. If you have a total score above 0, you will earn extra money at the 
exchange rate of 1 unit= 6p. The maximum extra amount that you can earn will be 
£27.  
We will distribute a questionnaire at the end of the experiment that will ask some 
basic information about you. 
Take your time to read through the instructions again. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand. In a few minutes we will begin the questionnaire followed 
by the games. 
3.7.2 Comprehension questions 
All participants were required to answer the following comprehension questions 
before playing the game. If they answered a question incorrectly they were shown 
the correct answer. The possible answers are shown in parentheses. 
1. Each game will last a predetermined number of rounds, between what? (10-200 
/ 20-100 / 0-50) 
2. How many games will you play in this experiment? (1 / 5 / 2) 
3. If you finish the experiment with a total score of 100 units, how much money 
will you earn on top of the £5 show up fee (1 unit = 6p)? (£6 / £10 / £80) 
4. If your total score drops to 0 or below in a game what will happen? (You will 
lose your show up fee / You will have to leave the room / You will not be able to 
play the remaining rounds of the current game) 
5. If you chose option "B" and the other player chooses option "A", how many 
58 
 
units will you get in step 1? (3 / 1 / 10) 
6. If both you and the other player choose option "A", how many units will you 
get in step 1? (1 / 15 / 1) 
7. If you are a "type 1" player and choose option "C" in step 2, how many units 
will be deducted from the other players’ income? (1 / 3 / 5) 
8. If both you and the other player are "type 2" players and you both choose 
option "C", how many units will you get in step 2? (-1 / -5 / 2) 
9.  If both you and the other player are "type 1" players, you both choose option 
"B" in step 1 and both choose option "D" in step 2, how many units will you get in 
that round? (0 / 2 / -5) 
3.7.3 Demographic questions 
After the game had finished, all participants were required to answer the 
following demographic questions. Responses to these demographic questions can 
be found in the supplementary data. 
1. What is your gender?  
2. How old are you?  
3. What is your country of origin?  
4. What is your subject of study?  
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3.7.4 Supplementary tables 
Parameter Weak Strong 
Age Mean = 22.2 ± 0.65 Mean = 21.8 ± 0.44 
Median = 21 Median = 21 
IQR = 24 – 33 IQR = 23 – 33.25 
Range = 20 – 23 Range = 20 - 23 
      
      
Gender  (n) Females = 36 Females = 27 
  Males = 24 Males = 33 
 
  Country of Origin (n)  Canada = 1 China = 10 
 China = 10  Czech Republic = 1 
 Cyprus = 1 Greece = 1 
 France = 1 Hong Kong = 5 
 Germany = 1  Hungary = 1 
 Greece = 2 Malaysia = 5 
 Hong Kong = 6 Mauritius = 1 
 India = 4 Nigeria = 1 
 Iraq = 2 Pakistan = 1 
 Italy = 2 Romania = 2 
 Malawi = 1 Singapore = 8 
 Malaysia = 3 Sri Lanka = 1 
 Pakistan = 1 Sudan = 1 
 Poland = 3 Taiwan = 1 
 Romania = 1  United Kingdom = 17 
 Singapore = 4 United States = 1 
 United Kingdom = 11 Vietnam = 2 
 United States = 2 
  Undisclosed = 1 
  
  Subject Studied (n) Anthropology = 1 Archaeology = 1 
 Architecture = 2 Biochemical Engineering = 1 
 Biochemistry = 1 Biochemistry = 2 
 Biology = 1 Biotechnology = 2 
 Biomedical Sciences = 5 Civil Engineering = 1 
 Biotechnology = 1 Classics = 1 
 Chemical Engineering = 1 Economics = 9 
 Chemistry = 1 Engineering = 1 
 Cognitive Neuroscience = 1 English Linguistics = 1 
 Computer Science = 1 Financial Risk Management = 1 
 Economics = 10 Fine Art = 1 
 Economics & Business = 1 History = 1 
 Egyptian Archaeology = 1 Human Science = 1 
 
Engineering = 3 Languages = 1 
 
English = 1 Law = 5 
 
Genetics = 1 Mathematics = 5 
 
History of Art = 2 Medicine = 4 
 
Humanities = 1 Management = 1 
 
International Planning = 1 Natural Science = 1 
 
International Public Policy = 1 Neuroscience = 2 
 
Italian & Art History = 1 Nutrition = 1 
 
Law = 1 Pharmacy = 3 
 
Hispanic Culture = 1 Physics and Biology = 1  
 
Librarianship = 1 Politics = 1  
 
Medicine = 1 Psychology = 3 
 
Global Health = 1 Security Services = 1 
 
Management = 1 Speech Science = 2 
 
Natural Sciences = 2 Statistics = 1  
 
Neuroscience = 2 Physics = 1 
 
Pharmacy = 3 Urban Design = 1 
 
Philosophy = 1 Urban Planning = 2 
 
Psychology = 2 Viking Studies = 1 
 
Russian and Italian = 1 
 
 
Statistics = 1  
 
 
Physics = 1 
 
 
Urban Design = 1 
 
 
Urban Planning = 2 
 
 
Table 3.S1 Information on mean, median values and sample sizes for 
demographic data. 
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Parameter 
Effect 
size 
 SE Confidence Interval  Importance 
Intercept -1.51 0.14 (-1.78, -1.24)  
Player type (strong) 0.62 0.28 (0.09, 1.17) 1.00 
Game type (asymmetric) 0.17 0.21 (-0.23, 0.57) 1.00 
Partner cooperated (yes) 1.94 0.16 (1.62, 2.27) 1.00 
Partner punished (yes) 0.10 0.22 (-0.34, 0.54) 1.00 
Player type x Game type -0.96 0.42 (-1.78, -1.13) 1.00 
Player type x Partner 
cooperated 
0.31 0.33 (-0.36, 0.94) 1.00 
Player type x Partner 
punished 
-0.67 0.39 (-1.43, 0.09) 1.00 
Game type x Partner 
cooperated 
-0.62 0.34 (-1.28, 0.04) 1.00 
Game type x Partner 
punished 
0.80 0.46 (-0.09, 1.69) 0.70 
Partner cooperated x 
Partner punished 
-1.02 0.38 (-1.76, -0.28) 1.00 
Player type x Game type 
x Partner cooperated  
1.58 0.67 (0.25, 2.90) 1.00 
Player type x Game type 
x Partner punished 
0.79 0.77 (-0.72, 2.30) 0.27 
Game type x Partner 
cooperated x Partner 
punished  
1.10 0.74 (-0.35, 2.56) 0.52 
Table 3.S2 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating 
players' responses to being punished for defecting in the previous round (player 
continued to defect = 0, player switched to cooperate = 1). 
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Chapter 4 
Power Asymmetries and Punishment 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with Variable 
Cooperative Investment 
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4.1 Note 
This work is currently in preparation for submission. Nichola Raihani contributed 
to experimental design and discussion. Redouan Bshary contributed to discussion. 
Brian Wallace contributed to data collection and discussion. I designed the 
experiment, collected the data, analysed the data and wrote the paper. 
4.2 Abstract  
Recent work has found that in economic two-player experiments, players that 
invest in punishment finish with lower payoffs than those who abstain from 
punishing. These results have led researchers to question the effectiveness of 
punishment at promoting cooperation, especially when retaliation is possible. It 
has been suggested that these findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption 
that all players are equal in terms of power. However, a previous empirical study 
which incorporated power asymmetries into an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) 
game failed to show that power asymmetries stabilise cooperation when 
punishment is possible. Instead, players' responses were conditional on their 
partner’s behaviour in the previous round (i.e. players cooperated in response to 
their partner cooperating) and punishment did not yield any additional increase in 
tendency to cooperate. Nevertheless, this previous study only allowed an all-or-
nothing – rather than a variable – cooperation investment. It is possible that power 
asymmetries increase the effectiveness of punishment from strong players only 
when players are able to vary their investment in cooperation. We tested this 
hypothesis using a modified IPD game which allowed players to vary their 
investment in cooperation in response to being punished. As in the previous study, 
punishment from strong players did not promote cooperation under any 
circumstances. Thus, it seems unlikely that human cooperation is promoted by 
either variable investment or power asymmetries in two-player games.   
4.3 Introduction 
Punishment involves paying a cost in order to inflict harm on cheats or defectors 
(Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995). Despite this cost, humans are often willing to 
invest in punishment in laboratory games involving both two players (Dreber et 
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al. 2011; Botelho et al. 2005; Camerer 2003) and multiple players (Bochet et al. 
2006; Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Gürerk et al. 2006; Henrich et al. 2006; Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Ostrom et 
al. 1992; Page et al. 2005; Rockenbach & Milinski 2006; Yamagishi 1986). 
Subjective pleasure from punishing others seems to be the proximate mechanism 
underlying such actions (de Quervain et al. 2004; Buckholtz et al. 2008). On a 
functional level, punishers may benefit from this investment if the target (or a 
bystander) behaves more cooperatively in future interactions (Clutton-Brock & 
Parker 1995; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012; dos Santos et al. 2013; Raihani & 
Bshary 2015). 
However, empirical studies using two-player games have found that punishment 
reduces the payoffs of punishers (Dreber et al. 2008) and has no effect on the 
payoffs of their groups (Botelho et al. 2005; Dreber et al. 2008). Similarly, in 
multiplayer games punishment has been shown to have no effect (Bochet et al. 
2006; Page et al. 2005) or even reduce (Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Ostrom et al. 1992; Sefton et al. 2007) group payoffs in all but long -run 
encounters (Gächter et al. 2008). Moreover, when retaliation is possible, 
punishment reduces payoffs even in long-run encounters (Engelmann & 
Nikiforakis 2012). The threat of retaliation potentially increases the cost of 
punishment because punishers not only pay the cost of punishing itself but also 
any cost incurred if partners retaliate. 
Previous studies have typically assumed that all players are equal in terms of 
power, meaning that all players can punish for the same cost and impose the same 
fine on targets (Botelho et al. 2005; Dreber et al. 2008; Bochet et al. 2006; Page et 
al. 2005; Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Gächter et al. 2008; Ostrom 
et al. 1992; Sefton et al. 2007; Engelmann & Nikiforakis 2012). In reality, 
individuals are expected to vary in power, such that some players are able to 
inflict greater harm than their partners are able to reciprocate. When power 
asymmetries exist, it is expected that stronger players will punish weaker players 
but that weaker players will be unlikely to retaliate (Clutton-Brock & Parker 
1995; Axelrod 1984; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2010). This 
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prediction is borne out by data from the interspecific mutualism between cleaner 
fish (Labroides dimidiatus) and their reef-fish 'clients'.  Cleaners provide a 
cleaning service to clients by removing skin ectoparasites (Grutter 1996). 
Although cleaner fish obtain nutrients from eating these ectoparasites, they prefer 
to eat the client’s mucus, which constitutes 'cheating' (Grutter & Bshary 2003). If 
bitten, clients often terminate the interaction (Bshary & Grutter 2002). Cleaners 
sometimes work together in mixed sex pairs when cleaning a client. This creates a 
situation akin to a prisoner’s dilemma because whilst only one cleaner can reap 
the benefits of eating the client’s mucus, both share the cost of the interaction 
being terminated. A game theoretic analysis of this scenario demonstrated that for 
almost the entire parameter space, mutual defection is an evolutionary stable 
strategy (Bshary et al. 2008). Despite this, cleaner fish appear to have found a 
cooperative solution and pairs of interacting cleaner fish provide a better service 
to clients (more ectoparasite removal and less biting) than singletons (Bshary et 
al. 2008). The male fish are larger than the females and punish them by chasing 
them if they cheat (Raihani et al. 2010). Punished females behave more 
cooperatively in the next interaction with that male (Raihani et al. 2010). 
However, females never punish or retaliate against cheating males, apparently due 
to the size difference (Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012; Raihani et al. 2010), 
suggesting that power asymmetries might stabilize cooperation in these mixed-sex 
interactions (Raihani, Pinto, et al. 2012; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012). 
Power asymmetries may also stabilize cooperation in human social dilemmas by 
making punishment from strong individuals more effective at promoting 
cooperation than in symmetric games. Nevertheless, recent empirical work which 
has incorporated power asymmetries into economic games has failed to detect any 
positive effect of power asymmetries on the effectiveness of punishment for 
strong players. One such study explored the effects of power asymmetries in a 
public goods game (Nikiforakis et al. 2010). The authors found that asymmetries 
had no effect on punishment use, contributions to a public good or average 
payoffs. Although incurring punishment was shown to increase the contributions 
of low contributors, the authors did not test whether the effectiveness of 
punishment use was affected by power asymmetries. Moreover, in this study 
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retaliation was not possible because players were not informed which of their 
peers punished them. A more recent study explored the effects of power 
asymmetries in a two-player iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game where 
retaliation was possible (Bone et al. 2015; Chapter 3 of this thesis). In this study, 
defecting players were more likely to cooperate in the next round if their partner 
cooperated, but punishment from the partner did not yield any additional benefits 
in either symmetric or asymmetric games. Moreover, counter to theoretical 
predictions, weak players were more likely to punish and retaliate in asymmetric 
games (i.e. against strong punishers) than in symmetric games. In fact, weak and 
strong players were equally likely to retaliate against strong partners (Bone et al. 
2015). 
One suggestion for why punishment from strong players failed to promote 
cooperation from weak partners in this setting is because cooperation was a binary 
decision: players could only choose between cooperate or defect. In such a setting, 
if the player's decision to cooperate (or defect) is conditioned on the partner's 
behaviour in the previous round, then there is little scope for punishment to have 
an additional positive effect on the behaviour of this individual.  In fact, 
cooperation in real-life situations often involves a variable rather than an all-or-
nothing investment (Frean 1996; Roberts & Sherratt 1998). For example, the 
cooperative allogrooming behavior exhibited in many animals (e.g. chacma 
baboons (Papio cyanocephalus ursinus)) may last from just a few seconds, up for 
several minutes (Barrett et al. 2000). Similarly, in the cleaner fish example, 
although defecting is a binary outcome (bite client / do not bite client) cooperative 
investment is variable (duration of time 'cooperating' by removing ectoparasites; 
Bshary et al. 2008). We therefore asked whether power asymmetries affected 
players’ average cooperation levels as well as their tendency to (i) increase their 
cooperation investment and (ii) retaliate in response to being punished when 
cooperation was a variable rather than binary investment. 
In order to address this question we used a modified version of the IPD game, 
with variable rather than binary investments. The game was structured such that 
increasing investments yielded mutual benefits but each player could gain a larger 
66 
 
benefit than the partner by choosing a slightly lower investment. Thus, the payoffs 
yielded the same incentive to defect as in the traditional prisoner's dilemma game 
(Table 4.1). Asymmetries were incorporated into the game by allowing strong 
players to interact with weak players. As in previous work (Nikiforakis et al. 
2010; Bone et al. 2015) investing in punishment cost all players the same amount 
but strong players could inflict greater damage through punishing than weak 
players. 
We predicted that players would be most likely to punish if their partner chose a 
lower cooperative investment than themselves (i.e. players would be more likely 
to punish defecting partners). Since previous work has found that in asymmetric 
games strong players were more likely to punish than weak players (Nikiforakis et 
al. 2010; Bone et al. 2015), we expected to replicate this pattern in this study. 
Based on theoretical and empirical insights (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; 
Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012), we predicted that being 
punished by a strong partner would induce weak players to increase their 
investment in cooperation in the next round, though we did not expect to find the 
same effect of punishment when strong players were punished by either weak or 
strong partners. Consequently, we envisaged that punishment from strong players 
would be more effective at promoting cooperation in asymmetric games than in 
symmetric games. 
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Partner  
 
 Cooperation 
level 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 0 (3, 3) (6, 0) (6, 0) (6, 0) (6, 0) (6, 0) 
 1 (0, 6) (4, 4) (7, 1) (7, 1) (7, 1) (7, 1) 
Player 2 (0, 6) (1, 7) (5, 5) (8, 2) (8, 2) (8, 2) 
 3 (0, 6) (1, 7) (2, 8) (6, 6) (9, 3) (9, 3) 
 4 (0, 6) (1, 7) (2, 8) (3, 9) (7, 7) (10, 4) 
 5 (0, 6) (1, 7) (2, 8) (3, 9) (4, 10) (8, 8) 
Table 4.1 Payoff matrix for players (player, partner) in step 1 of each round of the 
experiment. The player's cooperation level is given in the rows and their partner's 
cooperation level is given in the columns.  
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Experimental protocol 
This research was approved by the University College London ethics board 
(project number 3720/001). All subjects remained anonymous so informed 
consent about the use of personal data was deemed unnecessary and was therefore 
waived by the University College London ethics board. The experiment took 
place over six sessions (one in May 2012, one in Nov 2012 and four in October 
2014) in the experimental laboratory in the Department of Economics, University 
College London. The lab consists of twenty computers, which are visually 
partitioned. A total of 120 participants (71 women, 49 men, mean age ± se = 20.89 
± 0.20 years) were recruited from the student population to play a modified IPD 
game with a punishment option. Players interacted anonymously in pair-wise 
encounters by means of computer screens using the z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) 
software. Each player played two games: one game with a partner of the same 
type as themselves (symmetric) and one game with a partner of a different type 
(asymmetric). The order in which players played symmetric and asymmetric 
68 
 
games was counter-balanced. All players were paid a £5.00 show-up fee and their 
final score was summed over both games and multiplied by £0.02 to determine 
additional earned income. Thus, one game unit corresponded to £0.02. To allow 
for negative incomes while maintaining the £5.00 show-up fee, all players began 
each game with 100 units (£2.00) to play with. The average payment per player 
was £19.34 and the average session length was 90 minutes. Prior to the 
experiment, each player was given written instructions about the game structure 
and required to answer ten comprehension questions to verify their understanding 
of the game (see supplementary materials for experimental instructions and 
questions). The average score from the comprehension questions was 88 %. 
Players were informed of the correct answers after the test.  
The modified IPD game lasted 50 rounds. To avoid end effects (Rapoport & Dale 
1966), players were told that each game would last between 20 and 100 rounds. 
Players’ behaviour did not change abruptly towards the end of the game (Figure 
4.S1), indicating that end effects were absent. Each round was split into two steps 
as follows: 
Step 1: Both players simultaneously chose for how long they would like to 
cooperate with their partner. They could choose a time between zero and five 
seconds. For every second that both players cooperated they both got one unit. 
Whoever chose the shortest amount of time to cooperate for determined the 
duration of the interaction in that round and received a termination bonus of six 
units. If both players chose to interact for the same amount of time the interaction 
bonus was split into three units each. Hereafter, the amount of time a player chose 
to cooperate for will be called the players ‘cooperation level’. After both players 
made their choice, they were shown the cooperation level they chose, whether 
their partner chose a higher, lower or equal cooperation level (but not the exact 
cooperation level chosen by their partner) and each player's payoffs from this step. 
Step 2: Players were then given the option of whether or not to punish their 
partner (described below). At the end of step 2, players were shown their own and 
their partner's choice and payoff from step 2, as well as the cumulative payoffs for 
both players for that round and their own total payoff (summed over all rounds). 
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At the end of the first game, players were presented with the final scores and then 
randomly re-matched for the second game.  
Players were randomly split into two types: weak and strong. Weak players 
punished with a 1 : 1 fee to fine ratio, meaning that if they chose to punish their 
partner it would cost them one unit and it would also cost their partner one unit. 
Strong players punished with a 1 : 6 fee to fine ratio, meaning that punishing their 
partner would cost them one unit but it would cost their partner six units. A 1 : 6 
fee to fine ratio was chosen because the termination bonus was six units; thus, if 
players who chose to cooperate for a smaller amount of time than a strong partner 
were punished their payoff was lower than if they had chosen an equal or higher 
cooperation level than their partner.  
To rule out the possibility that less powerful players were being coerced into a 
position where they would do better if they could avoid interacting with the 
aggressor altogether (e.g. (Nikiforakis et al. 2014)), players could choose to not 
participate (opt-out) in any round of the game. This option was presented in step 
one of each round of the game and meant that the current round was skipped and 
the next round then began as normal. 
In order to avoid framing effects, neutral language was used. Player types “weak” 
and “strong” were replaced with “type 1” and “type 2”, “cooperate” was replaced 
with “interact” and “punish” and “don’t punish” were replaced by “option C” and 
“option D”. After both games had finished, all subjects were required to fill in a 
questionnaire to provide demographic information (see Supplementary materials 
for questions and demographic data). 
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4.4.2 Analyses 
We used a series of generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs), to ask the 
following questions: 
1. Did the mean cooperation level chosen by weak and strong players depend 
on whether they were in a symmetric or asymmetric game?  
For each subject we first calculated the mean cooperation level chosen in each 
game they played. The mean cooperation levels were then set as the dependent 
term in a GLMM with the following explanatory terms: ‘player type’ (a 2-level 
factor with levels weak/strong), ‘game type’ (a 2-level factor with levels 
symmetric/asymmetric) and the two-way interaction ‘player type x game type’.  
2. Did the propensity of weak and strong players to punish their partner 
depend on whether they were in a symmetric or asymmetric game?  
Punishment was coded as a binary response term (player did not punish = 0; 
player punished = 1) and set as the dependent variable in a GLMM, with the 
following explanatory terms: ‘player type’ (a 2-level factor with levels 
weak/strong), ‘game type’ (a 2-level factor with levels symmetric/asymmetric) 
and the two-way interaction ‘player type x game type’. Instances of hypocritical 
or antisocial punishment (where the player punished the partner despite having 
chosen an equal or lower cooperation level than their partner, respectively) were 
not included in this model, leaving an N of 1735 rounds available for analysis.  
3. Did punishing a cheating partner affect the punisher’s total payoff?  
The proportion of instances in which players punished a partner who chose a 
lower cooperation level than themselves was set as the dependent variable in a 
GLMM, with the following explanatory terms: ‘player type’ (a 2-level factor with 
levels weak/strong), ‘game type’ (a 2-level factor with levels 
symmetric/asymmetric) and the two-way interaction ‘player type x game type’. 
Players whose partner never chose a lower cooperation level than themselves were 
not included in this analysis, leaving N of 198 players available for analysis.  
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4. Did being punished affect the likelihood that a player would increase their 
cooperation level in the next round in symmetric and asymmetric games?  
Following Bone et al. (2015), we compared the likelihood that players increased 
their cooperation level in round n+1 after having been punished (or not) in round 
n. Whether or not players increased their cooperation level in round n+1 was 
coded as a binary response term (player didn’t change or decreased cooperation 
level = 0; player increased cooperation level = 1) and set as the dependent variable 
in a GLMM, with the following explanatory terms: ‘player type’, ‘game type’, 
‘partner punished in round n’ (a 2-level factor with levels no/yes), all two-way 
interactions and the three-way interaction. If the player or their partner opted out 
of either round n or round n+1 then both round n and round n+1 were excluded 
from the analysis. In addition, instances of antisocial or hypocritical punishment 
were not included in this model. Thus, data were restricted to instances where the 
player chose a lower cooperation level than their partner in round n, leaving an N 
of 1655 rounds available for analysis. 
5. Did being punished increase the likelihood that a player would retaliate in 
the next round in symmetric and asymmetric games?  
We classed a player as retaliating if they punished a partner who chose a higher 
cooperation level than themselves in round n + 1 (i.e. 'antisocially' punished the 
partner), having been punished (restricted to justified punishment) by that partner 
in round n.  Whether or not players punished their (cooperative) partner in round 
n+1 was coded as a binary response term (player did not punish = 0; player 
punished = 1) and set as the dependent variable in a GLMM, with the following 
explanatory terms: ‘player type’ (a 2-level factor with levels weak/strong), ‘game 
type’ (a 2-level factor with levels symmetric/asymmetric), ‘partner punished in 
round n’ (a 2-level factor with levels no/yes), all two-way interactions and the 
three-way interaction. A positive effect of the term ‘partner punished in round n’ 
would indicate that players retaliated in response to being punished. If the player 
or their partner opted out of either round n or round n+1 then both round n and 
round n+1 were excluded from the analysis. Data were restricted to instances 
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where the player chose a lower cooperation level than their partner in round n and 
round n+1, leaving an N of 875 rounds available for analysis. 
6. Did the propensity of weak and strong players to punish opt out depend on 
whether they were in a symmetric or asymmetric game? 
 The response term encoded whether the player opted out of the round (player 
didn’t opt out = 0, player opted out = 1). The explanatory variables included in 
this model were: ‘player type’ (a 2-level factor with levels weak/strong), ‘game 
type’ (a 2-level factor with levels symmetric/asymmetric) and the two-way 
interaction ‘player type x game type. All data were included in this analysis (N = 
12000 rounds). This analysis showed that although opting out of rounds was 
generally rare, weak players in asymmetric games were more likely to opt out 
than players in other conditions (Table 4.2; Table 4.S2). 
7. Did being punished increase the likelihood that a player would opt out in 
the next round in symmetric and asymmetric games? 
Data were restricted to instances where the player had chosen a lower cooperation 
level than their partner in round n (i.e. the effect of antisocial or hypocritical 
punishment on the probability that the target opted out was not measured). Due to 
the small proportion of rounds in which strong players or weak players in 
symmetric games opted out (Table 4.2), we did not have the statistical power to 
test what factors affected opt out decisions for these players. Thus, data were 
restricted to weak players in asymmetric games (448 rounds were included in this 
analysis). Whether or not the player opted out of round n+1 was coded as a binary 
response term (player didn’t opt out = 0, player opted out = 1) and set as the 
dependent variable in a GLMM. The only explanatory variable included in this 
model was: ‘partner punished in round n’ (a 2-level factor with levels no/yes).  
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4.4.3 Statistical methods 
Data were analysed using R version 2.15.2 (R Development Core Team 2011). 
Generalised linear mixed models (GLMMs) with Gaussian error structure and 
identity link function were used for analysis 1 and 3 and GLMMs with binomial 
error structure and logit link function were used for analyses 2, 4 & 5. GLMMs 
allow repeated measures to be fitted as random terms, thus controlling for their 
effects on the distribution of the data. For all models, player identity was included 
as a random term. Explanatory input variables were centred by subtracting their 
mean (Schielzeth 2010). After centring, continuous explanatory input variables 
were then standardized by dividing by 2 standard deviations.  
4.5 Results 
1. Did weak and strong players, respectively, chose different mean 
cooperation levels in asymmetric and symmetric games  
Players often chose a non-zero cooperation level (mean proportion of rounds 
players chose non-zero cooperation level ± SE = 0.74 ± 0.03; Figure 4.1). Weak 
players chose higher cooperation levels in asymmetric games than in symmetric 
games (Table 4.2; Table 4.3; Figure 4.2). In contrast, strong players chose higher 
cooperation levels in symmetric games than in asymmetric games (Table 4.2; 
Table 4.3; Figure 4.2). Thus, both weak and strong players were most likely to 
cooperate if their partner was strong. In asymmetric games, weak and strong 
players chose equally high cooperation levels (Table 4.2; Table 4.3; Figure 4.2). In 
all conditions, mean cooperation levels increased slightly over the course of the 
game (Table 4.2; Figure 4.3). Cooperation levels appeared to increase more 
rapidly for strong players in symmetric games than for other players (Table 4.2; 
Figure 4.3). 
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2. Did the propensity of weak and strong players to punish their partner 
depend on whether they were in a symmetric or asymmetric game? 
In general, players were most likely to punish if their partner chose a lower 
cooperation level than themselves (‘justified punishment’) than if their partner 
chose an equal cooperation level (‘hypocritical punishment’) or a higher 
cooperation level (‘antisocial punishment’; Table 4.2). We investigated how the 
player's type (weak or strong) and game type (symmetric or asymmetric) affected 
their tendency to invest in justified punishment. Weak players were generally less 
likely to punish than strong players and, as expected, were more punitive in 
symmetric games than in asymmetric games (Table 4.2; Table 4.4; Figure 4.4). 
Strong players, on the other hand, were more likely to punish in asymmetric than 
symmetric games (Table 4.2; Table 4.4; Figure 4.4). Over the course of the game, 
use of justified punishment decreased for all but strong players in symmetric 
games; for these players justified punishment actually increased throughout the 
game (Table 4.2; Figure 4.3). In all conditions, use of hypocritical and antisocial 
punishment started low but decreased to even lower levels over the game (Table 
4.2; Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.1 Histogram of cooperation levels chosen by players. Data exclude 
rounds where either player opted out.  
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 Weak players Strong players 
 Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric 
Cooperation 
level (whole 
game) 
2.46 ± 0.23 2.91 ± 0.24  3.22 ± 0.22  2.94 ± 0.23 
Cooperation 
level (last 10 
rounds) 
2.68 ± 0.09 3.19 ± 0.09 3.75 ± 0.08  3.17 ± 0.09 
Justified 
punishment 
(whole 
game) 
0.19 ± 0.04 0.14 ± 0.04 0.30 ± 0.05 0.41 ± 0.05 
Justified 
punishment 
(last 10 
rounds) 
0.02 ±  0.02 0.11 ± 0.04 0.18 ± 0.06 0.56 ± 0.07 
Hypocritical 
punishment 
(whole 
game) 
0.01 ± 0.00 0.02 ± 0.00 0.05 ± 0.00 0.06 ± 0.01 
Hypocritical 
punishment 
(last 10 
rounds) 
0.00 ± 0.00  0.02 ± 0.01 0.01 ± 0.00 0.03 ± 0.01 
Antisocial 
punishment 
(whole 
game) 
0.03 ± 0.01 0.07 ± 0.03 0.16 ± 0.04 0.17 ± 0.04 
Antisocial 
punishment 
(last 10 
rounds) 
0.00 ± 0.00  0.02 ± 0.02 0.2 ± 0.06 0.03 ± 0.02 
Opted out 0.01 ± 0.00 0.07 ± 0.02 0.02 ± 0.01 0.01 ± 0.00 
Total payoff 376.09 ± 15.90  337.48 ± 19.66  311.19 ± 17.35   327.82 ± 16.89  
Table 4.2 Summary data for mean cooperation level, mean proportion of instances 
where the player punished (justified / hypocritical / antisocial) and opted out and 
mean total payoffs (all means +/- SEM). 
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Figure 4.2 Barplot showing the mean (+/- SEM) cooperation levels chosen by 
weak and strong players in symmetric and asymmetric games. Data exclude 
rounds where either player opted out. Plots are generated from raw data. 
Parameter 
Effect 
size 
 SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Importance 
Intercept 2.88 0.14 (2.61, 3.15)  
Game  type (asymmetric) 0.09 0.17 (-0.25, 0.42) 0.71 
Player type (strong) 0.40 0.27 (-0.15, 0.94) 0.41 
Game type x Player type -0.74 0.34 (-1.41, -0.07) 0.41 
Table 4.3 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating which 
factors affected the mean cooperation level chosen the player in each game. Data 
were restricted to instances where the player chose a higher cooperation level than 
their partner in that round. 
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Figure 4.3 Scatter plot showing a) the mean cooperation level chosen; and the 
mean proportion of players that chose b) justified punishment c) hypocritical 
punishment and d) antisocial punishment in each round according to whether they 
were weak or strong and whether they were in a symmetric or asymmetric game. 
Rounds where either player opted out were excluded. 
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Figure 4.4 Barplot showing the mean (+/- SEM) proportion of instances in which 
weak and strong players punished their partner in symmetric and asymmetric 
games. Data were restricted to instances where the player chose a higher 
cooperation level than their partner and exclude rounds where either player opted 
out.  Plots are generated from raw data. 
Parameter 
Effect 
size 
 SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Importance 
Intercept -1.84  0.22 (-2.31, -1.42)  
Game  type (asymmetric) 0.09 0.19 (-0.28, 0.45) 1.00 
Player type (strong) 1.70 0.43 (0.86, 2.59) 1.00 
Game type x Player type 1.68 0.37 (0.96, 2.42) 1.00 
Table 4.4 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating which 
factors affected whether players punished their partners (player did not punish 
partner = 0; player punished partner = 1). Data were restricted to instances where 
the player chose a higher cooperation level than their partner in that round. 
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3. Did punishing a cheating partner affect the punisher’s total payoff? 
Justified punishment had no effect on the punisher’s payoff, regardless of player 
type or game type (Table 4.5; Figure 4.5). Nevertheless, weak player generally 
received higher payoffs than strong players (Table 4.2; Table 4.5). Although it 
appears that both weak and strong players received lower payoffs when 
interacting with a strong partner, the confidence interval for the interaction term 
crossed zero meaning evidence for this effect is weak (Table 4.2; Table 4.5). 
4. Did being punished affect the likelihood that a player would increase their 
cooperation level in the next round in symmetric and asymmetric games?  
Justified punishment had no discernible effect on the target's tendency to increase 
their cooperation level in the next round, regardless of whether they were weak or 
strong or the game type (Table 4.6; Figure 4.6).  
5. Did being punished increase the likelihood that a player would retaliate in 
the next round in symmetric and asymmetric games? 
Weak and strong players both retaliated in response to justified punishment (i.e. 
they were more likely to punish a cooperative partner if this partner had punished 
them in the previous round than when the partner had not punished in the previous 
round; Table 4.7; Figure 4.7). Contrary to our predictions, neither the player’s type 
nor game type had an effect on whether players retaliated against punitive partners 
(Table 4.7; Figure 4.7). Although strong players in symmetric games appeared to 
retaliate more frequently than players in other conditions (Figure 4.7), the 3-way 
interaction between the players type, the game type and whether or not the player 
was punished by their partner in the previous round was not a component of the 
top models, meaning evidence for this effect is weak.  
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6. Did the propensity of weak and strong players to punish opt out depend on 
whether they were in a symmetric or asymmetric game? 
Although opting out of rounds was generally rare, weak players in asymmetric 
games were more likely to opt out than players in any other condition (Table 4.2; 
Table 4.8). 
7. Did being punished increase the likelihood that a player would opt out in 
the next round in symmetric and asymmetric games? 
We did not have the statistical power to test what factors affected opt out decisions 
for all but weak players in asymmetric games. However, weak players in 
asymmetric games were more likely to opt out if they were punished by their 
partner in the previous round (proportion opting out if partner didn’t punish = 0.00 
± 0.0 versus if partner punished 0.09 ± 0.02; Table 4.9).  
 
Parameter Estimate  SE Confidence Interval Importance 
Intercept 339.07 9.30 (320.72, 357.41)  
Player type (strong) -37.88 18.60 (-74.56, -1.20) 1.00 
Game type 
(asymmetric) -13.80 15.74 (-44.84, 17.24) 0.56 
Player type x Game 
type 54.06 31.31 (-7.70, 115.82) 0.33 
Table 4.5. Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models for the response 
term encoding ‘total payoff’. 
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Figure 4.5. Scatter plots showing how the probability of punishing in response to 
defection affected total payoffs in symmetric and asymmetric games for (a) weak 
players and (b) strong players. Circles represent raw data points; red circles are 
symmetric games and blue circles are asymmetric games.  
 
Parameter 
Effect 
size 
 SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Importance 
Intercept -0.09 0.14 (-0.37, 0.19)  
Partner punished in 
round n (yes) 
-0.19 0.16 (-0.50, 0.12) 0.43 
Player type (strong) 0.31 0.29 (-0.25, 0.88) 0.31 
Game type 
(asymmetric) 
0.10 0.13 (-0.17, 0.36) 0.22 
Table 4.6 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating which 
factors affected whether or not players increased their cooperation level in round 
n+1 relative to round n (player didn’t change or decreased cooperation level = 0; 
player increased cooperation level = 1). Data were restricted to instances where 
the player chose a lower cooperation level than their partner in round n.   
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Figure 4.6 Barplot showing the mean proportion of instances in which weak and 
strong players in a) symmetric games and b) asymmetric games increased their 
cooperation level in round n+1 relative to round n, according to whether or not 
they were punished by their partner in round n. Data were restricted to instances 
where the player chose a lower cooperation level than their partner in round n and 
exclude instances where either player opted out in round n or n+1.  Error bars 
represent standard errors. Plots are generated from raw data.  
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Figure 4.7 Barplot showing the mean proportion +/- SE of instances that weak 
and strong players in a) symmetric and b) asymmetric games punished a more 
cooperative partner in round n+1, according to whether they were punished by 
their partner in round n. Data were restricted to instances in which the player 
choose a lower cooperation level than their partner in round n and n+1. Rounds 
where either player opted out in round n or n+1 were also excluded. Red bars 
represent antisocial punishment whereas blue bars can be interpreted as retaliation 
for punishment previously received. Plots are generated from raw data.  
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Parameter Effect size  SE Confidence Interval Importance 
Intercept -3.83 0.50 (-4.81, -2.86)  
Partner punished in 
round n (yes) 2.71 0.46 (1.81, 3.61) 1.00 
Player type (strong) 1.75 0.69 (0.43, 3.06) 1.00 
Game type 
(asymmetric) 0.41 0.41 (-3.85, 1.21) 0.44 
Game type x Partner 
punished in round n -1.13 0.84 (-2.77, 0.51) 0.21 
Partner punished in 
round n x Player type 0.19 0.87 (-1.51, 1.89) 0.15 
Table 4.7 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating which 
factors affected whether a player punished  a cooperative partner (player did not 
punish = 0; player punished = 1). Data were restricted to instances the player 
chose a lower cooperation level than their partner in round n and round n+1. The 
term 'partner punished in round n' describes whether the punishment can be 
interpreted as retaliation (i.e. player retaliating against a punitive partner) or 
antisocial punishment (i.e. player punishing a cooperative partner). 
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Parameter 
Effect 
size 
 SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Importance 
Intercept -9.88 1.01 (-11.91, -7.94)  
Players type (strong) 0.18 0.93 (-1.66, 2.05) 1.00 
Game type (asymmetric) 1.17 0.19 (0.79, 1.56) 1.00 
Players type x Game type -4.42 0.39 (-5.21, -3.69) 1.00 
Table 4.8 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating which 
factors affected whether the player opted out of rounds of the game (player did not 
opt out = 0; player opted out = 1).  
 
Parameter 
Effect 
size  SE Confidence Interval Importance 
Intercept -10.18 2.85 (-17.08, -5.86)  
Partner punished in 
round n 3.32 1.52 (0.93, 7.21) 1.00 
Table 4.9 Effect sizes, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models investigating which 
factors affected whether the player opted out of rounds of the game (player didn’t 
opt out of round n+1  = 0, player opted out of round n+1 = 1). Data are restricted 
to weak players in asymmetric games in instances where the player chose a lower 
cooperation level than their partner in round n. 
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4.6 Discussion 
Animal research has been suggested that asymmetries in punishing power may 
stabilize cooperation in humans by making punishment from strong individuals 
more effective at promoting cooperation than in symmetric games (Raihani, Pinto, 
et al. 2012; Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012; Úbeda 
& Duéñez-Guzmán 2011). However, a previous empirical study which 
incorporated power asymmetries into an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game 
failed to find any positive effect of power asymmetries on cooperation (Bone et al. 
2015). This failure was potentially due to decisions involving an all-or-nothing – 
rather than a variable – cooperation investment (Bone et al. 2015). We used a 
modified IPD game to test how power asymmetries affect the use of punishment 
and its effectiveness at promoting cooperation when both variable cooperation 
investment and retaliation were possible.  
As expected, players were most likely to punish partners that chose a lower 
cooperation level than themselves and as observed in previous studies 
(Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Ostrom et al. 1992; Falk et al. 2005; Egas & Riedl 
2008; Nikiforakis et al. 2010; Bone et al. 2015), strong players were more likely 
than weak players to punish their partners. In addition, strong players were more 
likely to punish a weak than a strong partner. Weak players, on the other hand, 
were less likely to punish when faced with a strong partner. These findings 
support the prediction that punishment is most likely to operate down a 
dominance hierarchy (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Axelrod 1984; Raihani, 
Thornton, et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2010; Bshary et al. 2008). 
Other findings did not support our predictions based on animal research (Raihani 
et al. 2010). For example, we predicted that weak players would respond to 
punishment from strong partners with increased cooperation in the next round, 
whereas we did not expect such an effect when strong players were punished by 
either weak or strong partners. However, we found that in all conditions, 
punishment had no effect on a target's tendency to increase their cooperation level 
in the next round. Moreover, players' tendency to retaliate against punishers did 
not vary with game type for either strong or weak players.  These findings are 
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consistent with previous work which incorporated power asymmetries into an IPD 
(Bone et al. 2015) and suggest that, in two-player prisoner's dilemma games at 
least, punishment might not be an effective strategy for motivating partners to 
cooperate.  
Instead, the fact that punishment rarely induced partners to cooperate and often 
invoked retaliation  supports the idea that conditionally cooperative strategies 
might often outperform punitive strategies in two-player games (Rand et al. 
2009). Such conditionally cooperative strategies are expected to be less effective 
in multiplayer games where defection harms cooperative partners as well as 
defectors (Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012). Punishment may therefore be more 
effective in multiplayer games than in two-player games (e.g. Przepiorka & 
Diekmann 2013).  
Empirical studies using repeated public goods games have shown that players 
increase their cooperation levels if they know their peers are able to punish them 
(compared to a no punishment treatment) even if they are not informed whether or 
not they were punished after each round (Vyrastekova et al. 2008; Fudenberg & 
Pathak 2010). These studies suggest that the mere threat of punishment may deter 
cheating; regardless of whether punishment is actually observed (Vyrastekova et 
al. 2008; Fudenberg & Pathak 2010). In other words, knowing they face the 
possibility of being punished may lead individuals to increase their cooperation 
levels a priori to being punished. Although in our study players’ tendency to 
increase their cooperation level in response to punishment was not affected by 
player type or game type, throughout the game, weak players generally chose 
higher cooperation levels in asymmetric games than in symmetric games. This 
finding suggests that the mere threat of punishment from a strong partner may 
have deterred weak players from defecting more effectively than the threat of 
being punished by a weak partner; even though actually incurring punishment did 
not change players’ behaviour.  If the threat of punishment sufficiently deters 
weak players in asymmetric games from cheating then strong players in 
asymmetric games would be required to punish less often (Cant 2011). This would 
reduce the cost associated with punishment for strong players in asymmetric 
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games; along with conveying benefits related to interacting with a more 
cooperative partner. It is possible that strong players would take the threat of 
being punished by a strong partner less seriously because they possess a credible 
threat of retaliation of their own (Cant 2011). If this were the case, then we would 
have expected that strong players would cooperate less than weak players when 
paired with a strong partner.  However, strong players in symmetric games 
actually chose higher mean cooperation levels than weak players in asymmetric 
games, suggesting that the threat of being punished by a strong partner deterred 
cheating regardless of whether the player was weak or strong. Perhaps more 
puzzling is the finding that weak and strong players were equally cooperative in 
asymmetric games. It is possible that the high levels of cooperation exhibited by 
strong players in asymmetric games were a result of conditionally cooperative 
strategies, whereby strong players behaved cooperatively because they believed 
their weak partners would cooperate as well (Croson 2001; Keser & van Winden 
2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fischbacher & Gaechter 2006; Bone et al. 2015); 
rather than because they feared being punished. These findings are consistent with 
the Bone et al. (2015) study where it was found that while incurring punishment 
did not elicit cooperation from targets in the following round, players were 
generally more cooperative if their partner was strong. Although the implications 
of this finding were not discussed in the earlier study (Bone et al. 2015), together 
these studies suggest that the threat of punishment from a strong player may be 
sufficient to promote cooperation (Cant 2011), even if actual punishment has no 
effect. Further work is required to understand how the threat of punishment (even 
when never implemented) promotes cooperation when power asymmetries are 
present. Future work could incorporate power asymmetries into a set-up similar to 
that used by Vyrastekova et al. (2008) & Fudenberg & Pathak (2010), whereby 
players were not informed of whether or not they were punished by their peers 
after each round of the game (Vyrastekova et al. 2008; Fudenberg & Pathak 2010). 
Although weak players were less likely to punish strong partners than weak 
partners, this effect was relatively small and weak players did still often punish in 
asymmetric games. The fact that weak players punished and retaliated against 
strong partners in these human experiments but in the cleaner fish system, female 
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fish never punish or retaliate against larger, dominant males (Bshary et al. 2008; 
Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012) may be associated with the 
different costs associated with provoking aggressive responses from a more 
dominant partner. For example, in this experiment and Bone et al. (2015) 
punishment (or retaliation) from a strong partner meant losing a known and 
relatively small amount of money. However, for female cleaner fish the cost of 
associated with provoking punishment (or retaliation) from a male fish is 
unknown and could potentially be fatal. In addition, for female fish, retaliating 
against a punitive male carries a risk of escalating aggression which was not 
possible in our game because opportunities to punish and the impact of 
punishment were fixed. The relatively small costs associated with being punished 
may also in part explain the ineffectiveness of punishment at promoting 
cooperation in both this study and Bone et al. (2015). Crucially, ‘cheating’ players 
received a higher payoff than their partner even if they were punished by a strong 
partner. Thus, if players are motivated by a desire to out-compete their partner as 
suggested in previous work (e.g. Fershtman et al. 2012; Houser & Xiao 2010), 
avoiding punishment may not have proved a sufficient incentive for players to 
behave more cooperatively. Future work should ask whether power asymmetries 
promote cooperation when the costs associated with retaliation are larger or have 
the possibility to escalate. 
An alternative explanation for why weak players readily punished and retaliated 
against strong partners is that although we incorporated power asymmetries into 
the game these may have failed to translate into dominant and subordinate social 
roles in players’ minds. This could stem from the use of neutral language in the 
game instructions given to participants. For example, although players were aware 
of the different payoff consequences of actions performed by the two player types, 
weak and strong players were referred to as ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ respectively. It 
is possible than these labels were not salient enough to elicit the behavioural 
responses we expected. This is a stark contrast to the famous Stanford prison 
experiment (Haney et al. 1973) where participants were randomly assigned the 
role of a prisoner or guard. In this experiment, effort was taken to make the 
situation as realistic as possible (e.g. guards were given sticks and uniforms and 
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prisoners role were arrested by the police department, deloused, forced to wear 
chains and prison garments). Under these conditions, within a short time both 
guards and prisoners settled into their new roles leading to extreme 
transformations of character (Haney et al. 1973). Other studies have shown that 
using loaded language like ‘bribe’ and ‘punish’ rather than neutral equivalents can 
produce significant changes in subjects' behaviour in economic games (e.g. 
Cameron et al. 2009). Although neutrally worded instructions have become a 
mainstream practice in behavioural experiments, it has been argued that it may be 
more useful to explore the effect of context rather than attempting the impossible 
goal of excluding it from experiments (Loomes 1999). We suggest that future 
work should explore how players behave in similar experiments when they are 
explicitly told that they are playing the role of a dominant or subordinate 
individual. 
In this study punishing cheats had no discernible effect on punisher’s payoffs (as 
in Bochet, Page, & Putterman, 2006; Botelho, Harrison, Pinto, & Rutstrom, 2005; 
Page, Putterman, & Unel, 2005). Nevertheless, in the laboratory setting, 
individual payoffs are determined by the (largely) arbitrary costs and benefits 
associated with the options players are given in the game, as well as the number of 
rounds that players interact with one another (Gächter et al. 2008). In a real world 
setting, any fitness benefits of punishment must stem from its ability to promote 
cooperation from partners or bystanders. Thus, we suggest that since the net 
benefit of punishment in real-world settings must emerge from its ability to deter 
partners (or bystanders; dos Santos et al. 2013) from defecting, the effect of 
punishment on targets' behaviour, rather than the total payoffs accruing to the 
punisher, is more important for understanding the functional basis of punishment. 
As observed in previous work (Bone el al. 2015), weak players in asymmetric 
games were considerably more likely to opt out than players in other conditions. 
In addition, weak players were more likely to opt out of rounds if they were 
previously punished by a strong partner than when they were not punished (see 
Supplementary materials for analysis). This suggests that weak players sometimes 
avoided further punishment from strong players by withdrawing from the game 
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rather than by increasing their cooperation level.  In this study, players (especially 
weak players) opted out less often than in the previous Bone et al. (2015) study 
(players opted out of around 3% of rounds in this study vs. 11% of rounds in Bone 
et al. 2015). We suggest that players opted out less frequently in this study than in 
the previous study  (Bone et al. 2015) because in the current study players could 
earn a positive payoff even if they chose a higher cooperation level than their 
partner (i.e. their partner defected). This was not the case in the previous study. 
Thus, unless they were the target of hypocritical or antisocial punishment, players 
in this study were always absolutely (if not relatively) better off participating 
rather than opting out.  
To summarize, we found that in a variable investment IPD, power asymmetries 
did not make punishment from strong players more effective at promoting 
cooperation in comparison to symmetric games. In fact, punishment provoked 
retaliation, rather than cooperation in all conditions. This finding supports 
previous work which has suggested that in a two-player setting, conditional 
cooperation may sustain cooperation more effectively than punishment (Rand et 
al. 2009). We suggest that future research could explore the effect of power 
asymmetries when aggression can escalate. In addition, we propose that further 
work is required to understand how the threat of being punished influences 
players behaviour even when punishment is never implemented. 
4.7 Supplementary materials 
4.7.1 Experimental instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. 
Please be quiet during the entire experiment. Do not talk to your neighbours and 
do not try to look at their screens. If you have any questions, please raise your 
hand. We will come to you and answer it privately. 
This experiment is about decision-making. You will be randomly assigned the 
role as either a “type 1” or a “type 2” player.  You will keep this role 
throughout the experiment. You will play a two-player game twice. Each game 
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will last a predetermined number of rounds (between 20 and 100). 
In each game you will be randomly matched with a different person in the 
room. You will play with the same person for the duration of each game. 
Therefore, you will play with two people in total. In one game you will play with 
someone of the same type as yourself and in one game you will play someone of a 
different type to yourself.  You will remain anonymous throughout the 
experiment and will be identified only by the name in the top left corner of your 
computer screen. 
Before playing the games you will answer some questions about the 
experiment. The purpose of this is to make sure that everybody fully understands 
the rules of the experiment before we start so please make sure you read these 
instructions carefully.   
Depending on your decisions and the decisions made by the other player in each 
of the two games you play, you will able to earn a considerable amount of money. 
The scores you receive in the game will be given in units (1 unit= 2p). 
Everyone will receive a show up fee of £5. In addition, you will be given an 
additional 100 units (£2.00) to play with at the start of each game. Depending 
on the decisions made by you and the other player during each game you will gain 
or lose units from this initial amount. After the experiment has finished, your units 
will be converted to real money and you will be paid your earnings together with 
the show-up fee. In total this could be as much as £29.   
Payment: Payment will happen after both games have been played. 
The Game: 
Each round will be split into two steps. In each step you will be asked to make 
a decision. The decisions you make will affect the income that you and the 
other player receive for that round. There is a time limit of 15 seconds on each 
step (shown in the top right corner of the screen). It is important you make a 
choice within this time, if not a default choice will be picked for you and you 
will move on to the next step. 
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Each of these steps will now be explained to you in detail. 
Step 1: You and the other player simultaneously choose how long you would 
like to interact for (between 0 and 5 seconds). To do this you will select the 
button corresponding to the amount of time you decide to interact for then 
click OK. Whoever chooses the smallest time determines the duration of the 
interaction in that round. For example, if you choose to interact for 3s and the 
other player chooses to interact for 5s the interaction will last for 3s. For every 
second (s) that you and the other player interact, both players will get an income 
of +1 unit. 
If one player chooses to interact for less time than the other they will also receive 
a termination bonus of +6 units. If both players choose to interact for the 
same amount of time the termination bonus of +6 units is split between the two 
players so that each player receives +3 units. 
You will also have the option of “Do not participate in this round”. If either 
player chooses “Do not participate in this round” both players will skip the 
second step and neither player will gain or lose any units in this entire round. 
The next round will begin as normal. 
Some examples are given below:                                             
If both you and the other player choose to interact for 3s you will both receive 
+6 units (+3 for interacting for 3s, +3 split termination bonus = +6 total). 
If you choose to interact for 2s and the other player chooses to interact for 3s 
you will receive +8 units (+2 for interacting for 2s, +6 termination bonus = +8 
total). 
If you choose to interact for 5s and the other player chooses to interact for 0s 
you will receive 0 units 0 for interacting for 0s, 0 termination bonus = 0 total). 
Step 2:  If either player chose “Do not participate in this round” in step 1 then 
this step is skipped. 
The decisions and scores from step one are presented to both players.  You 
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must both then decide whether you would or would not like to reduce the other 
player's income at a cost to yourself by choosing between options “A” or “B”, 
respectively. 
Option “A” = reduce the other player's income at a cost of 1 unit to yourself. 
Option “B” = do nothing (neither you nor the other player will gain or lose any 
points). 
The number of units that the other player’s income is reduced by when you 
choose option “A” varies depending upon what “type” of player you were 
assigned as at the start of the experiment. 
Type 1 player: If you choose “A” then you will lose 1 unit, and the other 
player will lose 1 unit. 
Type 2 player: if you choose “A” you will lose 1 unit, and the other player will 
lose 6 units. 
After you have made a decision you and the other player are presented with 
each other’s choices and incomes from step 2 as well as your total income for 
the round.  You will also be told your total score for the current game. 
Your overall income in step 2 is determined by the addition of the income from 
both your decision and the other player's decision. 
Your income for the round will be determined by the addition of your 
incomes from step 1 and step 2. 
The total number of units that you have at the end of these games will 
determine how much money you have earned. Therefore, the additional money 
you and the other player each earn depends on the options you choose in each step 
of the game. However, the final scores of the other players do not matter for 
your final earnings. 
If your total score drops to 0 units, you will not be able to play for the 
remaining rounds of the game of the current game. 
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At the end of both games, your total earnings will be computed. If you finish with 
a total score of 0 units over the two games, you will walk away with just the £5 
show up fee. If you have more than 0 units, you will earn extra money at the 
exchange rate of 1 unit= 2p. The maximum extra amount that you can earn will be 
£24. 
We will distribute a questionnaire at the end of the experiment that will ask some 
basic information about you. 
Please take your time to read through the instructions again and if you have any 
questions raise your hand. In a few minutes we will begin the questionnaire 
followed by the games. 
4.7.2 Comprehension questions 
All participants were required to answer the following comprehension questions 
before playing the game. If they answered a question incorrectly they were shown 
the correct answer. The possible answers are shown in parentheses. 
1. Each game will last a predetermined number of rounds, between what? (10-200 
/ 20-100 / 0-50) 
2. How many games will you play in this experiment? (1 / 5 / 2) 
3. If you finish the experiment with a total score of 500 units, how much money 
will you earn on top of the £5 show up fee (1 unit = 2p)? (£10  / £5 / £80) 
4. If your total score drops to 0 or below in a game what will happen? (You will 
lose your show up fee / You will have to leave the room / You will not be able to 
play the remaining rounds of the current game) 
5. If both you and the other player chose to interact for 3 seconds, how many units 
will you get in step 1? (1  / 3 / 6) 
6. If you chose to interact for 4 seconds and the other person chose to interact for 
5 seconds, how many units will you get in step 1? (10 / 1 / -6)   
7.  If you choose to interact for 2 seconds  and the other player chooses to interact 
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for 1 second, how many units will you get in step 1? (2 / 7 / 1) 
8. If you are a "type 1" player and choose option "A" in step 2, how many units 
will be deducted from the other players income? (1 / 3 / 5) 
9. If both you and the other player are "type 2" players and you both choose 
option "A" how many units will you get in step 2?  (1 / -7 / 2) 
10. If both you and the other player are "type 1" players, you both choose to 
interact  for 5 seconds in step 1 and both choose option "B" in step 2, what will 
your income be in that round?  (8 / 2 / -5) 
4.7.3 Demographic questions 
After the game had finished, all participants were required to answer the 
following demographic questions. Responses to these demographic questions can 
be found in the supplementary data. 
1. What is your gender? 
2. How old are you? 
3. What is your country of origin? 
4. What is your subject of study? 
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4.7.4 Supplementary tables 
Parameter Weak Strong 
Age Mean = 20.67 ± 0.31 Mean = 21.12 ± 0.27 
Median = 20 Median = 21 
IQR = 19 – 22 IQR = 20 – 22 
Range = 18 – 30 Range = 18 - 28 
      
      
Gender  (n) Females = 27 Females = 38 
  Males = 33 Males = 22 
   
Country of Origin 
(n) 
Bangladesh = 1 
 
  
 
Canada = 1 
Australia = 1 
 Belarus = 1 
 
 
 
= 10 
Azerbaijan = 1 
 Canada = 1 China = 9 
 China = 4 Czech Republic = 1 
 Czech Republic = 1 France = 1 
 Denmark = 1 Germany = 1 
 France = 1 Greece = 2 
 Greece = 1 Hong Kong = 5 
 Hungary = 2 Iceland = 1 
 
India 
 India = 4 India = 1 
 Indonesia = 1 Indonesia = 1 
 Japan = 1 Israel = 1 
 Jordon = 1 Italy = 1 
 Malaysia = 6 Malaysia = 9 
 Nepal = 1 Poland = 1 
 Pakistan = 2 Romania = 4 
 Peru = 1 Russia = 1 
 Poland = 2 Saudi Arabia = 1 
 Russia = 2 Singapore = 4 
 Singapore = 5 Spain = 1 
 Switzerland = 1 Taiwan = 2 
 United Kingdom = 14 Thailand = 1 
 USA = 4 United Kingdom = 8 
 Zimbabwe = 1 USA = 1 
  Vietnam = 1 
   
Subject Studied (n) Anthropology = 1 Anthropology = 1 
 Biochemistry = 2 Archaeology = 1 
 Biology = 2 Architecture = 1 
 Biomedical Sciences = 2 Arts and Sciences = 2 
 Chemical Engineering = 2 Astrophysics = 1 
 Chemistry = 1 Arts and Sciences = 1 
 Economics = 5 Biology = 1 
 Economics & Business = 1 Brain and Mind = 1 
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 Electronic Engineering = 2 Chemical Engineering = 1 
 Engineering = 4 Civil Engineering = 1 
 English = 1 Computer Science = 1 
 Fine art = 1 Digital Humanities = 1 
 French and German = 1 Economics = 7 
 French and Spanish = 1 Engineering = 1 
 Geography = 2 Environmental 
Engineering= 2 
 History = 2 Fine art = 1 
 History of Art = 1 Geography = 1 
 History & Philosophy of 
Science = 4 
History = 1 
 Human Genetics = 1 Human Genetics = 1 
 Human Sciences = 1 Human sciences = 2 
 Language and Culture = 1 Infrastructure Investment 
= 1 
 Translation theory = 1 Language and culture = 3 
 Management = 1 Law = 5 
 Mechanical Engineering = 1 Material Science = 1 
 Modern languages = 1 Mathematics = 2 
 Natural Science = 1 Medicine = 3 
 Pharmacogenetics = 1 Modern Languages = 1 
 Pharmacy = 2 Pharmacology = 1 
 Philosophy = 1 Pharmacy = 4 
 Philosophy and Economics = 1 Philosophy = 1 
 Physics = 4 Physics = 2 
 Political Science = 1 Psychology = 3 
 Politics = 2 Speech Sciences = 1 
 Psychology = 1 Statistics = 2 
 SSEES Politics, Security = 1 Statistics & Economics = 
1 
 Systems Engineering = 1 Urban Planning = 1 
 Urban Planning = 1 Zoology = 1 
Table 4.S1 Information on mean, median values and sample sizes for 
demographic data 
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Chapter 5 
Human Punishment is Motivated by 
Both a Desire for Revenge and a 
Desire for Equality 
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5.1 Note 
This work has been published as Bone JE, Raihani NJ (2015) doi: 
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.02.002. Nichola Raihani contributed to 
experimental design and discussion. I designed the experiment, collected the data, 
analysed the data and wrote the paper. 
5.2 Abstract 
Humans willingly pay a cost to punish defecting partners in experimental games. 
However, the psychological motives underpinning punishment are unclear. 
Punishment could stem from the desire to reciprocally harm a cheat (i.e. revenge) 
which is arguably indicative of a deterrent function.  Alternatively, punishment 
could be motivated by the desire to redress the balance between punisher and 
cheat. Such a desire for equality might be more indicative of a fitness-levelling 
function. We used a two player experimental game to disentangle these two 
possibilities. In this game, one player could choose to steal $0.20 from their 
partner. Depending on the treatment, players interacting with a stealing partner 
experienced either advantageous inequality, equal outcomes or disadvantageous 
inequality. Players could punish stealing partners but some players had access to 
efficient punishment (1 : 3 fee to fine) whereas others could only use inefficient 
punishment (1 : 1). Players who had access to efficient punishment could reduce 
disadvantageous inequality by tailoring their investment in punishment whereas 
inefficient punishment did not change the relative payoffs of the individuals in the 
game but could be used to exact revenge. Players punished regardless of whether 
stealing created outcome inequality or whether punishment was capable of 
removing payoff differentials, suggesting that punishment was at least partly 
motivated by the desire to inflict reciprocal harm. However, in the efficient 
punishment condition, players' tendency to punish increased if stealing resulted in 
disadvantageous inequality and, when possible, punishers tailored their 
investment in punishment to create equal outcomes. Together these findings 
suggest that punishment is motivated by both a desire for revenge and a desire for 
equality. The implications of these findings are discussed 
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5.3 Introduction 
Punishment typically involves paying a cost to harm individuals who harm or 
withhold benefits from the punisher (hereafter 'defectors', Clutton-Brock & 
Parker, 1995; Raihani, Thornton, & Bshary, 2012; but see Irwin & Horne, 2013; 
Sylwester, Herrmann, & Bryson, 2013 for punishment aimed at helpful or 
cooperative individuals). Since punishment is costly to administer, both in terms 
of executing the punishment itself and in terms of the possibility of provoking 
retaliation from the target (Dreber et al. 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008; Janssen & 
Bushman 2008; Nikiforakis 2008), considerable effort has been expended in 
trying to understand the evolved function of punitive sentiments (McCullough et 
al. 2013; Price et al. 2002). Specifically, it has been argued that understanding the 
contexts that reliably motivate punishment can provide key insights into its likely 
evolved function (Price et al., 2002; but see Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 
2002). Two broad functional explanations have been proposed. First, it has been 
suggested that punitive sentiment could confer a selective advantage if 
punishment deters targets (or bystanders) from harming the punisher in future 
interactions (e.g. Dos Santos, Rankin, & Wedekind, 2011; Hilbe & Sigmund, 
2010; McCullough et al., 2013). Under this hypothesis (hereafter the 'revenge' 
hypothesis), individuals should be motivated to reciprocally harm individuals that 
intentionally harm them, even if punishment cannot immediately equalize the 
payoffs between the defector and the punisher (Falk et al. 2005). However, 
evidence that punitive sentiments are sensitive to the risk of suffering a fitness 
disadvantage relative to defectors (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012a; Dawes et al. 
2007) suggests an alternative explanation: that punishment primarily serves a 
fitness-levelling function, by reducing payoff differentials between defectors and 
punishers (Price et al. 2002). Under this fitness-levelling hypothesis, punishers are 
expected to be motivated primarily by the desire to equalize payoffs and any 
deterrent function of punishment would arise as a by-product. Here, we present an 
experiment to test whether punitive sentiment can best be explained in terms of 
desire for revenge or in terms of a desire to equalize payoffs in social interactions. 
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Interacting with a defector often reduces cooperators' payoffs and creates unequal 
outcomes. It can therefore be difficult to establish whether punishment of 
defectors is motivated by the disutility associated with receiving lower payoffs 
than a defector (‘disadvantageous inequality aversion’; Fehr & Schmidt 1999) or 
simply a desire for revenge (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b).  A recent study 
attempted to disentangle these two possible motivations by asking whether, in the 
absence of disadvantageous inequality, experiencing losses was sufficient to 
motivate punishment (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b). Raihani & McAuliffe 
(2012b) found that defection, in the form of stealing money from the victim, did 
not motivate punishment when stealing resulted in equal outcomes or 
advantageous inequality for the victim. However, stealing did motivate 
punishment when it resulted in disadvantageous inequality for the victim (Raihani 
& McAuliffe, 2012b). These findings raise the possibility that individuals use 
punishment to restore equality in social interactions. However, the alternative 
possibility, that punishment is simply related to the disutility associated with 
experiencing disadvantageous inequality and is not tailored to achieve equal 
outcomes, could not be ruled out because players in this game were not allowed to 
tailor their investment in punishment. 
Alternative studies have also suggested that investment in punishment is aimed at 
producing equal outcomes in social interactions. For example, in Dawes et al. 
(2007) individuals were placed in groups of four and randomly allocated an 
endowment. Some players therefore started out richer than others in this game. 
Players were given the option to reduce (or increase) the income of others by 
purchasing negative (income-reducing) or positive (income-increasing) tokens 
and allocating these to other group members. In this setting, people allocated more 
negative tokens to the richest players and allocated more positive tokens to the 
poorest members of the group - suggesting that these behaviours were aimed at 
reducing outcome inequality. However, in this experiment, all four group 
members were able to purchase and allocate these tokens. Thus, it was impossible 
for players to predict how many tokens they would need to buy in order to achieve 
equal outcomes. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether players 
adjusted investment in punitive behaviour in order to achieve specific outcomes. 
103 
 
Moreover, since initial payoff inequalities were exogenously determined rather 
than arising through some players defecting, the study could not test to what 
extent investment in income-reducing tokens was related to the target’s behaviour, 
as opposed to the outcome itself. In other words, since cooperation and defection 
were not possible in this game, any revenge-based motives of punishment could 
not be measured. 
A more recent study by Houser & Xiao (2010) showed that players who were 
treated unfairly most commonly chose to punish as severely as possible and thus 
create inequality in their own favour. Although this seems to be more suggestive 
of punishment as a form of revenge rather than a fitness-leveller, it is important to 
take into account that in this study the severity of punishment chosen was not 
constrained by cost. In reality, imposing a larger cost on another individual is 
likely to also impose a larger cost on the punisher (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012a). 
Since punishers have been shown to adjust their investment according to the costs 
associated with punishment (Anderson & Putterman 2006; Bone et al. 2014; 
Carpenter 2007; Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Ostrom et al. 1992), this creates a 
potentially important trade-off between maximizing income and achieving the 
desired punishment outcome.  
The fitness-levelling hypothesis predicts that individuals should only invest in 
punishment that is more costly to the target than to the punisher, and is therefore 
able to reduce any existing disadvantageous inequality. Nevertheless, empirical 
work has demonstrated that individuals are prepared to invest in punishment that 
is equally costly to the punisher and the target (Anderson & Putterman 2006; 
Carpenter 2007; Egas & Riedl 2008; Falk et al. 2005; Nikiforakis & Normann 
2008) - or even more costly to the punisher (Anderson & Putterman 2006; 
Carpenter 2007; Egas & Riedl 2008) - and so is unable to re-establish equality. 
These findings suggest that punishers are not solely motived by a desire to remove 
fitness differentials and support the idea that punishers might instead be motivated 
by a desire for revenge against defecting partners. The predictions of the two 
hypotheses also differ with respect to whether the defection was performed 
intentionally or not. Specifically, the revenge hypothesis predicts that punishment 
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should be focused on those who impose harm intentionally and can therefore learn 
to avoid repeating the harmful behaviour in the future. Conversely, punishment 
aimed at removing fitness differentials should be less sensitive (or insensitive) to 
intentionality since the primary function is to reduce inequality rather than change 
the target's behaviour. Evidence from empirical studies provides some support for 
both hypotheses. Whilst several studies have shown that individuals will punish in 
response to unequal outcomes created at random or unintentionally (Cushman et 
al. 2009; Dawes et al. 2007; Falk et al. 2008; Houser & Xiao 2010; Kagel et al. 
1996; Yu et al. 2014), individuals are significantly more likely to punish when 
unequal outcomes are created intentionally by the target (Falk et al. 2008; Houser 
& Xiao 2010; Kagel et al. 1996). 
Based on past research it is therefore unclear whether punishment is motivated by 
a desire for revenge or by a desire to equalize payoffs. We aimed to answer this 
question by investigating whether victims of cheats adjusted their investment in 
punishment in order to restore equality using a modified version of the game used 
by (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b). In the current study, one player could choose to 
steal $0.20 from their partner. Depending on the treatment, players interacting 
with a stealing partner experienced advantageous inequality, equal outcomes or 
varying levels of disadvantageous inequality. Players could punish stealing 
partners, but while some players had access to efficient punishment (1 : 3 fee to 
fine), others could only use inefficient punishment (1 : 1 fee to fine). Players who 
had access to efficient punishment could achieve equal outcomes by tailoring their 
investment in punishment: more extreme outcome inequality could be alleviated 
by investing more into punishment. However, under the inefficient punishment 
condition, increasing investment in punishment did not reduce inequality.  
Although we suggest that revenge may serve a deterrent function, in the 
anonymous one-shot setting of our game, there is no scope for punishment to 
change the behaviour of stealing partners (or bystanders). However, previous 
work has suggested that behaviour may be constrained by psychological 
mechanisms that evolved in the context of non-anonymous repeated interactions 
and that responses that are attuned to these conditions may be invoked even in 
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anonymous, one-shot settings (Ben-Ner & Putterman 2000; Burnham & Johnson 
2005; Cosmides & Tooby 1989; Delton et al. 2011; Hagen & Hammerstein 2006; 
Hoffman et al. 1998; Johnson et al. 2003; Tooby et al. 2006). Thus, in our game a 
desire for revenge might reflect the desires of an evolved psychology that 
functions to deter cheats, even though this function is (due to the nature of the 
game) impossible to achieve.  Nevertheless, we note that since deterrence is not 
the only possible function for this behaviour we use the word ‘revenge’ in a purely 
descriptive sense.  
The revenge hypothesis predicts that punishment will be used in both the 
inefficient and the efficient punishment condition. Alternatively, if punishment is 
motivated by the desire to equalize outcomes, punishment should be used when it 
is efficient but not when it is inefficient. Moreover, players should use the amount 
of punishment that is required to equalize payoffs (Table 5.1); not more or less.   
5.4 Methods 
5.4.1 Experimental protocol 
This research was approved by the University College London ethics board 
project number 3720/001. Data were collected in October 2013 and July - August 
2014. We recruited 4912 subjects (2856 males, 1967 females, 89 unreported) for 
our experiment using the online labour market, Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT; www.mturk.com; see General Methods for details). Subjects were all 
based in the USA.  
Of the 4912 subjects, 2456 were assigned the role of player one (P1). The 
remaining subjects were allocated the role of player two (P2). P1 and P2 were 
both allocated one of five initial endowments (treatment A – E; Table 5.1). The 
game consisted of two stages. In the first stage P2 could choose to steal $0.20 
from P1 or do nothing. In the second stage, P1 was informed of P2’s decision and 
could choose how many punishment points they wished to assign to P2. P1 
experienced the same losses when P2 stole ($0.20) in all five treatments. 
However, depending on the treatment this $0.20 loss resulted in P1 experiencing 
either advantageous inequality (treatment A), equal payoffs (treatment B) or 
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disadvantageous inequality (treatments C – E; Table 5.1) relative to P2. All 
players were assigned to one of two punishment conditions at the start of the 
game: inefficient and efficient. In the inefficient punishment condition, each 
punishment point cost P1 $0.05 and reduced P2’s earnings by $0.05 (fee to fine 
ratio = 1 : 1). In the efficient punishment condition, each punishment point cost P1 
$0.05 and reduced P2’s earnings by $0.15 (fee to fine ratio = 1 : 3). To prevent 
negative earnings, P1 could assign a maximum of four punishment points to P2.  
P1 was assigned ex-post (Rand 2012) to one of two treatments in which either P2 
stole or P2 didn’t steal (Table 5.1). These treatments were allocated to players 
both in the inefficient and efficient punishment conditions, creating a total of 10 
treatments for P2 and a total of 20 treatments for P1. All subjects that participated 
in the experiment received a $0.20 show-up payment on top of a bonus based on 
both their and their partner’s decisions during the game.  
5.4.2 Analyses 
Data were analysed using R version 2.15.2 (R Development Core Team 2011). All 
comparisons used two-sided Fishers exact tests. First, we investigated whether 
experiencing losses or disadvantageous inequality had a greater effect on P1's 
decision to punish P2. We compared the proportion of P1s that chose a non-zero 
punishment investment when (i) P2 didn’t steal (across all treatments), (ii) P2 
stole but the stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality for P1 (i.e. 
treatments A & B) and (iii) P2 stole resulting in disadvantageous inequality for P1 
(i.e. treatments C – E). Separate analyses were conducted for players in the 
efficient and players in the inefficient punishment conditions (see Table 5.2 for 
comparisons and sample sizes).  
Next, we investigated whether the inequality-removing punishment investment 
was picked more frequently than each of the other three possible punishment 
investments. Data were restricted to instances where P1s punished P2 for stealing 
in treatments where P2 stealing created disadvantageous inequality for P1 
(treatments C – E) and when P1 had access to efficient punishment (see Table 5.3 
for comparisons and sample sizes). We then asked whether these punitive players 
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were less willing to invest the amount required to create equality when doing so 
became progressively more expensive.  
Finally, we investigated the possibility that players that chose the inequality-
removing punishment investment may have done so because that amount of 
punishment was related to the disutility associated with the level of inequality 
experienced in that treatment, even when punishment was incapable of restoring 
equality (i.e. when punishment was inefficient). For this analysis we compared the 
proportion of players in the efficient punishment condition that chose the 
inequality-removing punishment investment versus the proportion of players in 
the inefficient punishment condition that chose that same punishment investment. 
Data were restricted to instances where P1s punished P2 for stealing in treatments 
where P2 stealing created disadvantageous inequality for P1 (treatments C – E). 
As multiple comparisons were performed, sequential Benjamini - Hochberg 
adjusted p
BH
-values (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995; see also Waite & Campbell, 
2006) are reported alongside uncorrected p-values. By controlling for the false 
discovery rate, Benjamini - Hochberg adjusted p-values balance the risk of 
incurring Type I errors with the risk of incurring Type II errors. 
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Table 5.1 The payoffs experienced by P1 and P2 at the beginning of Stage 1 and 
Stage 2 in treatments A - E. Stage 1 payoffs varied according to the treatment, 
while Stage 2 payoffs also depend on whether or not P2 stole. These payoffs are 
described in terms of the outcome (advantageous inequality, equal outcomes or 
disadvantageous inequality) from P1's point of view. Finally, we show the 
punishment investment that P1 was required to make to create equal outcomes 
when punishment was efficient. 
 
Treatment Stage 1 payoff 
(P1 : P2) 
P2 stole 
(Yes/No) 
Stage 2 payoff 
(P1 : P2) 
Outcome 
(from P1 
point of view) 
Efficient 
punishment 
investment 
required to 
create equal 
outcomes 
(cost to P1) 
A $1.10 : $0.60 Yes $0.90 : $0.80 Advantageou
s Inequality 
NA 
    No $1.10 : $0.60 Advantageous 
Inequality NA 
B $1.10 : $0.70 Yes $0.90 : $0.90 Equal 
outcomes NA 
  No $1.10 : $0.70 Advantageous 
Inequality NA 
C $1.10 : $0.80 Yes $0.90 : $1.00 Disadvantage
ous 
Inequality $0.05 
  No $1.10 : $0.80 Advantageous 
Inequality NA 
D $1.10 : $0.90 Yes $0.90 : $1.10 Disadvantage
ous 
Inequality $0.10 
  No $1.10 : $0.90 Advantageous 
Inequality NA 
E $1.10 : $1.10 Yes $0.90 : $1.30 Disadvantage
ous 
Inequality $0.20 
  No $1.10 : $1.10 Equal 
outcomes NA 
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5.5 Results  
In both the efficient and the inefficient punishment condition, P1 was significantly 
more likely to punish a stealing than a non-stealing P2 (Fisher’s exact test, see 
Table 5.2 for p-values; Figure 5.1). In the efficient punishment condition, the 
tendency to punish a stealing P2 was increased significantly when stealing 
resulted in disadvantageous inequality (proportion punishing non-stealing P2 ± SE  
= 0.04 ± 0.01; stealing P2, no disadvantageous inequality = 0.19 ± 0.03; stealing 
P2, disadvantageous inequality = 0.34 ± 0.02; Table 5.2; Figure 5.1). Although 
players in the inefficient punishment condition also appeared to be more likely to 
punish a stealing P2 when stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality, this 
finding was non-significant (proportion punishing non-stealing P2 ± SE = 0.03 ± 
0.01; stealing P2, no disadvantageous inequality = 0.06 ± 0.01; stealing P2, 
disadvantageous inequality = 0.1 ± 0.02; Table 5.2; Figure 5.1). 
 
 
Table 5.2 The p-values generated by Fisher’s exact tests (two-sided) comparing 
the proportion of  P1 that chose a non-zero punishment investment when (i) P2 
didn’t steal; (ii) P2 stole but the stealing did not result in disadvantageous 
inequality for P1 (‘P2 stole no DI’); and (iii) P2 stole resulting in disadvantageous 
inequality for P1 (‘P2 stole DI’). Comparisons were made for players in both the 
inefficient and the efficient punishment condition. The fourth column reports 
Benjamini-Hochberg adjusted p
BH
-values. The final column shows the sample size 
(n) for that comparison. 
 
Punishment condition Comparison P-value P
BH
-value  n 
Inefficient P2 didn’t steal vs. P2 stole no DI  0.039 0.047 849 
 P2 didn’t steal vs. P2 stole DI <0.001 <0.001 975 
 P2 stole no DI vs. P2 stole DI 0.073 0.073 618 
     
Efficient P2 didn’t steal vs. P2 stole no DI  <0.001 <0.001 856 
 P2 didn’t steal vs. P2 stole DI <0.001 <0.001 987 
 P2 stole no DI vs. P2 stole DI <0.001 <0.001 627 
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When P2 stealing created disadvantageous inequality for P1 (treatments C - E), if 
P1 had access to efficient punishment, P1 could equalize outcomes by punishing 
P2. The specific punishment investment that would create equal outcomes 
depended on the treatment (Table 5.1). In treatments C - E, when punishment was 
efficient, the punishment investment that created equal outcomes was chosen 
significantly more often than any other possible investment (Fisher’s exact test, 
see Table 5.3 for p-values; Figure 5.2); and this punishment investment was 
chosen significantly more frequently in the efficient than the inefficient 
punishment condition (Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.024; pBH-value = 0.027; n = 
167; Figure 5.2). Moreover, in the efficient punishment condition, a punishing P1 
was equally likely to choose the punishment investment that created equal 
outcomes in all three treatments where P2 stealing created disadvantageous 
inequality for P1 (C – E; Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.698; pBH-value = 0.698; n 
= 130; Figure 5.2), indicating that players' attempts to equalize outcomes were 
largely insensitive to the cost associated with doing so. All significant findings 
reported above remained significant after p-values were adjusted according to 
the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg 1995). 
When punishment was efficient, in both treatments where P2 stealing did not 
create disadvantageous inequality for P1 (treatments A & B), if P1 used 
punishment, they were most likely to choose the harshest punishment option 
available (Figure 5.2; see supplementary materials for details). Due to the small 
proportion of P1 who chose to punish P2 when P2 didn’t steal or when 
punishment was inefficient, we did not have the statistical power to test which 
punishment investments were most popular in these scenarios (see supplementary 
materials for power analysis, conducted using GPower; Erdfelder, Faul, & 
Buchner, 1996).  
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Treatment Comparison   (proportion ± SE) P-value P
BH
-value n 
C $0.05 (0.53 ± 0.08) vs. $0.10 (0.16 ± 0.06)  <0.001 <0.001 43 
 
$0.05 (0.53 ± 0.08) vs. $0.15 (0.05 ± 0.03) <0.001 <0.001 43 
 
$0.05 (0.53 ± 0.08) vs. $0.20 (0.26 ± 0.07) 0.015 0.018 43 
  
  
  
D $0.10 (0.57 ± 0.07) vs. $0.05 (0.13 ± 0.05)  <0.001 <0.001 47 
 
$0.10 (0.57 ± 0.07) vs. $0.15 (0.11 ± 0.05) <0.001 <0.001 47 
 
$0.10 (0.57 ± 0.07) vs. $0.20 (0.19 ± 0.06) <0.001 <0.001 47 
  
  
  
E $0.20 (0.62 ± 0.08) vs. $0.05 (0.12 ± 0.05) <0.001 <0.001 40 
 
$0.20 (0.62 ± 0.08) vs. $0.10 (0.25 ± 0.07) 0.001 0.002 40 
 
$0.20 (0.62 ± 0.08) vs. $0.15 (0.00 ± 0.00) <0.001 <0.001 40 
Table 5.3 Data are restricted to players that punished a stealing partner and had 
access to efficient punishment. P values are generated from two-sided Fisher's 
exact tests. Benjamini-Hochberg adjusted p
BH
-values are also presented to account 
for multiple comparisons. The final column shows the sample size (n) for that 
comparison. 
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Figure 5.1 The proportion of P1 who punished P2 according to whether P2 stole 
(by taking $0.20 of P1's endowment), whether punishment was efficient (fee to 
fine ratio = 1 : 3) or inefficient (fee to fine ratio = 1 : 1) and the treatment. Initial 
endowments (P1 : P2) for treatment A were $1.10 : $0.60; in treatment B were 
$1.10 : $0.70; in treatment C were $1.10 : $0.80; in treatment D were $1.10 : 
$0.90 and in treatment E were $1.10 : $1.10. Thus, if P2 stole $0.20 from P1: in 
treatment A P1 experienced advantageous inequality ($0.90 : $0.80); in treatment 
B P1 experienced equal outcomes ($0.90 : $0.90) and in treatments C – E P1 
experienced disadvantageous inequality ($0.90 : $1.00, $0.90 : $1.10 & $0.90 : 
$1.30, respectively). Sample sizes for each condition are indicated in parentheses. 
Light grey bars, P2 didn’t steal; dark grey bars, P2 stole.  
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Figure 5.2 The proportion of punishment investments that were made in 
treatments A - E (given that P1 punished P2 for stealing) when punishment was 
(a) efficient and (b) inefficient. If punishment could create equal outcomes, the 
corresponding punishment investment is shown in dark grey for each treatment; 
all other punishment investments are shown in light grey. Sample sizes for each 
treatment are indicated in parentheses. 
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5.6 Discussion 
In this study, P1 experienced the same losses when P2 stole ($0.20) in all five 
treatments. However, depending on the treatment this $0.20 loss resulted in P1 
experiencing either advantageous inequality (treatment A), equal payoffs 
(treatment B) or disadvantageous inequality (treatment C - E) relative to P2. P2 
stealing provoked P1 to punish even when stealing did not create disadvantageous 
inequality. Moreover, although relatively rare, P1 sometimes punished a stealing 
P2 even when punishment was inefficient and was thus unable to re-establish 
equality. Both these findings suggest that punishment was motivated at least in 
part by a desire for revenge against stealing partners. However, when punishment 
was efficient, P1 was more likely to punish if P2 stealing created disadvantageous 
inequality and, when given the option, P1 typically adjusted their investment in 
punishment to create equal outcomes. This suggests that although a desire for 
revenge was sometimes sufficient to motivate punishment, players were also 
sensitive to inequality and preferred punishment to result in equal outcomes.  
Previous studies using three-player games have also shown that players will use 
apparently inefficient punishment (Egas & Riedl 2008; Falk et al. 2005). 
However, in these studies, it could be argued that, although inefficient punishment 
does not reduce inequality between players, it can reduce the standard deviation of 
the group’s mean payoff and so may still be driven by egalitarian motives (Dawes 
et al. 2007). This, however, is not possible in two-player games like ours. In the 
current study, a willingness to pay for inefficient punishment therefore seems to 
reflect a desire for revenge (with an associated deterrent function, (McCullough et 
al. 2013) despite the fact that punishment occurred in an anonymous, one-shot 
setting where no deterrent function was possible. Although in our game 
punishment yielded no potential return on investment for punishers in terms of 
changing the partner's future behaviour), previous studies have proposed that the 
psychological mechanisms that underpin social behaviour (e.g. punishment) are 
likely to have evolved in a context where one-shot or anonymous interactions 
were rare (Delton et al. 2011; Fehr & Henrich 2003). It has been suggested that 
this evolved psychology may invoke responses that are attuned to these conditions 
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even in that are not adaptive in truly anonymous, one-shot lab settings (Fehr & 
Henrich 2003; Ben-Ner & Putterman 2000; Burnham & Johnson 2005; Cosmides 
& Tooby 1989; Delton et al. 2011; Hagen & Hammerstein 2006; Hoffman et al. 
1998; Johnson et al. 2003; Tooby et al. 2006). Thus, it is possible that the use of 
inefficient punishment in our game was caused by the miss-firing of psychological 
mechanisms adapted to deter defecting partners from future defection, even when 
this function is (due to the nature of the game) impossible to achieve. Previous 
work has shown that when players are put under time pressure to make decisions 
in one-shot games, they are more likely behave cooperatively (Rand et al. 2014; 
Rand et al. 2012). Similarly, other studies also using one-shot games have shown 
that when players are given a cooling off period they are less likely to punish 
cheating partners (Grimm & Mengel 2011; Smith & Silberberg 2010; Sutter et al. 
2003). These studies suggest that when players are the given time to consider their 
decisions they are more likely to respond in a way that maximizes their payoff in 
their current one-shot setting rather than rely on intuitions that may maximize 
payoffs over repeated encounters in the real world but not one-shot laboratory 
settings. 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that the proximate mechanisms that 
underpin punishment may have evolved in a context where punishment was likely 
to have imposed larger costs on the target than the punisher (i.e. punishment was 
efficient) and was therefore capable of reducing the disadvantageous inequality 
experienced by victims of cheats. This line of reasoning would lead to the 
conclusion that a willingness to invest in inefficient punishment in our game could 
reflect the desires of an evolved psychology with the function of levelling fitness 
differentials (even though this function cannot be achieved in a context where 
punishment is inefficient). It is currently not clear what the most realistic fee to 
fine ratio is to use for punishment in laboratory settings in order to approximate 
the cost to impact ratio of punishment under real-world settings. Indeed, under 
real-world settings, the fee-to-fine ratio of punishment is likely to vary with 
relative dominance status of individuals (e.g. Bone, Wallace, Bshary, & Raihani, 
2015; Raihani et al., 2012). Clearly, more studies of punishment in real-world 
settings are needed to establish how punishment use varies according to whether 
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interactions are repeated or not; and whether the fee to fine ratios currently used in 
the laboratory studies are ecologically valid.   
Several players in this study used punishment to create advantageous inequality in 
their favour. For example, when players had access to efficient punishment and 
faced a stealing partner without also experiencing disadvantageous inequality 
(treatments A & B), punishing P1s typically chose the punishment investment that 
created the largest advantageous inequality for themselves. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that punishment is motivated by a desire for revenge, 
which might be ‘sweeter’ the more it harms the target (De Quervain et al. 2004); 
and  is comparable to previous empirical findings which have shown that when 
the severity of punishment used was not constrained by cost, players often choose 
to punish as severely as possible and thus create inequality in their own favour 
(Abbink & Sadrieh 2009; Houser & Xiao 2010). This finding supports the idea 
that punishment sometimes stems from competitive motives, where players value 
being in a position of advantageous inequality because it emphasizes their relative 
social status (Fershtman et al. 2012; Houser & Xiao 2010).  
Similar competitive motives have been inferred for the existence of 'antisocial' 
punishment (Herrmann et al. 2008; Sylwester et al. 2013; Raihani & Bshary 
2015). As in several previous studies (e.g. Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Gächter, 
Herrmann, & Thöni, 2005; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009; Herrmann et al., 2008), 
we documented antisocial punishment (aimed at non-stealing partners) in this 
study. In this context, antisocial punishment cannot be explained by a desire for 
revenge or a desire to reduce disadvantageous inequality since P1 experienced 
neither losses nor disadvantageous inequality when P2 did not steal. It may be the 
case that antisocial punishment reflects competitive motives (Sylwester et al. 
2013; Prediger et al. 2014; Raihani & Bshary 2015), though if this were the case 
we would have expected that players would use have used antisocial punishment 
in the efficient but not in the inefficient punishment condition, as previously 
documented (Falk et al. 2005). In contrast to this prediction, we found that players 
were equally likely to punish antisocially regardless of the punishment condition. 
It is possible that antisocial punishment in this study simply reflects execution 
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errors or misperceiving the game.  With the current dataset we are unable to 
determine the causes of antisocial punishment but this remains an exciting avenue 
for future research.   
Although many of our results support the idea that punishment was motivated 
primarily by a desire for revenge, we report two findings that support the 
hypothesis that punishment is motivated by a desire for equality (with an 
associated fitness-levelling function (Price et al., 2002). First, as in Raihani & 
McAuliffe (2012b), we found that in the efficient punishment condition players’ 
tendency to punish a stealing partner was increased if stealing resulted in resulted 
in disadvantageous inequality. Second, when given the option, players typically 
tailored their investment in efficient punishment to remove disadvantageous 
inequality and were seemingly insensitive to the cost associated with achieving 
this outcome. Moreover, the punishment investment that created equal outcomes 
was chosen much more frequently in the efficient than the inefficient punishment 
condition, indicating that players were attempting to create equal outcomes rather 
than increasing punishment investment in response to frustration at experiencing 
increasingly disadvantageous outcomes. 
Together our findings suggest that punishment is motivated by both a desire for 
revenge and a desire for equality. Indeed, these possibilities are not mutually 
exclusive. Furthermore, it might be the case that punishment which results in 
equality may be most likely to serve a deterrent function, if such punishment is 
perceived to be ‘fair’ and consequently more effective at changing the target's 
behaviour. This prediction is based on previous studies, where colleagues have 
suggested that 'morally legitimate' punishment is most likely to successfully deter 
future defection (Fehr & Rockenbach 2003; Houser & Xiao 2010). Fehr & 
Rockenbach (2003) suggest that punishment may be perceived as being morally 
illegitimate if it is associated with selfish or greedy (rather than altruistic) 
intentions. Punishment that creates advantageous inequality in the punisher's 
favour might be interpreted as a competitive act (Raihani & Bshary 2015) and 
therefore perceived as morally illegitimate.  Punishment that creates advantageous 
inequality in favour of the punisher might therefore be unlikely to deter further 
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defection (Bone et al. 2015; Fehr & Rockenbach 2003; Xiao 2013) and may even 
provoke retaliation from the target (Bone et al., 2015). Whilst we stress that this 
explanation is speculative it offers promising avenues for further studies to 
explore the scenarios that motivate punishment. 
We note that the current findings appear to contradict the results of Raihani & 
McAuliffe (2012b), who showed, using a similar experimental setup, that P1 only 
punished P2 where P2 stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality. In contrast, 
in the current study, we found that players punished stealing partners even when 
stealing did not create disadvantageous inequality. We believe it is unlikely that 
the different costs of punishment used in the two studies ($0.05 in this study; 
$0.10 in the previous study) are responsible for these conflicting results (see 
supplementary materials for supporting analysis). However, it is possible that 
other subtle differences between our experimental setups may be responsible, 
specifically differences in the endowments initially given to P1 or differences in 
the demographic sample across the studies. In Raihani & McAuliffe’s (2012b) 
experiment, the losses experienced by P1 as a result of P2 stealing ($0.20) were 
the same as in this experiment. However, the initial endowment of P1 was 
different: in Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b), P1 began the game with $0.70 and 
was left with $0.50 if P2 stole, whereas in this study, P1 began the game with 
$1.10 and was left with $0.90 if P2 stole. It has been shown that people pay most 
attention to the left-most digits when judging differences in the magnitude of 
numbers; a phenomenon known as the left-digit anchoring effect (Dehaene et al. 
1990; Hinrichs et al. 1981; Monroe & Lee 1999; Thomas & Morwitz 2005). For 
example, an experimental study showed that a reduction of one cent affected the 
perceived magnitude of a price when the left digit changed ($3.00 to $2.99) but 
not when the left digit was unchanged ($3.20 to $3.19) (Thomas & Morwitz 
2005). Thus, a reduction from $1.10 to $0.90 (as P1 experienced in this study) 
may be perceived as a greater loss than a reduction from $0.70 to $0.50 (as P1 
experienced in Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b). If players perceived greater losses 
in this study than in Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b), this may explain why a $0.20 
loss which did not result in disadvantageous inequality motivated P1 to punish P2 
in this study but not in the earlier Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) experiment. In 
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other words, in the absence of unequal outcomes, the loss experienced by P1 as a 
result of P2 stealing in Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) may have been perceived as 
too small to motivate punishment.  
Alternatively, the discrepancy between the results of the current study and Raihani 
& McAuliffe (2012b) may be explained by differences in demographic sampling 
between the two studies. Data for both studies were collected via the online labour 
market, Amazon Mechanical Turk, where the vast majority of workers hail from 
either the USA or India (Ross et al. 2010). In the Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) 
study, participants were recruited from both countries and the analysis did not 
control for the possible cross-cultural differences in subjects' behaviour. However, 
in this study we restricted participation to subjects based in the USA. Previous 
studies have demonstrated cross-cultural differences in the propensity of subjects 
to punish both defectors (Henrich et al. 2006; Marlowe & Berbesque 2008) and 
cooperative individuals (Ellingsen et al. 2012; Gächter & Herrmann 2009; 
Herrmann et al. 2008). Thus, differences in the way that subjects from India 
versus the US behave in economic games, particularly with respect to punishment, 
may explain the different results we saw across the two studies. Future work will 
explore how cultural differences between players affect punishment strategies. 
To summarize, we investigated whether punishment was motivated by a desire for 
revenge or a desire for equality and found support for both of these hypotheses. 
Players used punishment regardless of whether stealing created outcome 
inequality or whether punishment was capable at removing payoff differentials. 
This supports the hypothesis that punishment is motivated by revenge. However, 
players were more likely to punish if stealing resulted in disadvantageous 
inequality for the punisher and, when possible, typically tailored their investment 
in punishment to create equal outcomes. This supports the hypothesis that 
punishment is motivated by a desire to equalize payoffs. Since these hypotheses 
are not mutually exclusive we suggest that both a desire for revenge and a desire 
for equality are likely to play an important role in motivating punishment 
decisions. Future work should explore how the efficacy of punishment is related 
to its perceived moral legitimacy, and whether players are sensitive to this when 
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tailoring investment in punishment. We also suggest that more work is needed to 
understand what motivates antisocial punishment, how intuitions guide 
punishment decisions and in what ways cultural variation between players 
influences punishment strategies.  
5.7 Supplementary materials 
5.7.1 Demographic information 
All participants were asked to answer the following demographic questions in 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). The options given are in parentheses: 
 What is your gender? (male / female) 
 What is your age? 
 Which of the following best describes your highest achieved education level? 
(Some High School / High School Graduate / Some College no degree / 
Associates degree / Bachelor’s degree / Graduate degree ) 
 What is the total annual income of your household? (Less than $12,500 / $12,500 
– $24,999 / $25,000 - $37,499 / $37,500 - $49,999 / $50,000 - $62,499 / 
$62,500 - $74,999 / $75,000 - $87,499 / $87,500 - $99,999 / $100,000 or 
more) 
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Parameter Individuals allocated to role of P1 (n = 2456) 
Age Mean = 28.76 ± 0.17 
Median = 27 
IQR = 23 – 32 
Range = 14 – 72 
Undisclosed = 39 
Education level (n) Some High School = 24 
High School Graduate = 237 
Some College, no degree = 873 
Associates Degree = 231 
Bachelor’s Degree = 826 
Graduate Degree = 218 
Undisclosed = 47 
Gender  (n) Females = 992 
Males = 1424 
Annual income (n) Less than $12,500 = 324 
$12,500 - $24,999 = 401 
$25,000 - $37,499 = 454 
$37,500 - $49,999 = 303 
$50,000 - $62,499 = 267 
$62,500 - $74,999 = 187 
$75,000 - $87,499 = 151 
$87,500 - $99,999 = 113 
$100,00 or more = 218 
 Undisclosed = 38 
Table 5.S1 Demographic information on age, education, gender and annual 
income levels for individuals allocated the role of P1. 
 
 
 
122 
 
5.7.2 Game instructions 
Having completed the demographic questions above, participants were redirected 
to an external survey website (https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk) to take part in the 
experiment. Below is a text transcription of the game instructions received by 
players, including comprehension questions.  The example given is for a player 1 
in treatment A with efficient punishment; however, the general procedure is 
similar for all treatments and punishment conditions. 
Screen 1. Please enter your Worker ID. This is needed to ensure you get your 
bonus.  If you don't know your Worker ID you can find it out by opening the 
following page in a new window: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard. 
Screen 2. **GAME INSTRUCTIONS** You are player 1. You have been 
allocated a bonus of $1.10. Player 2 has been allocated a bonus of $0.60. Your 
worker ID and player 2's worker ID will remain anonymous. 
Screen 3. The game will be split into two stages: Stage one. Player 2 will choose 
between taking $0.20 of your bonus or doing nothing. If player 2 chooses to take 
$0.20 of your bonus, it will be added to player 2's own bonus. You will see player 
2's decision. Stage two. You may pay a cost to reduce player 2's bonus or do 
nothing. Each time you reduce players 2's bonus it will cost you $0.05 and will 
reduce player 2's bonus by $0.15. You may choose to reduce player 2's bonus up 
to 4 times 
Screen 4. Please answer these questions correctly to ensure your HIT is accepted. 
A. How much bonus have you been allocated? (You have been allocated a bonus 
of $1.10 / You have been allocated a bonus of $0.60). 
Screen 5. B. How much bonus has player 2 been allocated? Player 2 has been 
allocated a bonus of $0.60 / Player 2 has been allocated a bonus of $1.10. 
Screen 6. C. In stage one, will player 2 have the opportunity to take $0.20 of your 
bonus to add to their own bonus? Yes / No. 
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Screen 6. D. In stage two, you will have the opportunity to pay a cost to reduce 
player 2's bonus. You may choose to reduce player 2's bonus up to 4 times. How 
much will it cost you and by how much will it reduce player 2's bonus each time? 
It will cost you $1.00 and will reduce player 2's bonus by $0.60 each time / It will 
cost you $0.05 and will reduce player 2's bonus by $0.15 each time. 
Screen 7. Well done - you got all the questions right! Ready to play the game? 
Yes. 
Screen 8. **THE GAME** Stage 1. Player 2 could choose to take $0.20 of your 
bonus or do nothing. Player 2 chose to take $0.20 of your bonus. You initially had 
$1.10. You now have $0.90. Player 2 initially had $0.60. Player 2 now has $0.80. 
Screen 9. Stage 2. You currently have $0.90 bonus. Player 2 currently has $0.80 
bonus. You may pay to reduce player 2's bonus. Each time you reduce player 's 
bonus it will cost you $0.05 and will reduce player 2's bonus by $0.15. If you 
reduce player 2's bonus: 1 time - you will get $0.85 and player 2 will get $0.65 
bonus. 2 times - you will get $0.80 and player 2 will get $0.50 bonus. 3 times - 
you will get $0.75 and player 2 will get $0.35 bonus. 4 times - you will get $0.70 
and player 2 will get $0.20 bonus.  If you don't pay to reduce player 2's bonus: 
You will get $0.90 bonus. Player 2 will get $0.80 bonus. How many times would 
you like to reduce Player 2's bonus? Don't pay to reduce player 2's bonus / 1 / 2 / 3 
/ 4. 
Screen 10. That's the end of the game. The mystery word is 'cherry'. Please return 
to the HIT and enter the word 'cherry' in the box before submitting your HIT. 
Thanks for playing. 
5.7.3 Matching of subjects 
As described in the General Methods section it was not always possible to match 
players with a unique partner in the same treatment/punishment condition as them 
self.  In this experiment 85.71 % of players (n = 4210) were matched with a 
unique partner in the same treatment and punishment condition as them self, 5.57 
% of players (n = 274) were matched with a unique partner in the same 
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punishment condition but a different treatment and 0.16 % (n = 8) of players were 
matched with a unique partner in neither the same punishment condition nor the 
same treatment as them self. This left 110 P2s who did not steal and 110 P1s who 
were told that their partner did steal. These players (8.55 % of players) could not 
be uniquely matched with a partner and so were matched with a partner in the 
same treatment and punishment condition as them self but who had already been 
matched with another player (Figure 5.S1).  
 
Figure 5.S1 The percentage of subjects that were matched with a unique partner 
in the same treatment and punishment condition (Unique, same T and PC; Red 
bar), a unique partner in the same punishment condition but a different treatment 
(Unique, same PC but different T; Blue bar), a unique partner in a different 
treatment and a different punishment condition (Unique, different T and PC; 
Orange bar) or a partner in the same treatment and punishment condition but who 
has already been matched with another player (Re-matched, same T and PC Green 
bar).  
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5.7.4 Power analysis 
We used Gpower (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) to conduct an a priori power 
analysis to assess whether our sample of P1s that punished was large enough to 
test whether P1 used the punishment option that would remove inequality in each 
treatment (C-E). For the power analysis, alpha was set at 0.05 (i.e. we did not 
account for any p-value adjustment to control for multiple comparisons), two 
tailed and power (1 - β) was set at 0.80.  
The power analysis indicated that a sample size of 18 punishers would be required 
to detect a significant difference between a proportion of 0.70 (higher than 
observed in any treatments in this study) P1s choosing the most popular 
punishment investment versus a proportion of 0.1 P1s choosing another 
punishment investment. This suggests that we have insufficient punishers for this 
analysis in all treatments in the inefficient punishment condition (see Table 5.2). 
5.7.5 Supplementary analysis (i) 
When punishment was efficient, in both treatments where P2 stealing did not 
create disadvantageous inequality for P1 (treatments A & B), if P1 used 
punishment, the modal punishment investment chosen was $0.20. This 
punishment investment inflicted the largest costs on P2 and thus maximized 
advantageous inequality for P1. In treatment A, significantly more P1s invested 
$0.20 into punishing a stealing P2 than invested $0.15 or $0.10, though the 
difference between the proportion investing $0.20 versus $0.10 did not remain 
significant following p-value adjustment for multiple comparisons (Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995; Fisher’s exact test; Table 5.S2). There was no significant 
difference in propensity to invest $0.20 versus $0.05 (Fisher’s exact test, Table 
5.S2). In treatment B, significantly more P1s with efficient punishment invested 
$0.20 into punishing a stealing P2 than invested $0.10 or $0.15. In treatment B, 
the difference between the number of P1’s with efficient punishment that invested 
$0.20 versus $0.05 was non-significant (Fisher’s exact test, Table 5.S2).  
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Treatment 
Proportion choosing 
maximum punishment 
investment ($0.20) ± SE 
Comparison   
(proportion ± SE) 
P-value P
BH
-value n 
A 0.46 ± 0.1 $0.05 (0.32 ± 0.09) 0.412 0.495 28 
  
$0.10 (0.18 ± 0.07) 0.044 0.066 
 
  
 $0.15 (0.04 ± 0.04) 0.001 0.002 
 
      
B 0.50 ± 0.11 $0.05 (0.35 ± 0.11) 0.523 0.523 20 
  
$0.10 (0.05 ± 0.05) 0.003 0.001 
 
    $0.15 (0.10 ± 0.07)  0.014 0.028 
 
 
Table 5.S2 The proportion of players who chose the maximum punishment 
investment compared to the other punishment investments in treatments A & B. 
Data are restricted to players that punished a stealing partner and had access to 
efficient punishment. P values are generated from two-sided Fisher's exact tests. 
Benjamini-Hochberg adjusted P
BH
-values are also presented to account for 
multiple comparisons. The final column shows the total sample size (n) for the 
comparisons. 
5.7.6 Supplementary analysis (ii) 
Although both the current study and R&M used a 1:3 fee to fine, the minimum 
cost for punishment in the current study was $0.05 whereas the minimum cost in 
R&M was $0.10. Thus, we wanted to test whether the increased cost to punish a 
stealing partner in R&M might have explained the decreased tendency to punish, 
particularly when P2 stole but this did not result in DI.  To test whether the 
contradicting findings of Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) and this study could be 
explained by the cost of punishment, we compared the proportion of P1 in the 
efficient punishment condition  that chose a non-zero punishment investment 
when (i) P2 didn’t steal; (ii) P2 stole but the stealing did not result in 
disadvantageous inequality for P1 (‘P2 stole no DI’); (iii) and P2 stole resulting in 
disadvantageous inequality for P1 (‘P2 stole DI’), restricting data to P1’s who 
spent $0.10 or more on punishment.  
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P1 was more likely to invest $0.10 or more on punishing when P2 stole compared 
to when P2 didn’t steal; even when stealing did not result in disadvantageous 
inequality (Table 5.S3; Figure 5.1). Moreover, the tendency to invest $0.10 or 
more in punishment was increased when stealing resulted in disadvantageous 
inequality (proportion punishing (i) non-stealing P2 = 0.02 ± 0.01; (ii) stealing P2, 
no DI = 0.14 ± 0.02; stealing P2, DI = 0.28 ± 0.02; Table 5.S3; Figure 5.1). These 
results suggest that the difference in the findings of Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) 
and this study cannot be explained by the cost of punishment.  
 
 
Punishment 
condition Comparison P-value P
BH
-value  
n 
Efficient 
P2 didn’t steal vs. P2 stole 
no DI  <0.001 <0.001 
831 
 
P2 didn’t steal vs. P2 stole 
DI <0.001 <0.001 
944 
 
P2 stole no DI vs. P2 stole 
DI <0.001 <0.001 
577 
Table 5.S3 The P-values (and Benjamini-Hochberg adjusted P
BH
-values) 
generated by Fisher’s exact tests (two-sided) comparing the proportion of  P1 in 
the efficient punishment condition that chose a $0.10 or more punishment 
investment across the different conditions.   
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Chapter 6 
Exploring the Motivations for 
Punishment: Framing and Cross-
Cultural Effects 
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6.1 Note 
This work is currently in preparation for submission. Nichola Raihani contributed 
to experimental design and discussion. Katie McAuliffe contributed to discussion. 
I designed the experiment, collected the data, analysed the data and wrote the 
paper. 
6.2 Abstract 
Is punishment motivated by the desire to reciprocate losses ('revenge') or by the 
desire to reduce payoff asymmetries between the punisher and the target? In many 
experiments these two possibilities are impossible to separate because punishers 
typically experience losses and disadvantageous inequality when they interact 
with a cheat. Recent work that has separated these two possible motivations has 
suggested that punishment is more likely to be motivated by experiencing 
disadvantageous inequality than by a desire for revenge. Nevertheless, these 
findings do not replicate across different studies. Here, we suggest that 
considering culture - previously overlooked as a possible source of variation in 
responses - is important for understanding when and why individuals punish one 
another. We conducted a two-player stealing game with punishment, using 
subjects recruited from the USA and India. US-based subjects were sensitive to 
both losses and disadvantageous inequality when deciding whether to punish a 
partner. Antisocial punishment (paying to reduce the income of non-stealing 
partners) was vanishingly rare among the US-based subjects. India-based subjects, 
on the other hand, punished at higher levels than US-based subjects and, so long 
as they did not experience disadvantageous inequality, punished stealing and non-
stealing partners indiscriminately. Nevertheless, as in the USA, when stealing 
resulted in disadvantageous inequality, India-based subjects punished stealing 
partners more than non-stealing partners. These results are consistent with 
previous studies that have demonstrated cross-cultural variation in punitive 
behaviour and support the idea that under some circumstances punishment might 
function to improve relative status, rather than to enforce cooperation. 
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6.3 Introduction 
The factors underpinning decisions to cooperate and to punish others have 
traditionally been studied in stylized economic games in laboratories, mostly 
using Western undergraduates as the representative sample (Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Camerer 2003; Dawes et al. 2007; Henrich et al. 2010). One traditional paradigm 
is the public goods game (Ledyard 1995), where group members' contributions are 
costly in that they benefit the group at the expense of the contributor (Fehr & 
Gächter 2002). In such settings, it has been shown that subjects are willing to 
forfeit a portion of their endowment to fine uncooperative players; a behaviour 
that is interpreted as punishment (Fehr & Gächter 2002). Individuals that interact 
with cheating partners often experience negative emotions, and the strength of 
these emotions has been linked to the propensity to invest in costly punishment 
(Fehr & Gächter 2002; Sanfey et al. 2003; Xiao & Houser 2005; Grimm & 
Mengel 2011; Wang et al. 2011). Nevertheless, these negative emotions could 
have one of two (not mutually exclusive) sources (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012a). 
First, since cooperators that interact with cheats incur losses relative to those that 
interact with cooperators, the desire to punish might reflect the disutility 
associated with experiencing lower than expected payoffs and an associated desire 
to inflict reciprocal harm on a cheating partner (also termed the desire for 
'revenge'; McCullough et al. 2013). It is argued that the functional significance of 
punishment motivated by revenge is to deter cheating interaction partners from 
repeating their harmful actions again in subsequent interactions with the punisher 
(McCullough et al. 2013). Evidence from humans and non-human species 
suggests that punishment might often achieve this deterrent function (Fehr & 
Gächter 2002; Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani et al. 2012 but see Dreber et al. 2008; 
dos Santos et al. 2013). However, in stereotypical laboratory games, cheats 
typically end up with higher payoffs than cooperators meaning that, in addition to 
losses, individuals also experience disadvantageous inequality when interacting 
with a cheating partner. This means that the desire to punish could stem from 
disadvantageous inequality aversion (the disutility associated with experiencing 
lower payoffs than others, (Fehr & Schmidt 1999). In many of the most common 
games used to explore punishment in humans, these two possible motives are 
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impossible to separate. It has been suggested punitive sentiments that are 
motivated by disadvantageous inequality aversion (rather than desire for revenge) 
are more consistent with the idea of a fitness-levelling (rather than a deterrent) 
function of punishment (Price et al. 2002). 
In an effort to identify the motive underpinning punishment decisions, recent 
studies have placed subjects in conditions where they experience either inequality 
or losses independent of one another (e.g. Dawes et al. 2007; Raihani & 
McAuliffe 2012b; Bone & Raihani 2015). Based on these approaches, empirical 
data have supported the idea that punishment might be motivated more by 
inequality aversion than by the desire for revenge. For example, in a random 
income game (where no cheating occurred and the desire to inflict reciprocal harm 
could therefore be ruled out), Dawes et al. (2007)  showed that subjects would pay 
a cost to reduce the income of the richest players in the group (and also to increase 
the earnings of the poorer members). A follow-on study showed that the 
preference for equal outcomes in the random income game was significantly 
associated with willingness to punish cheats in a public goods game, leading the 
authors to conclude that egalitarian motives underpin the desire to punish cheats 
in social interactions (Johnson et al. 2009). Other supportive evidence includes the 
finding that third-party punishment decisions, which - by definition - cannot be 
motivated by a desire for revenge, are positively linked to the degree of envy felt 
by the third-party with respect to the transgressor's gains (Pedersen et al. 2013; but 
see Jordan et al. 2014). 
In a recent study, Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) provided a more direct empirical 
test of the relative importance of losses versus inequality in predicting 
punishment. The test was based on a two-player game, where player one was 
initially endowed with $0.70 and player two's endowment varied according to one 
of three treatments (A: $0.10; B: $0.30; C: $0.70). In the first stage, player 2 (P2) 
was given the option to steal $0.20 of Player 1's (P1) endowment. In the second 
stage of the game, P1 could pay a fee ($0.10) to punish P2 (by $0.30). In this 
setup, P1 therefore experienced the same losses if P2 decided to steal ($0.20 in 
each treatment) but different relative outcomes (A: advantageous inequality; B: 
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equal outcomes; C: disadvantageous inequality). Thus, the design allowed the 
possibly separate effects of incurring losses versus experiencing disadvantageous 
inequality on P1's decision to punish P2 to be disentangled. When P2 stole but 
stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality, about 15% of P1 punished 
P2, which was not significantly different from the number that punished when P2 
didn’t steal. However, when P2 stealing created disadvantageous inequality for 
P1, more than 40 % of P1 punished when P2 stole; a significantly higher 
proportion than when P2 didn’t steal. Thus, the study supported the idea that 
punishment decisions are motivated primarily by disadvantageous inequality 
rather than by a desire for revenge per se. 
In an attempt to replicate and extend the earlier Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) 
study (using a similar game structure), Bone & Raihani (2015) (Chapter 5 of this 
thesis) showed that players were more likely to punish stealing partners  if 
stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality rather than equality or 
advantageous inequality (Bone & Raihani 2015). However, they also found that 
P1s punished stealing P2s more than non-stealing P2s, even when stealing did not 
result in disadvantageous inequality. The findings from the more recent study 
suggest that punishment stems from both a desire for revenge and an aversion to 
inequality and therefore seem to contradict the results from the earlier study. We 
designed the current study to tease apart possible explanations for the differences 
between the findings of the original Raihani & McAuliffe (2012b) study (hereafter 
R&M) and the more recent Bone & Raihani (2015) study (hereafter B&R); and to 
get a better understanding of whether motives based on revenge or inequality 
aversion, respectively, are a more important driver of the decision to punish. 
Our initial hypothesis was that methodological details could explain the 
discrepancy in the results of the two studies. In R&M, subjects were initially 
endowed with $0.70 which, if they were paired with a stealing partner, was 
reduced to $0.50. In contrast, in B&R, subjects started out with $1.10, which 
would be reduced to $0.90 if the partner stole $0.20. Although the losses 
experienced were consistent across the two studies ($0.20 in both), it is possible 
that the loss was perceived as greater in B&R due to a phenomenon called the 
133 
 
left-digit effect (Thomas & Morwitz 2005), where losses that result in the left 
digit changing (i.e. from $1.10 to $0.90) are perceived as larger than those where 
the left digit does not change (i.e. as in $0.70 to $0.50). A second possibility is 
that variation in the cost of punishing a stealing partner (relative to the punisher's 
endowment) might have been responsible for the different findings. Although the 
same fee to fine ratio (1:3) was used in both studies, punishment in R&M cost 
twice as much as in B&R ($0.10 versus $0.05) meaning that, in B&R, punishers 
both had a higher endowment to spend on punishment and could punish a partner 
more cheaply. Variation in the cost of punishing has previously been shown to 
influence whether people use this option when it is available (Anderson & 
Putterman 2006). The current study was therefore designed to try and identify 
whether either of these methodological details might have systematically affected 
our results. 
We also wished to explore the possibility that cultural differences between players 
might have affected punishment strategies. Data for both previous studies were 
collected via the online crowdsourcing platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk; www.mturk.com), where the vast majority of workers hail from either 
the USA or India (Ross et al. 2010). While R&M recruited participants from both 
countries, B&R restricted participation to subjects based in the USA. Importantly, 
R&M did not control for possible cross-cultural differences in subjects' behaviour. 
If there are systematic differences in the way that India-based versus US-based 
subjects behave in economic games, particularly with respect to punishment, then 
the different demographic sampling could explain the different results we saw 
across the two studies. Previous work has shown stark cross-cultural differences 
in the propensity to punish, both when punishment is aimed at social cheats 
(Henrich et al. 2006; Marlowe & Berbesque 2008) and when punishment is aimed 
at non-cheating or overtly cooperative individuals (commonly referred to as 
'antisocial punishment'; Ellingsen et al. 2012; Herrmann et al. 2008; Gächter & 
Herrmann 2009). If we were to find differences in propensity to punish under 
different conditions between the US-based and India-based players on MTurk then 
this might help us to understand the discrepancies in our results of  and, more 
generally, to gain insights into the factors that motivate individuals to punish. 
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6.4 Methods 
6.4.1 Experimental protocol 
This project was approved by the University College London ethics board under 
the project number 3720/001. Prior to taking part in the study, subjects were 
required to tick a box to indicate that they understood that they were taking part in 
scientific research and that their participation was voluntary. No deception was 
used in this study and participants were not debriefed as to the purpose of the 
study after the game. All data were collected in November 2014 using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (see General Methods for details and justification for online data 
collection using MTurk). Using MTurk allowed us to recruit a more diverse 
demographic sample than the typical western, educated, industrialized, rich and 
democratic (WEIRD; Henrich et al. 2010) samples used in the majority of 
behavioural experiments (Buhrmester et al. 2011). Subjects were recruited from 
24 countries (see supplementary materials), with the vast majority (95 %) hailing 
from USA (n = 1941) or India (n = 315). We recruited workers to play a modified 
version of the game used in R&M and B&R (described above and see Supporting 
Information S1 for instructions given to players). MTurk workers are identified by 
a unique 14-digit worker ID rather than their names (Mason & Suri 2012). 
Workers were told that their ID would not be revealed to their partner in the game, 
thus ensuring anonymity. Of the 2,392 workers recruited to play the game, 1,196 
were randomly assigned to the role of 'player 1’ (P1) and the remaining 1,196 to 
the role of 'player 2' (P2). To be eligible to participate in the study, all players had 
to answer correctly three comprehension questions about the game. Prior to taking 
part in the game, subjects were first asked to provide some background 
demographic information on their age, gender, education, income levels and 
country of origin (see Supplementary materials; Table 6.S1).  
In the game, P1 was allocated a bonus of either $0.70, $1.10 or $1.30, depending 
on the experimental treatment (Table 6.1). P2 was also allocated a bonus 
according to the scenarios outlined in Table 6.1. Thus, we had three different 
experimental treatments (corresponding to different starting amounts for P1) and 
within each treatment players were allocated to one of four scenarios 
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(corresponding to the different starting amounts for P2). The game consisted of 
two stages. In the first stage, players were first informed of their own initial 
endowment and the endowment of the partner; and P2 was then given the choice 
to take $0.20 of P1's bonus or to do nothing (as in R&M). In the second stage, P1 
was given the option to punish P2 (framed as 'reducing P2's bonus' in the game 
instructions; see Supplementary materials), by paying $0.10 to reduce P2's bonus 
by $0.30 (as in R&M). Players were matched with partners ex-post (as in (Rand 
2012; Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b; Bone & Raihani 2015). The four scenarios for 
each treatment were chosen to allow us to identify different possible motives 
underpinning P1's decision to punish P2. In all scenarios, P1 incurred a loss of 
$0.20 if P2 stole (leading to a second stage bonus of $0.50, $0.90 or $1.10 in 
Treatments A, B and C, respectively, Table 6.1). For each treatment, in scenarios (i 
- iii) P1 started out better off than P2, but in scenario (iv) P1 and P2 started with 
equal initial bonus. In each scenario if P2 decided to steal from P1, the following 
outcomes ensued:  
scenario (i): P1 remained better off than P2; 
scenario (ii): P1 and P2's final outcomes  were equal;  
scenarios (iii): P1 ended up worse off than P2; 
scenario (iv): P1 ended up worse off than P2. 
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Treatment P1's 
endowment 
Scenario P2's 
endowment 
Outcome if P2 
stole  
(P1-P2) 
Sample 
size (P2 
stole) 
Sample 
size (P2 
did not 
steal) 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
$0.70 
 
i $0.10 $0.50 - $0.30 49 50 
ii $0.30 $0.50 - $0.50 50 50 
iii $0.50 $0.50 - $0.70 50 50 
iv $0.70 $0.50 - $0.90 50 50 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
$1.10 
 
i $0.50 $0.90 - $0.70 49 50 
ii $0.70 $0.90 - $0.90 50 50 
iii $0.90 $0.90 - $1.10 49 50 
iv $0.90 $0.90 - $1.30 50 50 
 
 
C 
 
 
 
$1.30 
 
i $0.70 $1.10 - $0.90 50 50 
ii $0.90 $1.10 - $1.10 50 50 
iii $1.10 $1.10 - $1.30 50 50 
iv $1.30 $1.10 - $1.50 50 49 
 
Table 6.1 Initial endowments allocated to P1 and P2, the outcome if P2 stole and 
the sample size of P1’s who interacted with a stealing / non-stealing P2 according 
to the treatment and scenario. 
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Thus, the four scenarios for each treatment allowed us to disentangle the possibly 
separate effects of experiencing losses versus experiencing disadvantageous 
inequality on P1's decision to punish P2. We included both scenarios (iii) and (iv) 
to further delineate two potential motivations that might have driven P1 to punish 
a stealing P2. First, punishment might be motivated by frustration that the starting 
bonuses had initially been equal but were now tipped in favour of P2 (scenario 
iv). Alternatively, the decision to punish might be insensitive to the initial starting 
bonuses and instead just reflect P1's frustration at a disadvantageous outcome 
(scenario iii).  
While the four scenarios allowed us to explore how different outcomes affected 
P1's decision to punish P2, the three treatments (A, B and C) allowed us to control 
for the possibility that the initial starting bonus of P1 might affect punishment 
decisions. Specifically, Treatment A (where P1's starting bonus was $0.70) was a 
direct replication of R&M. Treatment B (P1's starting bonus $1.10) was included 
to test whether the left-digit effect (Thomas & Morwitz 2005) might have 
motivated P1 to punish a stealing P2 (i.e. if losses were perceived as being greater 
when moving from $1.10 to $0.90 than from $0.70 to $0.50). Treatment C (P1's 
starting bonus $1.30) was included to investigate the possibility that P1 would be 
more likely to invest in punishment when the cost of punishment was  smaller, 
relative to the initial endowment. Thus, if either the left-digit effect or the cost of 
punishment (as a proportion of the endowment) were affecting P1's punitive 
behaviour, then we would have expected the starting bonus to have had an effect 
on P1's decision to punish P2.  
6.4.2 Analysis 
First, we used our data to ask whether the left-digit effect or the relative cost of 
punishment might have affected P1's decision to punish a stealing P2. If the left-
digit effect was increasing P1's tendency to punish P2, then we should have 
detected increased punishment of a stealing P2 in treatment B (starting bonus 
$1.10) relative to treatments A or C, even when stealing did not result in 
disadvantageous inequality for P1. Conversely, if P1 was more likely to punish a 
stealing partner when punishment was a smaller cost, relative to the initial 
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endowment, then we should have seen increased punishment in treatment C, 
relative to A or B. We explored these relationships using a chi-squared test. Data 
were restricted to instances where P2 stole from P1 and when stealing did not 
result in disadvantageous inequality for P1 (n =  297).  
Next, we explored how country of origin and outcome inequality affected P1's 
punishment decisions. We used a generalised linear model (GLM), with the term 
'punish' set as a binary response term (1 = P1 punished P2 = 1; 0 = P1 did not 
punish P2). As in R&M and B&R, we were interested in whether experiencing 
losses or disadvantageous inequality had a greater effect on P1's decision to 
punish P2. To this end, we used our data to create an explanatory term called 
'outcome' that captured this variable. The term 'outcome' was a 3-level categorical 
variable with the levels ‘P2 didn’t steal' (P2 did not steal from P1); 'P2 stole no 
DI' (P2 stole but the stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality); and 'P2 
stole DI' (P2 stole and the outcome was disadvantageous inequality for P1). We 
included the following explanatory terms in the GLM: 'outcome'; 'equality ruined' 
(1 = P2 stealing resulted in a formerly equal outcome becoming unequal; 0 = 
otherwise); and, 'country' (a 2-level factor specifying P1's country of origin: India 
/ USA). We also included the following two-way interaction: 'country x outcome'. 
Because our preliminary chi-squared analysis (described above) showed that the 
starting bonus was not an important predictor of P1's punishment decision, we 
combined data for all treatments (A, B and C) for this analysis. Since we were 
interested in exploring the possibility that culture could affect subjects' decisions 
in the game, and the vast majority (95 %) of our subjects allocated to the P1 role 
were recruited from either the USA (n = 962) or from India (n = 176), we 
restricted data to responses from these subjects. The remaining 58 subjects 
allocated to the P1 role hailed from 24 different countries (see Supplementary 
materials; Table 6.S1), meaning that we did not have a sufficient sample size to 
make meaningful inference about country-level effects on behaviour for these 
individuals. We therefore had a sample size of 1138 P1 punishment decisions for 
this model. All proportions are reported with 95 % confidence intervals. All data 
were analysed using R version 3.0.3 (www.r-project.org). For the GLM we used 
an information-theoretic approach with model averaging, as described in Grueber 
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et al. (2011), to determine the relative importance of the explanatory terms 
included in each model. The input variables were centred by subtracting the mean 
(Schielzeth 2010), this allows averaging over models that include different 
interaction terms (see General Methods for details). 
6.5 Results 
Neither the left-digit effect nor the cost of punishing relative to the initial 
endowment seemed to affect P1's punishment decisions, in scenarios where 
stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality for P1. In treatment A 
(starting bonus $0.70), P1 punished a stealing partner on 12 / 99 (12.1 %) 
occasions; in treatment B (starting bonus $1.10), P1 punished a stealing partner on 
16 / 99 (15.0 %) occasions; and in treatment C (starting bonus $1.30), P1 
punished a stealing partner on 10 / 99 (10.2 %) occasions. These differences 
across treatments were not significant at conventional levels (Chi-squared test: X 
= 1.69, df = 2, P = 0.43). 
On average, India-based subjects were more punitive than US-based subjects 
(Table 6.2). In addition, subjects from India and the US responded differently to 
outcome (the variable describing whether the partner stole; and whether this 
resulted in disadvantageous inequality if so, Table 6.2; Figure 6.1). Subjects from 
India were more likely than US-based subjects to punish a non-stealing partner 
(proportion India-based P1 punishing non-stealing P2 = 0.18 (0.11, 0.28); US-
based P1 punishing non-stealing P2 = 0.01 (0.00, 0.02); Figure 6.1). So long as 
stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality, India-based subjects did not 
punish a stealing partner more than a non-stealing partner. In other words, Indian 
subjects punished 'antisocially' at higher levels than US-based players and did not 
seem to increase punishment in response to experiencing losses in the absence of 
disadvantageous inequality (Figure 6.1b). Nevertheless, when stealing did result 
in disadvantageous inequality, India-based subjects were even more likely to 
punish the partner (proportion India-based subjects P1 punishing stealing P2 when 
stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequity = 0.19 (0.11, 0.32); when 
stealing did result in disadvantageous inequity = 0.50 (0.34, 0.66); Figure 6.1b). 
The patterns for US-based subjects were different: even when stealing did not 
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result in disadvantageous inequality, subjects were more likely to punish stealing 
than non-stealing partners (Figure 6.1a). Nevertheless, US-based subjects were 
also sensitive to inequality and punished stealing partners even more when 
stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality (proportion US-based P1 
punishing stealing P2 when stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequity = 
0.11 (0.08, 0.16); when stealing did result in disadvantageous inequity = 0.27 
(0.23, 0.34); Figure 6.1a). Thus, Indian subjects only punished stealing partners 
more than non-stealing partners when stealing resulted in disadvantageous 
inequality; whereas US subjects were sensitive to both losses and outcome 
inequality when making a punishment decision (Table 6.2).  
Although the term 'equality ruined' was a component of the top models, the 
confidence intervals for this term spanned zero indicating 'equality ruined' was not 
an important driver of P1's punishment decision (Table 6.2).  
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Figure 6.1 The proportion of P1 who punished P2 when P2 didn’t steal (‘Didn’t 
steal’), P2 stole but the stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality 
(‘Stole no DI’) or P2 stole and the outcome was disadvantageous inequality for P1 
(‘Stole DI’). Data are shown for players based in a) the USA and b) India. Error 
bars show the 95 % confidence intervals. Sample sizes for each condition are 
indicated in parentheses. Plots are generated from raw data.  
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Parameter Estimate Unconditional  
SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Relative 
Importance 
Intercept -2.75 0.20 (-3.14, -2.36)  
Country (India / USA) -1.93 0.30 (-2.52, -1.35) 1.00 
Outcome    1.00 
P2 stole no DI 2.10 0.42 (1.27, 2.93)  
P2 stole DI 3.31 0.41 (2.51, 4.12)  
Outcome x Country    1.00 
P2 stole no DI 2.40 0.67 (1.09, 3.71)  
P2 stole DI 2.10 0.64 (0.85, 3.36)  
Equality ruined -0.05 0.17 (-0.69, 0.34) 0.31 
 
Table 6.2 Estimates, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models. All input variables 
were centred by subtracting the mean (Schielzeth 2010). Standard errors are 
unconditional, meaning that they incorporate model selection uncertainty. 
Outcome is a 3-level categorical variable: ‘P2 didn’t steal’ = player 2 did not steal; 
‘P2 stole no DI’ = player 2 stole but this did not result in disadvantageous 
inequality for P1; and ‘P2 stole DI’ = player 2 stole and this resulted in in 
disadvantageous inequality for P1. For outcome, 'P2 didn’t steal' was the reference 
level. Estimates from the same model when the reference level for outcome is ' P2 
stole no DI' presented in Supplementary Information. 
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6.6 Discussion 
This study was designed to try and explain why we found seemingly contradictory 
evidence for the importance of revenge as a motive underpinning punishment 
decisions across two separate studies. The R&M study found that only 
experiencing disadvantageous inequality (rather than losses in the absence of 
inequality) motivated subjects to punish a stealing partner. In the more recent 
B&R study, we found that both losses and inequality motivated punishment 
decisions. Based on the current dataset, it seems unlikely that minor 
methodological differences (specifically, differences in stake size or the relative 
cost of punishment) across the two studies can explain this discrepancy in the 
respective studies. Instead, we suggest that differences in the tendency to punish a 
stealing partner are largely explained by subjects' country of origin. For US-based 
subjects, the decision to punish was affected both by whether the partner stole and 
by whether the punisher experienced outcome inequality. Thus, the motives 
underpinning punishment apparently stemmed both from a desire for revenge and 
from the disutility associated with experiencing relatively lower payoffs than a 
partner (a finding replicated by Bone & Raihani 2015). US-based subjects were 
very unlikely to punish a non-stealing partner. This pattern was not replicated for 
the Indian subjects; punishment aimed at non-stealing individuals was an order of 
magnitude higher. Where stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality, 
there was no effect of losses on the propensity that Indian subjects would punish. 
By contrast, punishment was increased when stealing resulted in disadvantageous 
inequality for the punisher. The findings from a reanalysis of the data from the 
R&M study (separating US and India-based subjects) were consistent with these 
overall patterns (see supplementary materials for details).  
Our data showed that a non-negligible proportion of players were prepared to 
incur a cost to harm the partner, even when the partner did not steal any money 
(Figure 6.1). The tendency to pay to harm a non-stealing (or even an overtly 
cooperative) partner has been observed in several other studies (e.g. Herrmann et 
al. 2008; Gächter & Herrmann 2009; Anderson & Putterman 2006; Sylwester et 
al. 2013; Abbink & Sadrieh 2009), where it has variously been described with the 
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labels 'antisocial punishment'   (Herrmann et al. 2008; Gächter & Herrmann 2009; 
Anderson & Putterman 2006; Sylwester et al. 2013; Abbink & Sadrieh 2009; 
Bryson et al. 2014) or 'spite' (Abbink & Sadrieh 2009). While the use of the term 
'antisocial punishment' does not fit the functional definition of punishment (as a 
harmful action aimed at changing the target's, or a bystander's, behaviour in future 
interactions, (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012) in our 
one-shot game, we retain its use here to informally describe the behaviour of 
individuals who paid a cost to harm a non-stealing partner. Antisocial punishment 
was more common among the India-based than the US-based subjects, a finding 
which mirrors previous studies that have shown cross-cultural variation in 
antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al. 2008; Gächter & Herrmann 2009).  Cross-
cultural variation in antisocial punishment is thought to be predicted by weak rule 
of law, which is itself negatively linked to Gross Domestic Product (GDP; 
Herrmann et al. 2008; Sylwester et al. 2013; Prediger et al. 2013). According to 
the World Bank (2013), the GDP of the USA in 2013 was 16,800,000 million 
dollars, compared with 1,876,797 million dollars for India in the same year, which 
supports the idea that the GDP of a country will be negatively associated with 
citizens' propensity to punish antisocially. In addition, Herrmann et al. (2008) 
showed that antisocial punishment was associated with low scores for civic norms 
of cooperation. Following Herrmann et al. (2008) we used the questions from the 
most recent World Values Survey (2010-2014) to calculate mean scores for civic 
norms of cooperation for Indian and US citizens (see Supplementary materials). 
We calculated a mean score of 8.73 for US citizens (comparable to the score of 
8.65 as calculated by Herrmann et al. 2008, using data from 1999-2004). For 
Indian citizens, we calculated a mean civic norms score of 6.84, which is lower 
than for any of the countries that were included in the original Herrmann et al. 
(2008) analysis. Thus, our results do seem to be consistent with the idea that low 
civic norms of cooperation and rule of law are associated with increased tendency 
for antisocial punishment.  
In stereotypical public goods games, punishment is most often directed from 
cooperative individuals towards uncooperative targets. When targets are aware of 
who punished them and are given the chance to counter-punish, many individuals 
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do choose this option (Dreber et al. 2008; Nikiforakis 2008; Janssen & Bushman 
2008; Fehl et al. 2012; Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Nikiforakis & Engelmann 
2008). On this basis, it has been proposed that antisocial punishment might 
sometimes reflect retaliation by free-riders who were punished by cooperative 
partners, or a pre-emptive strike against expected punishment in subsequent 
rounds (Cinyabuguma et al. 2006; Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Herrmann et al. 
2008; Sylwester et al. 2013; Raihani & Bshary 2015). In our study, however, 
retaliation (pre-emptive or otherwise) can be ruled out as a motive underpinning 
antisocial punishment since the punishers did not receive any previous 
punishment to retaliate against. We can also rule out the possibility that 
individuals used antisocial punishment to deter partners from punishing in 
subsequent rounds, since this was a one-shot interaction. Instead, our findings 
lend more support to the recent idea that spiteful actions (including antisocial 
punishment) might simply reflect aggressive competition for status (as proposed 
by Charness et al. 2010; Prediger et al. 2014; Sylwester & Roberts 2010; Raihani 
& Bshary 2015). This idea has been supported by previous studies that have 
shown that the tendency to punish antisocially tends to disappear when fee to fine 
ratios are adjusted such that punishers cannot improve their standing relative to 
that of the target (Falk et al. 2005 but see Egas & Riedl 2008). 
It has been suggested that conceiving of punishment as an aggressive act, 
designed to improve relative status, can go some way to explaining cross-cultural 
differences in antisocial punishment use since the benefits of acquiring higher 
status than others might vary with socio-ecological factors such as rule of law and 
resource availability (for which GDP might provide a reasonable proxy; Sylwester 
et al. 2013; Prediger et al. 2014; Bryson et al. 2014). For example, in a recent 
empirical study, Prediger et al. (2014) used the 'joy of destruction' game (Abbink 
& Sadrieh 2009) to show that willingness to engage in costly spiteful behaviour 
correlates positively with resource scarcity. This empirical result supports earlier 
theoretical work which has shown that costly spite (aimed at competitors) can be 
favoured under resource (Gardner & West 2004b; Lehmann et al. 2009). If 
'spiteful' or antisocial punishment functions to improve status (rather than to deter 
partners from cheating) it need not be motivated by a desire for revenge and might 
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instead be aimed rather indiscriminately against stealing and non-stealing 
partners. This hypothesis would, nevertheless, predict increased punishment of 
stealing partners (relative to non-stealing partners) when stealing results in 
disadvantageous inequality. The empirical data from our India-based subjects 
matches these predictions. Thus, our data support the idea that punishment might 
be used at least in some contexts to establish or maintain dominance over peers. 
An obvious future extension to this study would be to investigate whether we 
would observe similar punishment patterns when the fee to fine ratio is 1:1 (or 
lower) such that punishers cannot improve their payoffs relative to those of 
targets. If the hypothesis that punishment sometimes represents aggressive 
competition for status is correct, then we would expect a marked decrease in 
antisocial punishment when punishers cannot improve their payoff relative to that 
of the target. It would also be interesting in any follow up to obtain self-reports 
from subjects on the emotions they feel prior to making their punishment 
decision. While some studies have suggested that punishment might often be 
preceded by negative emotions, such as anger or disgust (e.g. Fehr & Gächter 
2002; Sanfey et al. 2003), this might not necessarily be the case when punishment 
is motivated by a competitive drive to elevate relative status and is used 
indiscriminately against prosocial and antisocial partners. 
While the data from the India-based subjects provides some support for the idea 
that punishment might be proximately driven by competitive motives, the data 
from the US-based subjects suggest that revenge based motives cannot easily be 
ruled out. A similar conclusion was also reached based on the data collected for 
the Bone & Raihani (2015) study, where it was shown that individuals would 
invest in 'inefficient' punishment (fee to fine: 1:1) if this was the only option 
available but that, when given access to an 'efficient' punishment option (fee to 
fine: 1:3), typically invested the amount that created equal outcomes for the 
punisher and the target. Investment in inefficient punishment supports the idea 
that punishment is motivated by a desire for revenge rather than by competitive 
motives to equalise or increase payoffs relative to the target (since, by definition, 
inefficient punishment cannot have any bearing on relative payoffs of punisher 
and target). Nevertheless, the preference to equalise outcomes when this was 
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possible supports the idea that punishment might be motivated by egalitarian 
preferences and therefore be more likely to serve a fitness-levelling function. If 
the assumption that motives underpinning decisions can lend some insight into the 
likely evolved function of the behaviour is correct, then - based on the previous 
data and the data collected for the current study - we suggest that punishment 
might in fact serve both a deterrent function (motivated primarily by revenge) and 
a fitness-levelling (or improving) function (motivated by competitive desire; 
which may be increased when punisher experiences disadvantageous inequality). 
The relative importance of the two functions (and associated motives) might be 
expected to vary according to context (e.g. Gardner & West 2004). Based on the 
current data, it appears that culture is likely to play an important role in 
determining the relative importance of the two functions (and underlying motives) 
of punishment, although it is not yet clear which of the many factors that vary 
across cultures might be causal. Moreover, whether among-culture variation in 
punishment patterns is greater than that which is observed within cultures remains 
an open avenue for investigation. 
To conclude, the discrepancies that we observed across two similar studies 
concerning the importance of revenge as a proximate motive underpinning 
punishment decisions do not seem to reflect minor methodological details or, as 
was even more of a concern, the general unreliability or noisiness of data 
collected via the online crowdsourcing platform, Mechanical Turk. Instead, we 
suggest that the differences between the studies reflect different demographic 
sampling and the fact that cultural differences in punitive behaviour were not 
accounted for in the earlier R&M study. In fact, comparing the data from our US-
based players in this study with the comparable data obtained by Bone & Raihani 
(2015) reveals remarkable consistency in the overall patterns (and, in fact, others 
have also reported similar levels of consistency across studies conducted using 
MTurk, Peysakhovich et al. 2014). There is much more to be done in 
understanding what motivates punishment decisions and, even more importantly, 
why these motivations vary across contexts. 
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6.7 Supplementary materials 
6.7.1 Experimental instructions 
Having completed the demographic questions, participants were redirected to an 
external survey website (https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk) to take part in the experiment. 
Below is a text transcription of the game instructions received by players, 
including comprehension questions.  The example given is for a player 1 in 
treatment A, scenario (i); however, the general procedure is similar for all 
treatments and punishment conditions 
Screen 1: You are about to take part in an academic study which is run by Raihani 
Lab based at University College London. By continuing with the HIT you are 
consenting to allow Raihani Lab to use your responses in the study for academic 
purposes. All data are anonymous (your name or worker ID will not appear in any 
publication related to this study). Please tick 'I agree' if you agree to these 
conditions. If you do not wish to participate, or if you change your mind during 
the course of the study, please return to the Mechanical Turk Interface and click 
'Return HIT' 
Screen 2: Please enter your Worker ID. Your Worker ID is needed to ensure you 
get your bonus. Please DO NOT enter your email address or name in this box. If 
you don't know your Worker ID you can find it out by opening the following page 
in a new window: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard 
Screen 3: You are playing a game with another worker. Your worker ID will not be 
revealed to the other player and you will not find out their worker ID. You are 
Player 1. You have been allocated $0.70 bonus. Player 2 has been allocated $0.10 
bonus. This game has 2 stages. Stage 1: Player 2 can choose to take $0.20 from 
your bonus or to do nothing. Stage 2: You find out what Player 2 did in Stage 1 
and can then choose one of the following options:   
- [A] reduce Player 2's bonus by paying $0.10 to reduce Player 2's bonus by 
$0.30.                                   - [B] do nothing (no cost to you or Player 2) 
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Screen 4: Before proceeding, please answer the following questions. Please 
answer carefully - you will not be able to proceed if you get an answer wrong. 
Reminder: You are Player 1. You have a $0.70 bonus. Player 2 has a $0.10 bonus. 
1. If Player 2 takes $0.20 from your bonus in Stage 1 how much will you have at 
the start of Stage 2? (I will have $0.50 / I will have $0.70 / I will have $0.90)          
2. If Player 2 takes $0.20 from your bonus in Stage 1, how much will Player 2 
have at the start of Stage 2? (Player 2 will have $0.70 / Player 2 will have $0.30 / 
Player 2 will have $0.90)   
3. How much do you have to pay to reduce Player 2's bonus in Stage 2? (Nothing 
- it is free / it costs me $0.50 to reduce Player 2's bonus / It costs me $0.10 to 
reduce Player 2's bonus)  
Screen 5: Well done - you got all the questions right. Click 'continue' below to 
continue to the game. (Continue) 
Screen 6:  STAGE 1. Player 2 could choose to take $0.20 of your bonus or to do 
nothing. Player 2 took $0.20 of your bonus. The starting bonuses and current 
bonuses are shown below. 
 
 
Screen 7: STAGE 2. You may now pay $0.10 to reduce Player 2's bonus by $0.30. 
The possible final bonuses for you and Player 2 are shown below. Do you want to 
reduce Player 2's bonus? (Yes - I want to reduce Player 2's bonus / No - I don't 
want to reduce Player 2's bonus ) 
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Screen 8: That's the end of the game. The mystery word is 'FISH'. Please return to 
the HIT and enter the word 'FISH' in the box before submitting your HIT. Thanks 
for playing! 
6.7.2 Matching of subjects 
As described in the General Methods section, it was not always possible to match 
players with a unique partner in the same scenario/treatment as them self.  In this 
experiment 86.79 % of players (n = 2076) were matched with a unique partner in 
the same scenario and treatment as them self, 5.85 % of players (n = 140) were 
matched with a unique partner in the same scenario but a different treatment and 
2.51 % of players (n = 60) were matched with a unique partner in neither the same 
scenario nor the same treatment as them self. This left 58 P2s who did not steal 
and 58 P1s who were told that their partner did steal. These players (4.85 % of 
players) could not be uniquely matched and so were matched with a partner in the 
same scenario and treatment as them self but who had already been matched with 
another player (Figure 6.S1).  
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Figure 6.S1 The percentage of subjects that were matched with a unique partner 
in the same scenario and treatment (Unique, same S and T; Red bar), a unique 
partner in the same scenario but a different treatment (Unique, same S but 
different T; Blue bar), a unique partner in a different scenario and a different 
treatment (Unique, different S and T; Orange bar) or a partner in the same 
scenario and treatment but who has already been matched with another player 
(Re-matched, same S and T; Green bar). 
 
6.7.3 Calculating norms of civic cooperation 
We followed the methodology of Herrmann et al. (2008) to calculate the norms of 
civic cooperation for India relative to the USA from the period 2010 - 2014. We 
used data from the World Values Survey website (www.worldvalues.survey.org) 
and assessed the answers to the three questions previously analysed by Herrmann 
et al. 2008 to calculate the norms of civic cooperation for each country. These 
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three questions asked participants to answer to what extent (on a scale of 1 - 10, 
with 1 being never justifiable and 10 being always justifiable) the following 
actions could be justified: claiming government benefits to which you are not 
entitled (question V198); cheating on taxes if you have a chance (V201); and 
avoiding a fare on public transport (V199). As in Herrmann et al. (2008) we 
rescaled the answers such that a value of 1 would indicate weak civic norms and a 
value of 10 would indicate strong civic norms. In the Herrmann et al. (2008) 
study, the authors typically used data collected between 1999-2004; in this 
analysis we used the data collected from 2010-2014. Our social capital variables 
for norms of civic cooperation for India and the USA, respectively, were 6.84 and 
8.73. Previously Herrmann et al. (2008) reported a value of 8.65 for the USA (and 
a global range of 6.75 - 9.81). Thus, by this metric, India appears to have 
extremely weak civic norms, which has been associated with increased prevalence 
of antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al. 2008).   
6.7.4 Reanalysis of R&M data 
We wanted to explore whether the cross-cultural differences in the propensity to 
punish found in the current study were consistent with the R&M study. In the 
R&M study the vast majority (81 %) of subjects allocated to the role of P1 were 
recruited were from the US or India. In the R&M study there was more India-
based P1s (n = 130) than US-based P1s (n = 97), whereas in the current study, we 
had more US-based P1s (n = 962) than India-based P1s (n = 176). Although 
sample sizes were too small to formally test for cross-cultural differences in the 
R&M data, descriptive statistics support the patterns found in the current study. 
Subjects from India were more likely than US-based subjects to punish a non-
stealing partner (proportion India-based P1 punishing non-stealing P2 = 0.16 
(0.08, 0.28); US-based P1 punishing non-stealing P2 = 0.03 (0.00, 0.12); Figure 
6.S1). So long as stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality, India-based 
subjects did not punish a stealing partner more than a non-stealing partner. 
However, when stealing did result in disadvantageous inequality, India-based 
subjects were more likely to punish their partner (proportion India-based subjects 
P1 punishing stealing P2 when stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequity 
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= 0.20 (0.11, 0.33); when stealing did result in disadvantageous inequity = 0.36 
(0.20, 0.57); Figure 6.S1b). The patterns for US-based subjects were different: 
even when stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality, subjects were 
more likely to punish stealing than non-stealing partners (Figure 6.S1a). 
Nevertheless, US-based subjects were also sensitive to inequality and punished 
stealing partners even more when stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality 
(proportion US-based P1 punishing stealing P2 when stealing did not result in 
disadvantageous inequity = 0.1 (0.03, 0.26); when stealing did result in 
disadvantageous inequity = 0.67 (0.35, 0.88); Figure 6.S1a). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.S2 The proportion of P1 who punished P2 when P2 didn’t steal (‘Didn’t 
steal’), P2 stole but the stealing did not result in disadvantageous inequality 
(‘Stole no DI’) or P2 stole and the outcome was disadvantageous inequality for P1 
(‘Stole DI’) in data from the R&M study. Data are shown for players based in a) 
the USA and b) India. Error bars show the 95 % confidence intervals. Sample 
sizes for each condition are indicated in parentheses. Plots are generated from raw 
data.  
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6.7.5 Supplementary tables 
Parameter P1 demographic information (n = 1195) 
Age                      Mean = 31 ± 0.3 
Range = 18 - 88 
Gender  (n)                                       Females = 493 (42.0 %) 
Males = 680 (58.0 %) 
Undisclosed = 22 
Country Australia = 1 
Belgium = 2 
Bolivia = 1 
Brazil = 1 
Bulgaria = 1 
Canada = 6 
China = 3 
Croatia = 2 
Czech Republic = 1 
Ethiopia = 1 
Germany = 1 
India = 176 
Indonesia = 1 
Italy = 1 
Lithuania = 1 
Macedonia = 1 
Panama = 1 
Peru = 1 
Philippines = 3 
Poland = 1 
Romania = 2 
Russia = 1 
Serbia = 2 
Thailand = 1 
UK = 1 
USA = 962 
Table 6.S1 Age, gender and country of origin for all subjects allocated to role of 
player 1.  
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Parameter India (n = 176) USA (n = 962) 
Age Mean = 32.4 ± 0.6        
Range = 19-72 
Mean = 31 ± 0.3 
Range = 18 - 88 
Gender Females = 57 (33 %) 
Males = 116 (67 %) 
Undisclosed = 3                                   
Females = 420 (44 %) 
Males = 535 (56 %) 
Undisclosed = 7 
Education 
 
 
School = 6 (4 %) 
Primary degree = 112 (66 
%) 
Graduate degree = 53 (31 
%) 
Undisclosed = 5 
School = 99 (10 %) 
Primary degree = 749 (79 %) 
Graduate degree = 100 (11 %) 
Undisclosed = 14 
 
Income Less than $12,000 = 88 (43 
%) 
$12,000 - $24,999 = 80 (39 
%) 
$25,000 - $49,999 = 25 (12 
%) 
$50,000 - $99,999 = 11 (5 
%) 
More than $100,000 = 1 
(0.4 %) 
Undisclosed = 11 
 
Less than $12,000 = 94 (10 %) 
$12,000 - $24,999 = 154 (17 %) 
$25,000 - $49,999 = 291 (32 %) 
$50,000 - $99,999 = 284 (31 %) 
More than $100,000 = 92 (10 %) 
Undisclosed = 47 
Table 6.S2 Demographic information for US-based and India-based subjects 
allocated to role of player 1.  
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Parameter Estimate Unconditional  
SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Relative 
Importance 
Intercept -2.75 0.20 (-3.14, -2.36)  
Country -1.93 0.30 (-2.52, -1.35) 1.00 
Outcome    1.00 
P2 didn’t steal -2.10 0.42 (-2.93, -1.27)  
P2 stole DI 1.21 0.24 (0.74, 1.67)  
Outcome x 
Country 
   1.00 
P2 stole no DI -2.40 0.67 (-3.71, -1.09)  
P2 stole DI -0.30 0.55 (-1.37, 0.77)  
Equality ruined -0.05 0.17 (-0.69, 0.35) 0.31 
 
Table 6.S3 Estimates, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models. All input variables 
were centred by subtracting the mean (Schielzeth 2010). Standard errors are 
unconditional, meaning that they incorporate model selection uncertainty. 
Outcome is a 3-level categorical variable ‘P2 didn’t steal’ = player 2 did not steal; 
‘P2 stole no DI’ = player 2 stole but this did not result in disadvantageous 
inequality for P1; and ‘P2 stole DI’ = player 2 stole and this resulted in in 
disadvantageous inequality for P1. For outcome, P2 stole no DI' is the reference 
level.  
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Chapter 7  
Defectors, Not Descriptive Norm 
Violators, are Punished by Third-
Parties 
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7.1  Note  
This work has been published as Bone JE, Silva AE, Raihani NJ (2014) doi: 
10.1098/rsbl.2014.0388. Nichola Raihani contributed to experimental design and 
discussion. Antonio Silva contributed to discussion. I designed the experiment, 
collected the data, analysed the data and wrote the paper. 
7.2  Abstract 
Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour 
deviates from the descriptive norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be 
punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate 
explanation is that individuals simply dislike descriptive norm violators. However, 
an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical 
behaviour because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of 
individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party 
punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting 
was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to descriptive norm 
violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players 
punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to 
atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished 
more often than typical behaviour. In fact most punishment was targeted at 
defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest 
that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be 
explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to descriptive 
norm violators.  
7.3  Introduction 
Humans have a strong tendency to conform to norms of behaviour (Asch 1956; 
Cialdini et al. 1990; Schultz et al. 2007). In previous literature, the term ‘norm’ 
has been used in a rather broad way and thus the concept of norms is often split 
into two categories: injunctive norms and descriptive norms (Deutsch & Gerard 
1955; Cialdini et al. 1990). Injunctive norms, describe beliefs about how people 
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ought to behave in a given situation (Irwin & Simpson 2013). Descriptive norms 
on the other hand, describe what behaviour is typical or is what most people do in 
a given situation. Conformity to descriptive norms can be an adaptive response to 
uncertainty regarding the appropriate behaviour in a specific context: by 
observing how others behave in that setting, individuals might be better able to 
infer what behaviour is successful (Claidière & Whiten 2012) and what is likely to 
be approved or disapproved by others (Cialdini et al. 1990).  
Compliance with norms has been argued to underpin the existence of large-scale 
cooperation in human societies (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004a). Specifically, humans 
are thought to conform to a social norm of conditional cooperation, which is 
enforced by punishment of those who violate the norm (Fischbacher et al. 2001). 
Thus, defectors should be less likely to be punished, or be punished less severely, 
when they are in the majority rather than the minority. Some evidence exists to 
support this idea. For example, third-party punishment of defectors in a Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game is more severe when the partner cooperates than when both 
players defect (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b). Similarly, individuals in public goods 
game are more likely to be punished the more their contribution deviates from the 
group average (Fehr & Gächter 2002; Irwin & Horne 2013). 
While these findings have been interpreted as evidence that punishment is 
motivated by a dislike of descriptive norm deviants, we suggest an important 
alternative explanation: individuals are more likely to punish atypical defectors 
because this is by definition cheaper than punishing defectors when defection is 
common. In most previous studies, this explanation for the punishment of atypical 
behaviour has not been ruled out because the costs of punishment increase with 
the number of individuals that are punished (e.g. Fehr & Gächter 2002; Irwin & 
Horne 2013). We used a public goods game (PGG) with third-party punishment 
and experimentally manipulated the number of cooperators and defectors to test 
whether punishment is aimed specifically at descriptive norm deviants or, more 
generally, at defectors, when there is no additional cost to punishing the majority. 
We also measured the third parties desire to exclude individuals from a 
subsequent PGG game as an indicator of social rejection. 
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7.4  Methods 
Data were collected in March 2014. We recruited 1050 subjects (664 males, 380 
females, 6 unspecified) for our experiment using the online labour market, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; www.mturk.com). Subjects were all based in 
the USA. We used a PGG to test whether punishment was motivated by the 
descriptive norm violation in this setting. Players were randomly allocated to the 
role of Player 1 - 4 (n = 840) or to the role of Player 5 (n = 210). Players 1 - 4 
played a PGG while Player 5 was an observer who could choose to punish any or 
all of the four PGG players after they made their contributions. After the game, all 
subjects were required to fill in a questionnaire to provide demographic 
information (Table 7.S2). 
In the PGG, Players 1 - 4 were allocated an investment token and informed that 
they could invest this in a 'public investment opportunity' or a 'private investment 
opportunity'. Public investments yielded $0.20 to the investor and $0.20 to each of 
the other players. Conversely, private investments yielded $0.30 to the investor 
and nothing to the other players. Thus, investing publicly was equivalent to 
cooperating while investing privately was equivalent to defecting, or free-riding, 
in standard PGGs. Players 1 - 4 were assigned to groups ex-post (Horton et al. 
2011) to create two conditions: the 'typical defector' condition (3 defectors, 1 
cooperator) and the 'atypical defector' condition (3 cooperators, 1 defector). 
Player 5 observed the decisions of Players 1 - 4, either in the typical defector 
condition (n = 102) or the atypical defector condition (n = 108). Player 5 was 
allocated $1.05 and could choose whether to pay a fixed cost ($0.05) to reduce the 
earnings of any of the other players by $0.15. Player 5 could punish one, two, 
three or all four of the PGG players for the same fixed cost of $0.05; thus, the 
increasing costs associated with punishing more than one player were removed in 
this game.  
Subsequent to the punishment decision, Player 5 rated each PGG player on a 
seven point scale as to how much they would like to play a subsequent investment 
game with that player (similar to Irwin & Horne 2013; Parks & Stone 2010). This 
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answer provided a measure of social rejection. The majority of ratings were either 
one or seven (proportion = 0.68 ± 0.2) so we re-categorised ratings into a binary 
variable for analysis. Ratings less than four were set as 1 (indicating desire to 
avoid the player in question) and ratings of four or more were set as 0 (indicating 
indifference, or preference for the player in question).  
Data were analysed using R version 3.02 (R Development Core Team 2011). 
Using two Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMMs), we measured the 
probability that a player would be (i) punished and (ii) socially rejected by Player 
5 according to how they behaved (cooperator / defector) and whether or not the 
behaviour violated the descriptive norm in that setting. We additionally controlled 
for the effects of age and gender on Player 5's propensity to punish. We employed 
a multi-model inference approach (Grueber et al. 2011). Input variables were 
standardized (Gelman 2008). We estimated the importance and model-averaged 
coefficients of parameters using a set of models with the highest support (within 
2AICc units of the top model; Burnham & Anderson 2004). We only present the 
parameter estimates from the top models (see General methods for further details). 
7.5  Results 
In general, typical and atypical behaviours were equally likely to be punished 
(proportion of typical behaviour punished = 0.17 ± 0.02; versus atypical = 0.22 ± 
0.04; Table 7.1). In addition, defectors were just as likely to be punished whether 
their behaviour was typical (0.36 ± 0.03) or atypical (0.36 ± 0.05; Table 7.1; 
Figure 7.1). Similarly, cooperators were rarely punished, regardless of whether 
their behaviour was typical (0.02 ± 0.01) or atypical (0.01 ± 0.01; Table 7.1; 
Figure 7.1). Cooperators were never singled out for costly punishment and only 
faced punishment when all members of their group were also punished (on 3 
occasions). Furthermore, when Player 5 invested to punish defectors, they always 
punished all defectors in the group rather than singling one individual out for 
punishment. Punishment was linked to gender, with male players being more 
likely to punish than females (proportion of individuals that were punished by 
males = 0.22 ± 0.02; versus females = 0.12 ± 0.02; Table 7.1).  
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The results for social rejection mirrored the punishment investment decisions 
above: cooperative individuals were preferred as partners over defectors for a 
hypothetical subsequent PGG, regardless of whether cooperative behaviour was 
typical or atypical (proportion defectors rejected typical = 0.84 ± 0.03; atypical = 
0.80 ± 0.05).  Although, players appear to reject atypical cooperators slightly more 
often than typical cooperators, the confidence intervals for the interaction term 
just crossed zero, meaning that the evidence for this effect is weak (cooperators 
rejected typical = 0.3 ± 0.01; atypical = 0.5 ± 0.02; Table 7.2; Figure 7.S1).  
 
Parameter Estimate Unconditional SE Confidence 
Interval 
Relative 
Importance 
Intercept -4.35 0.56 (-5.45, -3.25)   
PGG decision 
(cooperate / defect) 
5.98 1.02 (3.96, 8.00) 1.00 
Player 5 gender 
(female / male) 
2.19 0.49 (1.22, 3.16) 1.00 
Player 5 age -0.25 0.42 (-1.08, -0.59) 0.30 
 
Table 7.1  Estimates, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models explaining whether 
PGG players were punished by Player 5.  
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Parameter Estimate Unconditional 
SE 
Confidence 
Interval 
Relative 
Importance 
Intercept -1.31 0.49 (-2.27, -0.34)   
PGG decision 
(cooperate / 
defect) 
9.45 0.99 (7.51, 11.39) 1 
Violated the 
descriptive norm 
(no / yes) 
0.56 0.81 (-1.02, 2.14) 0.8 
Violated the 
descriptive norm 
x PGG decision  
-2.21 1.59 (-5.32, 0.90)  0.8 
Player 5 gender 
(female / male) 
0.74 0.56 (-0.36, 1.82) 0.62 
Table 7.2 Estimates, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals and 
relative importance for parameters included in the top models explaining whether 
PGG players were socially rejected by Player 5.  
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Figure 7.1 The proportion of PGG players who were punished by Player 5, 
according to their PGG decision and whether this violated the descriptive norm. 
Sample sizes for each condition are indicated in parentheses. Error bars show 
standard errors. 
7.6  Discussion 
Previous studies have suggested that punishment might be proximately driven by 
the desire to harm individuals that violate descriptive norms. However, these 
studies have typically not controlled for the possibility that paying to harm 
descriptive norm violators is less costly than paying to harm conformers, because 
the costs of punishing typically scale with the number of individuals that are 
punished (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b; Horne 2009; Irwin & Horne 2013). Here, 
we removed this scaling effect of punishment by allowing individuals to pay a 
fixed cost to punish any or all of the PGG players. Under these conditions, 
individuals directed almost all punishment towards defectors regardless of 
whether defecting was the descriptive norm. These results contradict the 
prediction that defectors are less likely to be punished when they are typical  (Fehr 
& Fischbacher 2004b) and suggest that defectors are probably viewed negatively 
regardless of their prevalence in the population. In other studies, rare defectors 
may receive more punishment than common defectors because this is less costly 
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to the punisher. It is possible that defectors were punished regardless of their 
prevalence because individuals did not make punishment decisions based on the 
events in the game but instead on a pre-existing perception of defection as a 
descriptive norm violation formed from their experience in the ‘real world’.  
However, previous studies in the same cultural group (US-based subjects) have 
shown that individuals’ behaviour is sensitive to similar descriptive norm 
manipulations that occur within the confines of the game setting (Irwin & Horne 
2013; Parks & Stone 2010). 
We found very little evidence for antisocial punishment in this setting, even when 
cooperators were in the minority. This contradicts previous findings, which have 
shown that excessively generous individuals are singled out for punishment, even 
though their behaviour ostensibly benefits the individuals who punish them (Irwin 
& Horne 2013). The rarity of antisocial punishment in our current study may be 
because many of the motives proposed to underpin antisocial punishment were 
absent in our setting. Most previous studies of antisocial punishment have shown 
that it comes from individuals within the group, rather than third-parties, 
suggesting that antisocial punishment reflects competition for status within groups 
(Sylwester et al. 2013). For example, antisocial punishment might occur in 
retaliation for punishment received (or expected to be received) from cooperators 
(Sylwester et al. 2013; Herrmann et al. 2008). Alternatively, since individuals are 
often chosen as partners based on their cooperativeness relative to others (Roberts 
1998; Barclay & Willer 2007; Sylwester & Roberts 2010), defectors might punish 
cooperators because cooperators ‘raise the bar’, making defectors look bad in 
comparison (Herrmann et al. 2008; Minson & Monin 2012). In the absence of 
these motives, we found no evidence to suggest that descriptive norm deviants 
were more likely to be punished by third-parties. Our measures of social rejection, 
however, did hint that atypical cooperators were slightly less likely to be preferred 
for subsequent hypothetical interactions, when Player 5 would then be in the 
group with this individual. This tendency, although weak, supports previous work 
showing that excessively helpful, cooperative or moralistic individuals might be 
viewed negatively rather than positively by others in their social group (Monin et 
al. 2008; Parks & Stone 2010; Irwin & Horne 2013; Raihani 2014). 
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To summarize, third-party punishers targeted defectors, rather than descriptive 
norm violators in this setting. We suggest that decreased punishment of defectors 
when common might reflect the increased cost of punishing. Although, atypical 
cooperators were infrequently punished in this setting, they were slightly less 
preferred for subsequent interactions. Thus, the lack of antisocial third-party 
punishment in our setting might reflect the fact that punishers were not in 
competition for status with cooperators (Sylwester et al. 2013). Punishment of 
cooperative descriptive norm violators might be more common from fellow group 
members, rather than third-parties.  
7.7  Supplementary materials 
7.7.1 Supplementary methods 
All subjects were paid a show-up fee of $0.30 on top of a bonus based on their 
payoff in the game. All Players (1 – 5) were required to answer nine 
comprehension questions. Players were required to answer all comprehension 
questions correctly to take part in the game.  
Player 5's initial endowment was chosen so as to exceed the largest possible 
payoff of any of the PGG players to rule out disadvantageous inequality aversion 
as a motive for punishing defectors (e.g. Johnson et al. 2009; Raihani & 
McAuliffe 2012). 
At the end of the experiment players were asked on a seven point scale (1 = not at 
all, to 7 = very much) how confident they were that the other players in their 
group were real people. It is important that players were confident that they were 
playing real people because punishment decisions have been shown to be different 
when people play human players compared to computer players (Sanfey et al. 
2003). We repeated all analyses excluding players that gave an answer of less than 
four (proportion answering < 4 = 0.46 ± 0.02) to the question above but found that 
this did not change the key findings of the study. Although the proportion of 
players that gave an answer of less than four was relatively high, it is likely that 
by asking this question we increased their suspicion that they weren’t really 
playing real people. 
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All GLMMs produced had a binomial error distribution and logit link and were 
fitted using the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2011). GLMMs allow repeated 
measures to be fitted as random terms, thus controlling for their effects on the 
distribution of the data. We ran two models with our data. In model (i), we asked 
whether each of the Players 1 - 4 (n = 840) was punished by Player 5. The 
response term was set as '1' if the player was punished and '0' if the player was not 
punished. In model (ii), we asked whether the player was socially rejected by 
Player 5. Again, the response term was set as '1' if a player was rejected 
(preference score of < 4) and '0' if a player was not rejected (preference score of > 
4). For both analyses, we included the following explanatory variables in the 
model: 'PGG decision' (cooperate / free-ride), ‘violated the descriptive norm’ (no / 
yes) and the two-way interaction between these variables. We also controlled for 
players' age and gender (male / female). For each model, 'Player 5 ID' was 
included as the random term.  
7.7.2 Matching of subjects 
As described in the General Methods section, because we did not know how many 
players would defect and how many would cooperate, it was not always possible 
to uniquely match players.  In order to make up 104 groups which contained 3 
defectors and 1 cooperator and 102 groups which contained 3 cooperators and 1 
defector (as were presented to Player 5s), we would have required 426 defectors 
and 414 cooperators. In fact, 311 player 1 – 4s defected and 529 player 1 – 4s 
cooperated. This meant that 115 cooperting player 1 – 4s (11 % of subjects) had to 
be matched with 2 different Player 5s. 
7.7.3 Supplementary results 
An equal proportion of Player 5s invested in costly punishment in both the typical 
defector (0.36 ± 0.05) and the atypical defector treatment (0.36 ± 0.05). In both 
treatments, costly punishment was focussed on defectors rather than cooperators. 
Thus, antisocial punishment was uncommon in this setting (proportion of 
defectors punished = ± 0.36 ± 0.02; proportion cooperators punished = 0.02 ± 
0.01). 
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Treatment Player PGG decision  Payoff  
Descriptive 
Norm 
violated 
Atypical defector Player 1 Cooperate $0.60 No 
 Player 2 Cooperate $0.60 No 
 Player 3 Cooperate $0.60 No 
 Player 4 Defect $0.90 Yes 
 Player 5 NA $1.05 NA 
Atypical cooperator Player 1 Defect $0.50 No 
 Player 2 Defect $0.50 No 
 Player 3 Defect $0.50 No 
 Player 4 Cooperate $0.20 Yes 
 Player 5 NA $1.05 NA 
Table 7.S1 The public goods game (PGG) decision, payoff received and whether 
or not this PG game decision violated the descriptive norm for Players 1 – 5 in the 
atypical cooperator and atypical defector treatment.  
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Parameter Players 1 - 4 Player 5 
Age Mean = 29.36 ± 0.3 Mean = 30.14 ± 0.67 
Median = 27 Median = 27.5 
IQR = 24 – 33 IQR = 23 – 33.25 
Range = 18 - 66 Range = 18 -68 
Prefer not to disclose = 6 Prefer not to disclose = 2 
 
Education level 
(n) 
 
Some High School = 8 
 
Some High School = 1 
High School Graduate = 76 High School Graduate = 14 
Some College, no degree = 
282 
Some College, no degree = 
64 
Associates Degree = 64 Associates Degree = 20 
Bachelor’s Degree = 322 Bachelor’s Degree = 79 
Graduate Degree = 82 Graduate Degree = 32 
Prefer not to disclose = 6 Prefer not to disclose = 0 
 
Gender  (n) 
 
Females = 313 
 
Females = 67 
Males = 521 Males = 143 
Prefer not to disclose = 6 Prefer not to disclose = 0 
 
Annual income 
(n) 
 
Less than $12,500 = 79 
 
Less than $12,500 = 20 
$12,500 - $24,999 = 105 $12,500 - $24,999 = 37 
$25,000 - $37,499 = 142 $25,000 - $37,499 = 24 
$37,500 - $49,999 = 101 $37,500 - $49,999 = 33 
$50,000 - $62,499 = 101 $50,000 - $62,499 = 30 
$62,500 - $74,999 = 88 $62,500 - $74,999 = 15 
$75,000 - $87,499 = 42 $75,000 - $87,499 = 6 
$87,500 - $99,999 = 39 $87,500 - $99,999 = 16 
$100,00 or more = 86 $100,00 or more = 21 
Prefer not to disclose = 57 Prefer not to disclose = 8 
Table 7.S2 Information on mean and median values (where appropriate) and 
sample sizes for demographic information for Players 1 – 4 and Player 5.  
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Figure 7.S1 The proportion of PGG players who were socially rejected by Player 
5, according to their PGG decision and whether this violated the descriptive norm. 
Sample sizes for each condition are indicated in parentheses. Error bars show 
standard errors. 
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
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8.1 Overview 
Cooperative behaviour often involves individuals making a short-term investment 
(Bshary & Bergmüller 2008). The question of how this investment is repaid in 
terms of lifetime fitness has captured the attention of researchers across a wide-
range of disciplines including evolutionary biology, economics and psychology. A 
plethora of mechanisms have been enlisted as possible solutions to this problem. 
One such mechanism is punishment (Gardner & West 2004a; Henrich & Boyd 
2001; Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Gächter et al. 2008). Despite the attention that punishment has received, many 
questions remain unanswered regarding when punishment is most effective at 
promoting cooperation and what proximate motivations underpin punishment 
decisions. In this thesis, I investigated a number of these unanswered questions 
using experimental economic games.  
8.2 When does punishment promote cooperation? 
Recent work has suggested that punishment use is detrimental because it induces 
retaliation rather than cooperation (Dreber et al. 2008; Janssen & Bushman 2008; 
Nikiforakis 2008). However, previous studies have typically made the unrealistic 
assumption that players are equal in terms of the power with which they can 
punish (e.g. Dreber et al. 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Fehr & Gächter 2002). I 
investigated the effect of power asymmetries on cooperation and punishment in an 
iterated prisoner dilemma (IPD) game, both where cooperation was binary 
(Chapter 3) and where cooperation investment was variable (Chapter 4).  
Based on previous work in animal models (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; 
Axelrod 1984; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2010; Bshary et al. 
2008; Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012), I predicted that power 
asymmetries may stabilize cooperation in humans by making punishment from 
strong players (i) more effective at eliciting cooperation from defecting partners 
and (ii) cheaper, by reducing the costs associated with targets retaliating. 
However, my findings did not support these predictions. In both the binary 
investment IPD game and the variable investment IPD game, punishment from 
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strong players did not elicit cooperation from previously defecting weak partners 
in either symmetric or asymmetric games. In addition, weak players readily 
retaliated against strong partners, in both the binary investment IPD game 
(Chapter 3) and in the variable investment IPD game (Chapter 4). These findings 
indicate that power asymmetries did not stabilize punishment in the IPD games I 
studied.  
These findings seem to contradict the findings from empirical work on non-
human animals. For example, in the cleaner fish system, female fish never punish 
or retaliate against males (the larger sex) and females that are punished by a male 
behave more cooperatively in future interactions with that male (Raihani et al. 
2010; Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012). I propose that the difference between the 
findings of these human experiments and the cleaner fish studies may be 
associated with the acceptance of the dominant individual's authority. In my 
experiments (Chapter 3 & 4), the allocation of players’ roles (weak or strong) was 
random. For this reason players may not have accepted the authority of strong 
players in asymmetric games. For example, a recent study demonstrated that 
punishment is likely to be more effective at promoting cooperation when 
centralized authorities have been legitimately elected; rather than chosen at 
random (Baldassarri & Grossman 2011).This situation resembles most 
industrialised democratic societies where punishment is largely handed over to a 
legal authority overseen by an elected government (Baldassarri & Grossman 2011; 
Kümmerli 2011; Rustagi et al. 2010).  
When punishment is not centralized, punishment might only occur if a critical 
mass of peers agree to participate in the punishing the cheat (Mathew & Boyd 
2011). For example, the Turkana, a pastoral society in East Africa, sustain costly 
cooperation in combat by the collective punishment of cowards or deserters. 
Importantly, punishment only occurs if a critical mass of peers assemble to punish 
the cheat (Mathew & Boyd 2011). In addition, laboratory studies have 
demonstrated that players prefer to pay a tax for the punishment of cheats to be 
performed on the behalf of the group, rather than conduct punishment themselves 
(Traulsen et al. 2012). Punishment may be more likely to elicit cooperation rather 
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than retaliation when it is supported by the consensus, either because it is 
conducted by an elected central authority (Baldassarri & Grossman 2011) or is 
coordinated by members of the group ‘voting with their feet’ (Mathew & Boyd 
2011; Traulsen et al. 2012). Future work should explore whether power 
asymmetries allow punishment to promote cooperation when individuals are 
elected to the dominant role based on their behaviour in a preliminary task. In 
addition, real life power asymmetries may often resemble the relationship 
between a centralised authority or a group of individuals agreeing to punish and a 
lone cheat, rather than between one strong and one weak individual. Therefore, 
the importance of power asymmetries on eliciting cooperation in these situations 
deserves further consideration. It is possible that the acceptance of authority is 
also culturally dependent. Hofstede (1984) characterized world cultures by 
various dimensions, one of which - ‘power distance’ - describes the strength of 
social hierarchy. Individuals in a society that exhibits a high power distance are 
expected to accept hierarchies in which everyone has a place without the need for 
justification. However, individuals in societies with low power distance are 
expected to seek an equal distribution of power (Hofstede 1984). According to 
power distance values taken from The Hofstede Centre website (www.geert-
hofstede.com), the power distance in the UK,  where my IPD experiments took 
place,  is relatively low (power distance = 35) in comparison to the average power 
distance across all countries for which data is available (average power distance = 
59). It is possible that we would have seen a greater effect of power asymmetries 
had my experiments taken place in a country with a higher power distance 
because players may have more readily accepted the strong player’s dominant 
position. Future work, should explore how cultural differences affect the 
acceptance of punishment from dominant individuals. 
In Chapter 3 & 4, being punished (even by a strong player) meant losing a 
relatively small amount of money. I suggest that this may explain why punishment 
was ineffective at promoting cooperation in these experiments but in cleaner fish, 
where punishment was more costly  or even potentially fatal, punishment does 
promote cooperation from targets (Raihani et al. 2010). I suggest that the 
relatively small cost associated with being punished may also explain why in 
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these human experiments weak players punished and retaliated against strong 
partners in but in the cleaner fish system, female fish never punish or retaliate 
against larger, dominant males (Bshary et al. 2008; Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani, 
Grutter, et al. 2012). On the other hand, anthropologic studies of real-life suggest 
that most punishment comes in the form of ridicule, gossip and verbal reproach 
(Boehm 1993), all of which carry a relatively low cost to the target. I therefore 
suggest that future work should explore the effect of power asymmetries on 
cooperation and punishment with a range of fee-to-fine ratios, both higher and 
lower than those tested in Chapter 3 & 4. 
Several studies have demonstrated that subtle manipulations in the context given 
in laboratory game instructions can have drastic effects on subjects’ behaviour 
(Kagel & Roth 1995; Hertwig & Ortmann 2001; Bohnet & Cooter 2003). For example, 
defection rates  have been shown to vary depending on whether a  prisoners dilemma 
game is described to subjects as a “Community” or a “Wall Street” game (Ross & Ward 
1996) and punishment rates vary depending on whether subjects are given the option to 
“punish” or to “assign” points” to other players (Gintis 2001).  In order to avoid such 
framing effects, neutrally worded instructions have become a mainstream practice in 
behavioural experiments. I suggest that the use of neutral language in Chapters 3 and 4 
may explain why weak and strong players did not behave as expected. For example, 
although players were aware of the different payoff consequences of actions performed 
by the two player types, weak and strong players were referred to as ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 
2’ respectively. The use of these neutral labels (‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’) may have not been 
salient enough to translate into dominant and subordinate social roles in players’ minds. 
Future work should explore how players behave in similar experiments when they are 
explicitly told that they are playing the role of a subordinate or dominant individual. 
Increasing the saliency of the roles allocated to players may also be achieved by setting 
experimental games within a context in which people are already familiar with the 
different roles; for example the game could be framed as a ‘workplace game’ and players 
allocated the role of ‘junior’ or ‘senior’ workers (Nikiforakis et al. 2014). Moreover, 
experimental games could be performed in the presence of real life power asymmetries, 
for example between real life bosses and employees. Such an experiment would 
particularly interesting as studies have suggested that subjects bring context learned in 
everyday life into the lab (Levitt & List 2007).  
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Previous studies have suggested that the more efficient punishment is (i.e. the 
cheaper punishment is for the punisher, relative to the amount the target’s payoff 
is reduced by), the more effective it is at promoting cooperation (Nikiforakis & 
Normann 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008; Falk et al. 2005; Vukov et al. 2013). My 
results supported these previous findings to some extent. Although, incurring 
punishment did not increase players’ cooperation in the next round in either the 
binary investment IPD (Chapter 3) or the variable investment IPD experiment 
(Chapter 4), players were more cooperative in general when paired with a strong 
partner than a weak partner. This indicates that the mere threat of punishment (but 
not the use of punishment) from a strong player may have more effectively 
deterred cheating than the threat of punishment from a weak partner (i.e. more 
efficient punishment was a more effective threat). If the mere threat of punishment 
is sufficient to deter cheats, the costs associated with punishment will be lower 
because punishment will rarely need to be executed (Cant 2011). However, it is 
likely that the threat of punishment will quickly lose its power as a deterrent if it is 
not backed up with actual punishment in response to cheating. In fact, since the 
use of punishment may increase the target’s sensitivity to the threat of future 
punishment (Ellis 2012), by only investigating the target’s cooperation directly 
after punishment I may have missed some of the longer term deterrent effects 
associated with incurring punishment. For example, although I did not find a 
positive effect of punishment in the round directly after targets were punished 
(potentially because some players responded by defecting in retaliation), 
punishment may have had a deterrent effect for several subsequent rounds and 
potentially the rest of the game. Unfortunately, I was unable to test this hypothesis 
with the current set-up because analysing players’ decisions in the rounds 
following punishment would have created an unmanageable number of 
confounding factors. This hypothesis could be tested in future experiments by 
incorporating a stooge player into the game that is constrained to play a ﬁlay 
strategy or by hiding punishment decisions such that cheats are not informed 
whether or not they were punished by their peers until all rounds of the game have 
been completed (Vyrastekova et al. 2008; Fudenberg & Pathak 
2010).Nevertheless, some of my other findings were less supportive of the idea 
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that more efficient punishment is more effective at promoting cooperation.  In the 
binary investment IPD game (Chapter 3), strong players were actually more likely 
to defect (rather than cooperate) after being punished by strong partners and both 
player types were more likely to retaliate after being punished by strong partners. 
I propose that the detrimental effect of punishment from strong players may be 
related to the inferences made by targets regarding the punisher’s motives. Fehr & 
Rockenbach (2003) argued that punishment may be perceived as being morally 
illegitimate if it is associated with selfish or greedy (rather than altruistic) 
intentions. It is possible that punishment that improves the punisher's payoffs 
relative to those of the target (as punishment from strong players did in my 
experiments), may be interpreted as a competitive act and therefore perceived as 
morally illegitimate (Xiao 2013; Fehr & Rockenbach 2003; Raihani & Bshary 
2015). Previous studies have proposed that punishment which is perceived to be 
morally illegitimate is unlikely to promote cooperation from targets (Xiao 2013; 
Fehr & Rockenbach 2003). A logical extension of this prediction might be that 
morally illegitimate punishment makes targets more likely to defect and to 
retaliate; as observed when strong players punished strong partners in the binary 
investment IPD experiment (Chapter 3).  Future work could explore the moral 
assessment of punishment in different circumstances by collecting data on both 
players’ behavioural responses as well as their subjective evaluations of 
punishment and the reasons why they decided to retaliate. 
The fact that punishment did not promote cooperation from targets in either IPD 
experiment (Chapters 3 & 4), supports previous work which has suggested that in 
a two-player setting, conditional cooperation may sustain cooperation more 
effectively than punishment (Rand et al. 2009). Further support for this finding 
comes from the finding that in the binary IPD game, defecting players were more 
likely to switch to cooperate if their partner cooperated in the previous round. 
Moreover, in the variable investment IPD, players that chose a lower cooperation 
level than their partner were more likely to increase their cooperation in the 
following round than to decrease or choose same cooperation level again. This 
finding is indicative of the existence of ‘give-as-good-as-you-get’ strategies 
(Roberts & Sherratt 1998). Nevertheless, conditional cooperation may be less 
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effective in multi-player games because defecting in response to the defection of a 
group member will also harm the cooperative members of the group (Raihani, 
Thornton, et al. 2012). This suggests that whilst punishment did not promote 
cooperation in these two-player games, punishment from strong players may be 
more effective in a multi-player game (e.g. Przepiorka & Diekmann 2013). 
Indeed, many real-life social dilemmas, such as climate change or overfishing, 
more closely resemble multiplayer than two-player games (Raihani & Hart 2010). 
Future work should explore how power asymmetries effect punishment and 
cooperation in multiplayer games. Although, Nikforakis et al. (2010), 
incorporated power asymmetries into a multiplayer game, they did not test 
whether the effectiveness of punishment use was affected by power asymmetries.  
A possible limitation to the IPD experiments reported in Chapters 3 & 4 is that 
there was not a treatment in which punishment was not possible. The inclusion of 
this control treatment would have allowed me to investigate how the availability 
of punishment affected cooperation levels in the games used. For example, even 
though punishment itself did not increase cooperation from targets in the next 
round, conditionally cooperative strategies may not have been so successful if not 
backed up by a threat of punishment. The possibility of punishment may have 
encouraged conditional cooperation by increasing players’ expectations that their 
partner would also cooperate. 
8.3 The proximate motivations underpinning punishment decision  
Recent work has suggested that both second-party and third-party punishment is 
motivated by negative emotions (Fehr & Gächter 2002; Sanfey et al. 2003; Xiao 
& Houser 2005; Grimm & Mengel 2011; Wang et al. 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher 
2004b; Jordan et al. 2014). However the source of these negative emotions is not 
well understood.   
 
 
8.3.1 A desire for revenge versus desire for equality 
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Previous work has suggested that the negative emotions underpinning second-
party punishment could arise from one of two (not mutually exclusive) sources 
(Raihani & McAuliffe 2012a): (i) a desire to inflict reciprocal harm on a cheating 
partner (also termed the desire for 'revenge'; McCullough et al. 2013) or (ii) a 
desire for equality (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b; Johnson et al. 2009). My 
findings from Chapter 5 suggested that punishment is motivated by both a desire 
for revenge and a desire for equality. Support for the idea that punishment is 
motivated by a desire for revenge comes from the findings that players punished 
stealing partners regardless of whether stealing created disadvantageous inequality 
for the punisher and players punished when punishing was unable to restore 
equality. However, players' tendency to punish increased if stealing resulted in 
disadvantageous inequality for the punisher and when possible, punishers most 
often tailored their investment in punishment to create equal outcomes, suggesting 
that players were also motivated by a desire for equality. 
Whilst my results in Chapter 5 suggested that punishment stems from both a 
desire for revenge and an aversion to inequality, previous work using a similar 
experimental set-up found that players only punished stealing partners when 
stealing resulted in disadvantageous inequality (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b), 
suggesting that punishment was motivated by egalitarian preferences and not a 
desire for revenge. My findings in Chapter 6 suggest the different demographic 
sampling of the two studies could explain different findings of these two studies 
(whilst I only recruited subjects from the US in Chapter 5, Raihani & McAuliffe 
2012b) recruited from both the US and India). I found that whilst for US-based 
subjects, the decision to punish was affected both by whether the partner stole and 
by whether the punisher experienced disadvantageous inequality, Indian subjects 
only punished stealing partners more than non-stealing partners when stealing 
resulted in disadvantageous inequality (as in Raihani & McAuliffe 2012b) 
It has been proposed by (Brosnan 2006; Brosnan 2011; but see Chen & Santos 
2006) that an aversion to inequality is most likely to evolve in species that 
regularly cooperate with non-kin. According to Brosnan (2011), the ability to 
detect and respond to inequality may be beneficial in the social domain because it 
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can encourage individuals to avoid unfair partners (see also Baumard et al. 2013). 
Following, Price et al. (2002), I propose that inequality aversion may also be of 
benefit in social contexts because it allows cooperators to recognise and therefore 
act to remove the fitness-differentials between cooperators and cheats using 
punishment. Previous studies profess to have demonstrated inequality aversion in 
several non-human primate species (e.g. Brosnan 2006; Brosnan et al. 2010; 
Neiworth et al. 2009), all of which are species that are known to cooperate with 
unrelated group members; however, such claims have not gone undisputed (e.g. 
Silberberg et al. 2009; Jensen et al. 2007; Bräuer et al. 2006). Nevertheless, since 
evidence for punishment in non-human species is weak (Jensen et al. 2007a; 
Jensen et al. 2007b; Raihani, Thornton, et al. 2012), these examples of inequality 
aversion do little to inform our understanding of the relationship between 
inequality aversion and punishment (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012a). Since cleaner 
fish regularly cooperate with and punish non-kin during joint inspections, they 
provide a valuable non-human model to study inequality aversion in the context of 
punishment (Raihani & McAuliffe 2012a). Using the cleaner fish system, Raihani, 
Pinto, et al. (2012) showed that male punishment of cheating females does not 
require the male to compare his own payoffs with the females. Instead, males 
appear to take a cognitive short-cut by punishing in response to the client's sudden 
departure, an indirect signal that the female cheated. Moreover, a follow up study 
showed that cleaner fish are insensitive to outcome inequity when performing an 
effortful task (providing tactile stimulation to a model client) in return for food 
rewards (Raihani, McAuliffe, et al. 2012).  This raises the question of why some 
species that cooperate with non-kin (i.e. humans and possibly primates) are 
apparently inequality averse whereas cleaner fish are not. One possible reason 
why humans are inequality averse whereas cleaner fish are not is that, cleaner 
fish’s cooperative interactions are mostly limited to joint inspections of clients; 
humans however, cooperate in a vast number of different and often unique 
situations. Therefore, while punishing in response to the clients departure may be 
sufficient to restore ‘fair’ outcomes for cleaner fish (Raihani, Pinto, et al. 2012), 
humans may require a more versatile psychological mechanism (i.e. inequality 
aversion) to consistently arrive at fair payoff distributions. 
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Punishment might be perceived to be ‘unfair’ (and therefore less effective) if it 
increased the punishers payoff relative to the targets. Since cleaner fish do not 
appear to have fairness preferences per se (Raihani, McAuliffe, et al. 2012), how 
females respond to being punished by a male is not likely to be affected by how 
‘fair’ she perceives the male to be. Although speculative, this may explain why 
female cleaner fish respond to punishment from male fish with increased 
cooperation (Bshary et al. 2008; Raihani et al. 2010; Raihani, Grutter, et al. 2012), 
whereas punishment from strong partners in my human experiments provoked 
retaliation from targets (Chapter 3 & 4). 
I believe that the main limitation of Chapter 5 & 6 was that with the experimental 
set-up used, I was unable to test if punishment use was affected by whether or not 
outcome inequality was a result of the intentional actions of the target. Although, 
previous studies have shown that individuals will punish in response to unequal 
outcomes created at random or unintentionally (Cushman et al. 2009; Dawes et al. 
2007; Falk et al. 2008; Houser & Xiao 2010; Kagel et al. 1996; Yu et al. 2014), 
this previous work did could not test whether players tailored their punishment 
investment to create equal outcomes under these circumstances. Future work 
should explore this possibility. 
8.3.2 Dislike of descriptive norm deviants 
Previous studies have suggested that third-party punishment is motivated by the 
violation of broadly recognized group norms (i.e. descriptive norms), rather than 
simply by a personal aversion to cheats or disadvantageous inequality (e.g. Fehr & 
Fischbacher 2004; Carpenter & Matthews 2012). For example, Irwin & Horne 
(2013) showed that individuals punished descriptive norm violators in a public 
goods game regardless of whether the target's behaviour was beneficial or 
detrimental to the group. It is possible that descriptive norm deviants are targeted 
for punishment because punishing the 'odd one out' is the cheapest strategy when 
the cost of punishing increases with the number of targets. However, I found that 
when the costs associated with punishment did not increase according to the 
number of players punished, defectors were equally likely to be punished when 
defection was common as when defection was rare (Chapter 7).  This finding 
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suggests that in other studies, rare defectors may receive more punishment than 
common defectors because this is less costly to the punisher. Nevertheless, there is 
an important distinction between my study (Chapter 7) and that of Irwin & Horne 
(2013) which might also explain why I found that defectors were punished, 
irrespective of whether they were rare or common. In my study, the punisher was 
a third-party and therefore not part of the initial public goods game. By contrast, 
in the Irwin & Horne study (2013) punishers were part of the same group as their 
targets. Thus, in the Irwin & Horne (2013) study, defectors may have punished 
rare cooperators because cooperators ‘raised the bar’, making defectors look bad 
in comparison (e.g. as suggested by Herrmann et al. 2008; Minson & Monin 
2012). Data from donations made to online fundraising pages has shown that 
people are sensitive to how their donation compares to those made by other 
donors, and will opt for anonymity when making very generous donations 
(Raihani 2014). This finding also suggests that individuals expect to be evaluated 
negatively when their contribution has the possibility to make the contributions of 
others look stingy.   
8.3.3 Competitive motives and antisocial punishment 
In all of my experiments (Chapter 3-7) I observed some level of punishment 
aimed at cooperative or non-stealing individuals, commonly referred to as 
'antisocial punishment' (Herrmann et al. 2008; Ellingsen et al. 2012; Gächter & 
Herrmann 2009) or 'spite' (Abbink & Sadrieh 2009). Previous studies have 
suggested that antisocial punishment may be motivated by a desire to improve 
social status relative to others (Sylwester & Roberts 2013; Prediger et al. 2014; 
Bryson et al. 2014). My findings generally support this hypothesis. Firstly, 
previous work has suggested that the benefits of acquiring higher social status 
might be higher when the rule of law is weak and resources are scarce (for which 
GDP might provide a reasonable proxy; Sylwester et al. 2013; Prediger et al. 
2014; Bryson et al. 2014). I would therefore predict that if antisocial punishment 
is motivated by competition for status then subjects from countries with weaker 
rule of law and lower GDP would be more likely to invest in antisocial 
punishment. Consequently, I would expect there to be more antisocial punishment 
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from India-based subjects than US-based subjects because GDP is lower and rule 
of the law is weaker in India compared to the US. In Chapter 6, I showed that 
India-based subjects were more likely to invest in antisocial punishment than US-
based subjects. My findings therefore support this prediction. This is also 
consistent with another cross-cultural study which found that there was more 
antisocial punishment in societies with weak rule of law (Gächter et al. 2005). 
Second, if antisocial punishment is aimed at maximising relative payoffs I would 
expect that players would be more likely to invest in antisocial punishment if 
punishment improved the punisher's payoffs relative to those of the target 
(hereafter ‘efficient punishment’) than if punishment is equally costly to the 
punisher and the target (hereafter ‘inefficient punishment’). This prediction has 
been supported by previous studies (Falk et al. 2005; but see Egas & Riedl 2008) 
and my findings partly supported this prediction. In the IPD experiments reported 
in Chapters 3 & 4, players were more likely to punish cooperative partners if they 
had access to efficient punishment than if they only had access to inefficient 
punishment. Nevertheless, in the experiment reported in Chapter 5, antisocial 
punishment was equally common when punishment was efficient as when it was 
inefficient. It is possible that I did not observe more antisocial punishment from 
players with efficient (rather than inefficient) punishment in Chapter 5 because in 
this experiment, punishers interacting with non-stealing partners were already 
better off than the target in all but one treatment, where players’ payoffs were 
equal. However, it remains unclear why antisocial punishment was equally likely 
from efficient and inefficient punishers when players’ outcomes were equal.  
Nevertheless, alternative explanations for antisocial punishment exist. Previous 
studies have suggested that antisocial punishment might sometimes reflect 
retaliation by cheats who were punished by cooperative partners, or a pre-emptive 
strike against expected punishment in subsequent rounds (Cinyabuguma et al. 
2006; Nikiforakis & Normann 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008; Sylwester et al. 2013; 
Raihani & Bshary 2015). This idea is supported by data from Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 where players in IPD games were more likely to antisocially punish 
their partner if they were punished in the previous round. This however, cannot 
explain all the antisocial punishment in Chapter 3 and 4, some of which took 
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place even when the punisher was not punished in the previous round. In addition, 
retaliation cannot explain the antisocial punishment I observed in one-shot games 
(Chapter 5, 6, 7). Although my findings best support the hypothesis that antisocial 
punishment is motivated by a desire to improve relative social status, antisocial 
punishment may be underpin by several different motives. Further dedicated 
experimentation is required to disentangle the relative importance of these 
possible motivations. 
I used the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit 
subjects for the experiments reported in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. Online 
experimentation allows data to be collected internationally and enables data to be 
collected from a large number of individuals at a relatively low cost and within a 
relatively short amount of time. Nevertheless, the reliability of data collected via 
MTurk has been subject to debate. It has been argued that experimenters using 
MTurk relinquish a degree of control because they cannot be certain that subjects 
complete the task alone or if subjects are distracted by simultaneously performing 
other tasks (e.g. instant messaging or watching television; Bartneck, Duenser, 
Moltchanova, & Zawieska, 2015). However, in a survey of MTurk workers, most 
reported that they did complete tasks alone and were not engaged in other 
activities (Chandler et al. 2014). Nevertheless, in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, attention 
checks built in as comprehension questions were used to screen out subjects who 
either did not pay attention to or did not understand the task (Goodman, Cryder, & 
Cheema, 2013). Another common criticism of MTurk centres on the smaller 
stakes typically used in MTurk experiments in comparison to laboratory studies 
and the possibility that this may bias subjects behavior (Raihani, Mace, & Lamba, 
2013). However, since the effective hourly rates of MTurk subjects who took part 
in the experiments reported in this thesis (around $19 per hour) were comparable 
with those in laboratory studies, I do not believe that this is a major concern in 
this case. Previous work has demonstrated that the MTurk subject base has 
become increasingly experienced with common behavioural experiments over 
time and that behaviour in some tasks has been shown to vary with the experience 
of subjects (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). However, alternative studies have 
found no systematic differences in the behaviour of experienced versus naive 
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subjects (Raihani & Bshary, in review) and that subjects behaviour is remarkably 
consistent across different cooperation games conducted on MTurk as well as in 
self-reports of real-life measures of cooperative tendency (Peysakhovich, Nowak, 
& Rand, 2014). In addition, several behavioural experiments using MTurk have 
reliably replicated findings originally obtained in a  laboratory setting (Horton, 
Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Rand, 2012; Suri & Watts, 2011). Taken together, 
therefore, I believe that the results obtained using MTurk in Chapter 5, 6 and 7 
should be as reliable as those that could be obtained using laboratory methods. 
8.4 Future work 
A major limitation of the experiments reported in Chapter 5, 6 and 7 was the fact 
that the game only lasted one round, meaning that it was not actually possible for 
any deterrent function of punishment to be realised. It has been argued that since 
we evolved in a context where one-shot or anonymous interactions were rare 
(Delton et al. 2011), our evolved psychology is likely to invoke responses that are 
attuned to these conditions even one-shot lab settings (Ben-Ner & Putterman 
2000; Burnham & Johnson 2005; Cosmides & Tooby 1989; Delton et al. 2011; 
Hagen & Hammerstein 2006; Hoffman et al. 1998; Johnson et al. 2003; Tooby et 
al. 2006). However, other studies have demonstrated that when players are given  
the time to consider their decisions, they are more likely to respond in a way that 
maximizes their payoff in their current one-shot setting (Grimm & Mengel 2011; 
Smith & Silberberg 2010; Sutter et al. 2003; Rand et al. 2012; Rand et al. 2014). It 
is therefore possible that players may have behaved differently in these studies if 
the game was repeated for multiple rounds (Grimm & Mengel 2011; Smith & 
Silberberg 2010; Sutter et al. 2003) before making their punishment decision. 
Future work should explore this possibility by using similar experimental setups 
as reported in Chapter 5, 6 and 7 but allowing players to interact for several 
rounds. 
Furthermore, the experimental games reported in this thesis, allowed a very 
limited set of choices to players. For example, in the punishment stage of all the 
experiments, players could only choose between punishing or not punishing their 
partner. In reality however, there is likely to be the option to reward as well as to 
186 
 
punish partners. Although limiting the choices available to subjects simplified the 
analysis and interpretation of data produced from these experiments, providing a 
richer choice set could yield valuable insights. It is likely that dominant 
individuals will hold more resources and thus be able to grant larger rewards as 
well as inflict harsher punishment than subordinates. Thus, future work should 
explore the effect of asymmetries in players’ ability to reward, as well as punish, 
on cooperation. The experiments reported in Chapter 5 and 6 could also be 
extended by allowing P2 to reward as well as to steal from P1 and allowing P1 to 
reward as well as to punish P2. It would be interesting to explore whether P1s 
who experienced disadvantageous inequality after being rewarded by P2 still 
punished P2 to create equal outcomes. It would also be valuable to test whether 
P1s who experienced advantageous inequality would reward P2s to create equal 
outcomes. 
Along with the results from previous studies (Wu et al. 2009; Gächter et al. 2005; 
Balliet & Lange 2013; Herrmann et al. 2008; Henrich et al. 2006), the cross-
cultural variation in the motivations underpinning punishment found in Chapter 6, 
highlight the importance of studying behaviours in a more diverse demographic 
sample than the typical western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic 
(WEIRD; Henrich et al. 2010) samples used in the majority of behavioural 
experiments (Buhrmester et al. 2011). In addition, previous cross-cultural studies 
have typically sampled from one population per culture and have therefore 
confounded cultural and demographic differences (e.g. age structure and social 
network size) between populations (Lamba & Mace 2011). Future cross-cultural 
work should collect data from multiple different populations within each culture 
taking into account the demographics of sampled populations.  
Experimental games studying cooperation typically assume that players have to 
interact with a randomly allocated partner and they have no scope for partner 
choice. However, in reality individuals may have opportunities for interactions 
elsewhere ('outside options'; Cant 2011; Raihani et al. 2012), and so they may be 
able to choose at which point to end an interaction in order to interact with an 
alternative partner. Outside options can also influence the outcome of cooperative 
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interactions, since players are expected to choose the most cooperative of their 
prospective partners to interact with (Roberts 1998; Barclay & Willer 2007; Noë 
& Hammerstein 1995; McNamara et al. 2008; Sylwester & Roberts 2010; 
Sylwester & Roberts 2013). However, individuals may vary in their outside 
options, generating asymmetries between players: some players may have several 
prospective interaction partners to choose from while others have relatively few. It 
is expected that in cooperative interactions, individuals with more outside options 
will assess the behaviour of potential partners and choose to interact with the most 
cooperative individuals. On the other hand, those with fewer outside options may 
invest in their reputation by behaving cooperatively in order to attract choosy 
partners (Barclay & Willer 2007; McNamara et al. 2008; Roberts 1998; Noë & 
Hammerstein 1995). It is therefore expected that where there are asymmetries in 
outside options, players with fewer outside options will be more cooperative than 
those with many alternative partners to choose from.  
If punishment is an option it is likely that players with more outside options will 
only attempt to discipline a cheating partner up to a point before ending the 
interaction and choosing an alternative partner. Therefore, it is predicted that 
player’s with fewer outside options will be more receptive to punishment and will 
be less likely to retaliate against punishment from players with more outside 
options. It is possible that this will make punishment more effective at eliciting 
cooperation. Previous work on cleaner fish supports this idea. Whilst clients who 
are forced to repeatedly interact with the same cleaner fish (due to small home 
ranges) punish cheating cleaners with aggressive chasing (Bshary & Grutter 
2002), clients with access to several cleaners (due to large home ranges) rarely 
punish cheats and instead choose another cleaner fish (Bshary & Schäffer 2002).  
Whether players prefer to punish cheats or to choose alternative partners is also 
likely to depend upon the variation in cooperativeness in the population (Leimar 
& Hammerstein 2010; McNamara et al. 2008). For example, if there is low 
variation in cooperativeness in the population then punishment might be preferred 
over switching because alternative partners are unlikely to be an improvement on 
the current partner. On the other hand, when population variation is higher, 
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switching might be preferred over punishing. Varying the availability of 
information about the cooperativeness of potential partners may also affect 
player’s strategic decisions regarding punishment or partner switching. For 
example, when faced with a cheating partner, players may prefer to switch when 
they know that alternative partners are cooperative but may be more likely to 
punish if such information is not available. 
Future work could test whether (i) players with fewer outside options are more 
cooperative when interacting with players with more outside options (ii) if 
asymmetries in outside options improve the effectiveness of punishment at 
eliciting cooperation and (iii) how information on the cooperativeness of potential 
partners affects players decisions to punish their current partner or switch to an 
alternative partner. These questions could be explored by incorporating 
asymmetries in outside options into an IPD game by varying the cost associated 
with switching partners.  
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